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Part I
Introduction & Preliminaries

Chapter 1
Introduction
“When making a decision of minor importance, I have always found it advantageous to
consider all the pros and cons. In vital matters, however, such as the choice of a mate or a
profession, the decision should come from the unconscious, from somewhere within ourselves.
In the important decisions of personal life, we should be governed, I think, by the deep inner
needs of our nature.”
(Sigmund Freud)
T
HE role of affect in decision making under risk has come into focus during
the last decades. There are a lot of observed phenomena in subjects’ decision
behavior which might be explained by affective influence. Progress in technology
allows for new methods to test for the affective influence in decision making un-
der risk. However, economic literature still lacks a framework which structures the
decision making process such that it can be analyzed where, why and how in each
particular step of decision making, affect influences decision making and how these
explanations of a cognitive-affective interplay lead to a better understanding of de-
cision making under risk. Against this background, this thesis approaches the role
of affect in decision making under risk on the basis of the concepts and findings of
3
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economics, psychology and neuroscience.
1.1 Motivation and Research Questions
The question of how subjects make, and how they should make judgments and
decisions has occupied researchers for many centuries with different disciplines
approaching the problem with characteristically different techniques (Sanfey et al.
2006). Economic research, over nearly three centuries, has fundamentally advanced
our understanding of decision making under risk, yet in the middle of the last cen-
tury the debate about rational decision makers has started. In economics, decision
making under risk is usually modeled by a choice problem over a set of lotteries,
where a lottery is defined as a distribution of probabilities over a set of prospective
outcomes. Economic models assume that subjects have stable and well-defined pref-
erences and make rational choices according to these preferences. Decision making is
depicted as a matter of maximizing utility.1 Soon after the publication of the Expected
Utility Theory (EUT) by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), which is still seen as
one of the most important models of decision making under risk, several researchers
have proven that subjects hurt the EUT’s axioms when actually making a decision
under risk.2 Trying to find purely rational explanations for these so-called anomalies
in observed behavior fails. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have approached these
anomalies in their Prospect Theory (PT). They propose for example that subjects in
fact weight probabilities non-linearly, that they show different risk attitudes towards
gains and losses and that preferences may change due to a different framing. Thus,
they address some psychological issues, however they don’t specify these. Over the
last years the field of behavioral economics, which has already been the subject of
consideration within the "bounded rationality" by Simon (1955), has been replaced
in the focus of research. As Loewenstein et al. (2008) state, behavioral economics,
1cf. Kreps (1990)
2c.f. Allais (1953)
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amongst other questions of interest, considers the question of how utility depends on
the prospective outcome. Other than classical economic models, which assume that
the utility only depends on the prospective outcome itself, it is assumed that the util-
ity also depends on emotions such as anticipated regret or disappointment.3 Thaler
(2000) predicts that Homo Economicus, as he has been described by economics over
the last decades, will become more emotional, implying that economists will devote
more attention to the study of emotions. He goes even further and states that "Homo
Economicus will evolve into Homo Sapiens." (Thaler (2000), p. 140) Yet, we still lack
the knowledge how decisions under risk are actually made. This implies why re-
search in other disciplines comes into the focus of economic research on decision
making under risk. Psychologist Sigmund Freud already noticed, back in 1900, that
decisions to be made are different in their matters and thus are built upon different
deliberations. When making a decision we consider the prospective outcomes - but
very often we cannot tell for sure which prospective outcome is going to be realized.
It lies in the nature of choosing, that the desirable prospective outcome of the one
alternative goes along with the risk that the unwanted prospective outcome of the
other alternative could be realized. That is, within decision making under risk, a sub-
ject has to weight the pleasure of the desirable prospective outcomes against the pain of
the undesirable prospective outcomes in order to decide about the risk he is willing to
take. But what about prospective outcomes that he really wants to achieve? Doesn’t
he tend to ignore all the other possibilities that could be realized even if they are not
very unlikely? This leads to the idea that in fact affect guides human decision making
and that there might be a difference in making a decision by head or by heart.
Research on the role of affect in decision making under risk addresses very inter-
esting research questions which cannot be answered with standard economic theory.
First of all, it needs to be elucidated what affect exactly is, especially as the coun-
terpart of cognition, and how emotions, feelings and mood can be subsumed under
the name of affect. In psychology and neuroscience there is a long history of emotion
3cf. Loomes and Sugden (1982), Loomes and Sugden (1986), Bell (1982), Bell (1985)
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research, which reveals that for a long time, there was no consistent idea of what emo-
tions actually are and how to define them.4 Zajonc (1980) is a pioneer in discussing
the role of affect in decision making. He discusses the possibility that affect and cog-
nition are separate and partially independent systems and he argues that affective
reactions to stimuli are very often the very first reactions which occur unconscious
and fast. He states that all perceptions contain some affect.
"We do not just see ’a house’: We see a handsome house, an ugly house,
or a pretentious house." (Zajonc 1980, p. 154)
It is important to further investigate where cognitive appraisal enters as a significant
element of affective reactions. In the following years there has been plenty of research
on the cognitive-affective interplay.5 This research has been expanded by integrating
the finding that affective reactions are accompanied by physiological reactions which
are in fact measurable.6 Bechara and Damasio (2005) integrated this emotion research
and research from neuroscience to develop the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH).
Based on several lesion studies in the 1980’s they investigated the question of how
affective processing influences advantageous decision making. They subsume how
these findings are generally applicable in economic decision making. They argue that
"the development of what became known as the Expected Utility The-
ory was really based on the idea that people established their values for
wealth on the basis of the pain and pleasure that it would give them. So
utility was conceived as a balance of pleasure and pain. These notions of
pleasure and pain were eliminated from notions of utility in subsequent
economic models. The exclusion of current economic models of expected
utility to the role of emotion in human decisions is therefore inconsistent
with their foundations." (Bechara and Damasio 2005, p. 337)
4cf. Fehr and Russell (1984), Bechara and Damasio (2005)
5cf. Epstein (1994), Sloman (1996)
6cf. Ekman et al. (1983), Vianna et al. (2009), Rainville et al. (2006), for a review see Cacioppo et al.
(2000)
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RESEARCH QUESTION ≺1≻. What is affect? How can affect be understood as the coun-
terpart of cognition?
Second, as it might in fact be a promising approach to take a closer look at the dis-
ciplines psychology and neuroscience, it has to be discussed which models exist and
which concepts they provide to investigate the role of affect in decision making un-
der risk. Parallel and in wide parts totally independent from research in economics,
research in psychology as well as in neuroscience attend to the question of how hu-
man beings make decisions under risk. Psychological models consider the role of
emotions, feelings and mood in the cognitive-affective interplay in decision making
under risk whereas neuroscience provides the methods to gain insight in how the
brain works while making decisions. In recent years the new research field of neu-
roeconomics arose as it became more and more obvious that economics, psychology
and neuroscience can contribute to each other in order to develop a profound under-
standing of how subjects make decisions.
RESEARCH QUESTION ≺2≻. Which are the appropriate models of economics, psychology
and neuroscience with respect to further analysis of the cognitive-affective interplay in the
decision making process? Based on these models:
(a) Which are, from the economic perspective, the relevant components of decision making
under risk?
(b) Which are the underlying concepts within economics, psychology and neuroscience suit-
able to analyze the cognitive-affective interplay?
Third, based on the discussion of the models in economics, psychology and neu-
roscience and the underlying concepts in each discipline, the central question within
this thesis is how these disciplines can contribute to each other. Where does research
in psychology and neuroscience offer explanations and approaches to extend eco-
nomic literature? To answer this question a structure is needed which allows for a
7
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separate and thus systematic analysis of each economically relevant component of
decision making under risk from the perspective of each discipline. This analysis
makes it possible to specify those steps and elements which are processed affectively
and cognitively.
RESEARCH QUESTION ≺3≻. How can psychologic and neuroscientific research be inte-
grated into economic theory in order to evaluate a decision on the basis of a cognitive-affective
processing?
Forth, after disassembling the decision making process, the question is how these
results can be integrated into a framework to model human decision behavior under
risk such that it allows to interpret the cognitive-affective interplay.
RESEARCH QUESTION ≺4≻. How can affective decision making under risk be described
and analyzed in a formal decision making framework?
To answer these four central research questions, a strong interdisciplinary approach
is needed, integrating research from economics, psychology and neuroscience. Inte-
grating other disciplines might offer advances to the formulation of powerful eco-
nomic models yet there are several challenges and problems to deal with. However,
other than often claimed by traditional economists, integrating affect into a decision
under risk doesn’t always mean to give up the traditional approach of building mod-
els with utility maximizing subjects. Instead, this thesis provides an approach how to
include affect in such utility maximizing models.
1.2 The Interdisciplinary Approach
This thesis uses an interdisciplinary approach. The idea that the discoveries of eco-
nomics, psychology and neuroscience might contribute to each other in order to de-
velop a better understanding of decision making has emerged several years ago un-
8
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der the name of neuroeconomics. Yet, the challenge is to identify how this contribu-
tion could possibly work.
Neuroeconomics is defined as an interdisciplinary field that seeks to explain the
human decision making process. It studies how economic models and theories can
shape our understanding of the brain, and how neuroscientific and psychological
research can constrain and guide models of economics. It combines research methods
from neuroscience, experimental and behavioral economics and cognitive and social
psychology.7 Neuroeconomic research addresses various fields of research within
economics, such as social choice, intertemporal choice, game theory, auction theory
and decision making under risk and uncertainty.8 Yet, this thesis focuses on decision
making under risk. With this focus, Figure 1.1 is introduced and depicts the possible
contributions of psychology and neuroscience to approach affect in a formal decision
making framework to be developed within this thesis.
Economic decision theory provides formal models and theories. Here, it is gener-
ally assumed that a subject bases his decision on a set of well-defined preferences and
chooses in favor of the option with the highest expected utility. Hereby, affect is rather
not taken into account (yet there is the emerging idea that affect cannot be ignored any
longer). Psychology provides behavioral models and heuristics. It is suggested that
every decision in fact depends on the content and context of a decision situation, as
every different situation elicits different emotions which have an influence on the de-
cision to be made. There seems to be evidence that a decision is based on cognition as
well as affect and that each decision is processed within the interaction of a controlled,
cognitive system and an automatic, affective system.9 Neuroeconomic research ad-
dresses the question of how research on these behavioral models and heuristics can
be integrated into economic models.
7Refer to Camerer et al. (2004), Park and Zak (2007) or Camerer et al. (2005), who provide an
introduction into neuroeconomic research.
8cf. Camerer et al. (2004), Camerer et al. (2005), Rick and Loewenstein (2008)
9Refer to Section 2.1.2, where the idea that decision making might be processed by an experiential
system as well as by a cognitive system is shortly introduced. Chapter 4 discusses how the psycholog-
ical models deal with the cognitive-affective interplay within the decision making process.
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Neuroscience provides neural systems and ’brain maps’ as results of neuroscientific
research of how the human brain works. This might improve the basic understand-
ing of human decision making. As economic and psychological models are usually
stylized and simplified they imply a useful environment to test for the impact of spe-
cific variables with neuroscientific methods. Neuroscientific research is a valuable
factor in expanding the boundaries of economic models. It provides the methods and
knowledge to explain how a decision is processed in the brain.10 However, knowl-
edge about how the brain works is still in its infants. The method of ’inverse infer-
ence’ is used in neuroscience to draw conclusions from the activated brain regions
during a decision task.11 Thus, the more specific a decision task, the more concrete
conclusions about the activation of a brain region can be made. That is, neuroscience
doesn’t only provide methods and brain maps but also uses results from economic
and psychological research to expand knowledge about how the brain works.
There is a long history of experimental research within all three disciplines, yet
based on very different conventions and rules. Especially in economics, there is a
long tradition in correct experimenting in order to receive robust and replicable re-
sults. Thus, within neuroeconomic research it is necessary to integrate experimental
neuroscience and psychology into experimental economics within a unified charta of
conventions and rules to guarantee for robustness and replicability.
The goal of this thesis is to develop an Affective Decision Making Framework
(ADMF) which integrates psychological and neuroscientific research into economic
models of decision making under risk.
10Refer to Section 2.1.3, where the methodology of mapping the brain is shortly introduced. Chap-
ter 4 discusses how the neuroscientific models deal with the cognitive-affective interplay within the
decision making process.
11Refer to Section 2.1.3, where reverse inference is discussed.
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FIGURE 1.1: Decision Making under Risk as an Interdisciplinary Approach
1.3 Structure
The remainder is structured as follows. The thesis is composed of six chapters within
three main parts. Part I consists of Chapter 1, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 and serves as
a preliminary and introduction for Part II in which the ADMF is developed. Part III
concludes with a summary and a short outlook of future research.
The chapters of Part I deal with the Research Questions 1 and 2. Chapter 2 ad-
dresses the interdisciplinary approach of this thesis. It deals with the formulation of
possible interfaces between the disciplines economics, psychology and neuroscience.
Chapter 2 points to the different approaches within each discipline and specifies the
resulting challenges with respect to the interdisciplinary research in decision mak-
ing under risk. This gives rise to the point that, by considering the role of affect in
the sense of the Dual-Processing Theory, psychology and neuroscience can contribute
11
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to economic research in order to provide a better understanding of decision making
under risk.
Chapter 3 provides a broad and structuring literature overview of the existing (and
relevant within this thesis) models of decision making under risk in economics, psy-
chology and neuroscience. On the basis of these models Chapter 3 selects and spec-
ifies the relevant components of decision making under risk as well as the underly-
ing concepts which are appropriate to develop a formal framework. This discussion
within Chapter 3 motivates the following structure for the further development of
a formal framework. It should be analyzed separately how economics, psychology
and neuroscience deal with the evaluation of prospective outcomes, the probability
distribution and the subject’s risk attitude.
Part II consists of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Chapter 4 addresses Research Question
3. Thus, the focus of Chapter 4 is on the analysis of the three central components of
decision making under risk. The evaluation of the prospective outcomes, the prob-
ability distribution and the subject’s risk attitude are discussed within nine sections,
each from the perspective of economics, psychology and neuroscience. This analysis
enables the identification and specification of those interfaces, where research in psy-
chology and neuroscience can broaden economic models in their explanatory power.
The discussion within the last section of Chapter 4 serves as a structured consolida-
tion of the results in order to provide the basis for the formal approach developed in
Chapter 5.
Chapter 5 deals with Research Question 4 and thus introduces the developed
ADMF. The ADMF bases on the Dual-Processing-Theory. Thus, it is particularly
developed with respect to the analysis of the interplay between the affective and
cognitive evaluation of a decision under risk. First of all, Chapter 5 points to the
requirements of the ADMF, based on the results of Chapter 4. Second, the ADMF
is developed. Therefore, a comprehensive scheme of the decision making process is
introduced. The decision making process is composed of four phases, whereof the
first phase, the evaluation phase, is analyzed in detail in the following of Chapter
12
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5. It turns out that, even though every phase is comparably important, the evalua-
tion phase is most suitable to analyze the cognitive-affective interplay within decision
making under risk. Further, the elements of the evaluation phase are introduced in or-
der to develop a detailed processing scheme. This processing scheme is structured by
the following correlations: The representation of a lottery triggers different emotions
which change the subject’s affective state. The affective state influences the subjective
transformation of an objective lottery into a subjectively perceived lottery. Based on
the overall affective state, either the affective processing or the cognitive processing
of the computation of the lottery’s overall value is active. Subsequently, Chapter 5
transfers this scheme to economic decision making under risk. It is shown, that each
theory introduced in Chapter 3 can be integrated into the ADMF as a special case. The
discussion of the economic theories reveals, that the ADMF is most closely related to
the model of Reference Dependent Preferences by Köszegi and Rabin (2007), yet it
extends the understanding of this model as the ADMF first gives rise to the question
of how the specific properties of a utility function can be derived from the affectivity
of a decision situation and second, how can a subject’s content and context sensitivity,
that is the impact of the reference dependent component of utility, be derived from
the affectivity of a decision situation.
Part III concludes with Chapter 6 as a summary of this thesis. The chapter high-
lights the results in this thesis and the contributions to the existing literature, dis-
cusses the limitations and extensions of this thesis and concludes with some inten-
tions for future research on decision making under risk.
Figure 1.2 depicts the structure of this thesis.
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Chapter 2
History of Decision Making under
Risk: An Interdisciplinary Approach
T
HIS chapter addresses the interdisciplinary approach of this thesis. It is in-
tended as an introduction to the history of research and methodologies within
economics, psychology and neuroscience to highlight the differences in language, ap-
proach, implementation and implication. It discusses how these disciplines deal with
decision making within a very different background and using very different tech-
niques. It further discusses that, besides these differences however, in the recent past
it has become more and more obvious that research on these three disciplines can in
fact contribute to each other by approaching the role of affect.
2.1 History and Methodology of Decision Research
2.1.1 Economics
Economic research on decision making under risk has a long history within a rather
mathematical background. A decision under risk in the economic sense is a choice
between two or more lotteries with each lottery carrying uncertainty about the real-
15
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ization of the prospective outcomes.1 That is, choosing a lottery may result in either
one prospective outcome or another. The probabilities with which these prospective
outcomes may occur are known to the decider and may differ between the lotter-
ies. Surely, there exist plenty of situations in which these probabilities are not ex-
actly known, however, by considering decision making under risk economists only
take those situations into account in which the probabilities are known. It was Frank
Knight, who first introduced the differentiation between decisions under risk and
decisions under uncertainty in his Phd in 1921.2 Decisions under risk may also in-
clude situations in which only positive prospective outcomes are possible. That is,
a decision under risk as economic models consider, does not necessarily involve an
actual loss. The risk in such situations is, for example, to choose between a lottery
which may result in a high prospective outcome with a small probability and a lottery
which may result in a smaller prospective outcome with a high probability.3 Thus,
decision making under risk is closely related to probability theory. The idea of a the-
ory of probabilities comes from the history of gambling and computing the different
chances to win.4 Thus, a probability specifies how likely it is that an event is going
to happen. Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat are seen as the "fathers" of probability
theory. They developed an early understanding of expected value when discussing
how to solve the problem of points posed by Chevalier de Méré.5 Fermat first intro-
duced the idea of equally likely chances to win by listing the prospective outcomes
of the game in a table. This approach was generalized by Pascal (1665) with the help
of a probability triangle. That is, the expected value is a simple method to evaluate a
situation in which the realized prospective outcome is distributed by probabilities.
However, this concept is not applicable in situations in which the expected value
1Please refer to Section 3.1, where I discuss several economic models and theories and introduce
how they deal with decision making under risk.
2cf. the reprint: Knight (2012)
3For examples of such lotteries see Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
4David (1962) provides a detailed overview of the history of gambling, probability and statistical
ideas.
5The interested reader may be referred to David (1962), who presents extracts of the letters between
Pascal and Fermat.
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may be infinite. Daniel Bernoulli was the first to propose the concept of utility when
solving the St Petersburg Paradox described by his cousin Nicolas Bernoulli (1738).
The St Petersburg Paradox describes a situation in which a subject has to decide how
much to pay for the participation in a gamble. In this gamble, a coin is tossed as long
as head occurs. The gain of the subject depends on the number of coin tosses, that is,
if head appears with the first toss the subject receives 1 Euro, if head also appears with
the second toss 2 Euros, if head appears with the third toss 4 Euros and so on. That is,
with every toss of the coin, while head appears, the amount which is paid, doubles.
To be more precise, for the kth toss of the coin, while head appears, the paid amount is
2(k−1). If the subject decides to pay up to the expected value of this gamble, in order
to participate, he would be prepared to pay any amount, as the expected value of this
gamble is infinite. This seems not to be very rational as it is very likely to win a small
amount and very unlikely to win a large amount. This led Bernoulli (1738) to the idea
that
"... the determination of the value of an item must not be based on its
price, but rather on the utility it yields. [...] There is no doubt that a gain of
one thousand ducats is more significant to the pauper than to a rich man
though both gain the same amount" (Bernoulli 1738, p.24 of the english
translation of 1954).
The concept of a subjective utility to evaluate a prospective outcome has been taken
into account within most of the economic theories of decision making under risk.
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) provide a very famous normative theory of
decision under risk, the EUT. As the name of the EUT suggests, a subject’s decision
under risk is based on the comparison of the expected utilities of different lotteries.6
Despite its continuous fame and wide acceptance as a normative theory, soon after the
publication of the EUT, Allais (1953) presented several so-called anomalies in human
behavior, which systematically hurt the underlying assumptions of the EUT. These
6Please refer to Section 3.1.1 for a discussion of EUT.
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anomalies gave a first understanding that subjects might not decide as rationally as
they are expected to. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) were the first to integrate some
psychological factors to decision making under risk. With the PT they introduce a
descriptive theory which, among others, takes the anomalies presented by Allais into
account. The PT is still the most famous theory of decision making under risk.7
In economics, it is usual to experimentally test for the predictions of models and
theories within laboratory experiments. Economic experiments are conducted for dif-
ferent reasons.8 In many experiments, the experimenters expect to observe system-
atically occurring "mistakes" in a controlled environment which allows to interpret
the observations in relation to the theory and to give feedback to theoretical litera-
ture. There are also experiments which study effects that have not yet been discussed
in the existing literature. These experiments are often based on earlier experiments
in order to isolate the cause of earlier observed systematically occurring mistakes
by varying details of the former experiments. Accumulating these facts may allow
to propose new theories which then can be tested again. Experiments are also con-
ducted in mission to inform policy. These experiments investigate effects which occur
when the market rules are changed. The experimental environment in such experi-
ments is designed to simulate the environment which is in the focus of the political
discussion.
2.1.2 Psychology
Psychologists consider emotions, feelings and mood to play an important role in the
decision making process interacting with cognition.9 This idea combines two strands
of psychological research: emotion theories and cognitive psychology. Research on
emotion theories intends to answer the question "What is an emotion?". Cognitive
psychology investigates mental processes such as attention, language use, memory,
7Please refer to Section 3.1.2 for a discussion of PT.
8Kagel and Roth (1995) provide a very detailed book of the history and methodology of experi-
mental economics.
9cf. Zajonc (1980), Schwarz and Clore (1983), Loewenstein et al. (2001), Slovic et al. (2007)
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perception, problem solving, creativity and thinking.10 To provide the basis to un-
derstand the models and theories introduced in Section 3.2 and further analyzed in
Chapter 4, this section intends to introduce the history of the the basic elements of
psychological research on decision making and the resulting challenges of research
with respect to the following points:
• What is an emotion?
– The lack of a unified definition
– The lack of a clear classification of the terms affect, emotion, feeling and
mood
• The idea of a Dual-Processing Theory
Understanding emotion theory from a psychological point of view reveals two in-
tricacies. First, though psychologists have investigated emotions over centuries there
is still no such one definition of emotion. Second, the term emotion is usually dis-
tinguished from feelings, mood, and affect, yet their use is often rather mixed and
synonymous.
Concerning the question "What is an emotion?" Fehr and Russell (1984) state that:
"Everyone knows what an emotion is, until asked to give a definition.
Then, it seems, no one knows." (Fehr and Russell (1984), p. 464)
There is a huge spectrum of psychological literature discussing possible definitions
of an emotion, depending on the particular context and from various perspectives.11
In psychology, it is assumed that there exist several basic emotions out of which all
other emotions are built. Ortony and Turner (1990) provide a selection of lists of basic
emotions as discussed in the psychological literature. They question the existence of
such basic emotions and rather suggest that instead of basic emotions there are other
10The interested reader may be referred to Gerrig and Zimbardo (2002).
11Paul R. Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981) discuss 92 definitions and 9 sceptical statements from
different sources in the literature of the emotion theories.
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basic elements out of which different emotions are built. They suggest that these
elements are rather components of cognitions, feeling states, and emotion responses.
In the nineteenth century, the scientists James (1884) and Lange and Kurella (1887)
developed a completely new definition and explanation of the nature of emotions.
The James-Lange-Theory refers to a hypothesis, which states that within subjects, as
a response to certain stimuli, the autonomic nervous system creates physiological re-
actions like muscular tension, a rise in heart rate, perspiration, and dryness of the
mouth. Emotions are expressed by feelings which come about as a result of these
physiological changes, rather than being their cause. James (1884) explains his con-
cept as:
"My theory [...] is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception
of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur
is the emotion. Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and
weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival,
are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this
order of sequence is incorrect [...] and that the more rational statement is
that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because
we tremble [...] Without the bodily states following on the perception,
the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of
emotional warmth. We might then see the bear, and judge it best to run,
receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we should not actually
feel afraid or angry." (James (1884), p. 190)
According to the James-Lange-Theory emotions are associated with distinct pat-
terns of somato-visceral activity.12 Table 2.1 provides an overview of several experi-
ments that have been conducted to give evidence of the existence of distinct patterns
of peripheral activity associated with basic emotions. Ekman et al. (1983) state that
basic emotions are for example happiness, sadness, disgust, anger, surprise and fear.
12Andreassi (2007) provides a very detailed book on human behavior and corresponding physio-
logical responses.
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TABLE 2.1: Selected Literature on Psychophysiological Parameters
(HR = heart rate, SC/SR = skin conductance/skin resistance, SP = skin potential)
(BP = blood pressure, ST = skin temperature, RF = respiration frequency, P = pulse, BF = blood flow, ECG = electrocardiography)
Author(s) Published in HR SC/SR SP BP ST RF P BF ECG
Vianna et al. (2009) International Journal of Psy-
chophysiology, Vol. 72
X X
Rainville et al. (2006) International Journal of Psy-
chophysiology, Vol. 61
X X X
Christie and Friedman
(2004)
International Journal of Psy-
chophysiology, Vol. 51
X X X
Vernet-Maury et al.
(1999)
Journal of the Autonomic Ner-
vous System, Vol. 75
X X X X X X
Ekman et al. (1983) Science, Vol. 221 X X X
Averill (1969) The Society of Psychophysio-
logical Research, Vol. 5, No. 4
X X X X X X
Collet et al. (1997) Journal of the Autonomic Ner-
vous System, Vol. 62
X X X X X
Levenson et al. (1990) Psychophysiology, Vol. 27, No.
4
X X X
The mentioned experiments investigate response patterns of the autonomic nervous
system as a result to different stimuli, as, for example, voluntary facial expression,
visual and olfactory stimuli or film clips (see Table 2.1). Response of the autonomic
nervous system is expressed by different physiological reactions. These reactions are
for example, as Andreassi (2007) describe them, changes in heart rate, skin conduc-
tance, skin temperature and respiration frequency. There is also a lot of criticism
towards the evidence of distinct response patterns. Cacioppo et al. (2000) state, ac-
cording to a meta-analysis of the studies investigating the physiological responses
observed during basic emotions, that these studies only provide equivocal evidence.
Rainville et al. (2006) propose two reasons for the limited result in finding distinctive
physiological patterns regarding basic emotions. First, there is inadequate elicitation
of the target emotion to be investigated. Second, there is incomplete physiological
characterization of the following somatic states. As there is such a controversial dis-
cussion about the existence of distinct physiological patterns associated with basic
emotions there clearly is the need of further investigation.
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Additionally to this very controversial debate about observable physiological pat-
terns of an emotion there is also another way of emotion classification. Loewenstein
et al. (2008) propose a characterization of emotions according to the point of time
when they are experienced. On the one hand, emotions can be expected to be experi-
enced when a subject anticipates how it will feel when an event takes place. They are
labeled as anticipated or expected emotions. On the other hand emotions can be experi-
enced immediately when a stimulus occurs. Hence, they are labeled as immediate emo-
tions or also as anticipatory emotions. Immediate emotions can further be distinguished
by their reference to the considered situation. Immediate emotions can be integral
or incidental to the situation.13 With respect to integral emotions Rick and Loewen-
stein (2008) (p.138) denote that "they arise from thinking about the consequences of
one’s decision". That is, integral emotions are elicited by stimuli directly related to
the decision. Incidental emotions "arise from dispositional or situational sources ob-
jectively unrelated to the task at hand" (Rick and Loewenstein (2008), p.138). That
is, incidental emotions are also immediate but elicited by stimuli totally independent
from the situation a subject is considering. However, incidental emotions may also
influence behavior as a subject may not be aware that these emotions are incidental
as discussed by Schwarz and Clore (1983).
Besides the problematic towards the definition of what an emotion actually is, there
is also the problem that the terms emotion, feeling, mood and affect are often rather
mixed up and synonymously used. With respect to this terminology, Scherer and
Peper (2001) propose a classification of the so-called affective phenomena. An emo-
tion is a rather short episode which refers to momentary responses to a single event.14
According to Damasio (1994) the experience of an emotion results in a subjective feel-
ing. The term feeling is very often used synonymously to the term emotion. Contrary
to the short and intense episode of an emotion, Scherer and Peper (2001) consider
13cf. Schwarz and Clore (1983), Loewenstein et al. (2001), Rick and Loewenstein (2008)
14cf. Scherer and Peper (2001), Ortony and Turner (1990), Adam (2010), Loewenstein et al. (2001),
Slovic et al. (2007)
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mood to be of low intensity and longer duration.15 Schwarz and Clore (1983) suggest
a subject’s mood mostly to be influenced by incidental emotions.
In this sense, affect is considered to be the umbrella term of all emotional concerns
as the counterpart to cognitive concerns. Yet, there exist several other definitions of
affect. Panksepp (1982) defines affect as the conscious experience of emotion and
feeling. Slovic et al. (2007) define affect as the specific quality of goodness or badness
experienced as a feeling which marks the positive or negative quality of a stimulus.
All these affective phenomena (emotion, feeling and mood) influence a subject’s af-
fective state which refers to his ongoing affective processing.
In terms of this thesis, affect can best be described as the counterpart to cognition
concerning the interplay of the head and the heart in human decision making. It
dates back to Plato who proposed the idea of a tripartite structure of the soul: emo-
tional/affective, cognitive, conative (see Figure 2.1).
The idea of a Dual-Processing-Theory of human decision making has emerged over
the last century. It was Sigmund Freud (1900) who first considered the idea, that there
might be more than just our conscious mind. He introduced the idea of an uncon-
scious processing when he wrote his book about the interpretation of dreams. Re-
search in psychology adopted this idea in research on decision making. It is assumed
that affect and cognition interact when making a decision making. Zajonc (1980) was
the first who addressed the idea that affective processing of a decision might actually
be prior to cognitive processing. Epstein (1994) and Sloman (1996) both discuss the
distinct characteristics of the affective and cognitive systems. Figure 2.2 and Figure
2.3 depict how the authors understand these differently processing systems.
These systems are referred to as System 1 (experiential system) and System 2 (cog-
nitive system). In Section 3.2 it is discussed how psychological models and theories
deal with affect based on the Dual-Processing Theory within a decision and in Chap-
15Mood is also referred to as background state by Bechara and Damasio (2005).
16Source: Scherer (1995)
17Source: Epstein (1994), Table 1 on page 711
18Source: Sloman (1996), Table 1 on page 7
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   Components of the soul     Glosses    Components of the state
Cognition
Emotion|Affect|Passion
Conation|Motivation
Thought, reason, will.
Considered rational
judgment - the good.
Thumos, anger or spiri-
tedhigher ideal emotions, 
resenting infringements by 
others and lower appetites.
Impulses, cravings, 
instincts, appetites. 
Multitude of clamant and 
conflicting appetites for 
particular gratifications.
Ruling class. Philosophers, 
kings, statesmen, nobility. 
Interested in wisdom.
Warrior class. Soldiers, 
policemen, auxiliaries, 
men of action. Interested in 
disticnition.
Lower classes. Civilians, 
workers, peasantes, slaves. 
Interested in enjoyment 
and gratification.
FIGURE 2.1: Plato’s Tripartite Structure of the Soul16
ter 4 it is analyzed how this can be integrated into economic decision making under
risk.
In psychology research there is a long history of experimental testing.19 Compa-
rable to experimental economics, in psychological experiments it is investigated why
subjects make mistakes with regard to a specific theory or model. According to Her-
twig and Ortmann (2001) however, in psychology rather than in economics it is as-
sumed that subjects decide according to simplified procedures such as heuristics in-
stead of fully rational preference relations. These simplified mechanisms might be
understood better if regarded through the lens of mistakes (Hertwig and Ortmann
2001). As well as in the field of economics the borders of experimental testing and
thus supporting or neglecting theories and models are weakened by new method-
19There is a huge bandwidth of literature on experimental psychology grown within the last cen-
tury, cf. Kantowitz et al. (2014), Woodworth and Schlosberg (1954), Osgood (1953), Underwood (1949).
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Experiential System Rational?System
1 Holistic 1 Analytic.? .?
2.?Affective:?Pleasure?pain?oriented?(what?feels?good) 2.?Logical:?Reason?oriented?(what?is?sensible)
3.?Associationistic connection 3.?Logical?connections
4 B h i di t d b ib  f t i 4 B h i di t d b i i l f t.? e av or?me a e ? y?!v es ? rom?pas ?exper ences .? e av or?me a e ? y?consc ous?appra sa ?o ?even s
d li i i h d d li i b b l d d5.?Enco es?rea ty? n?concrete? mages,?metap ors,?an ?
narratives
5.?Enco es?rea ty? n?a stract?sym o s,?wor s,?an ?
numbers
6.?More?rapid?processing:?Oriented?toward?immediate?
action
6.?Slower?processing:?Oriented?toward?delayed?action
7.?Slower?to?change:?Changes?with?repetitive?or? 7.?Changes?more?rapidly:?Changes?with?speed?of?
intense?experience thought
8 More crudely differentiated: Broad generalization.? ? ? ? ? ?
gradient;?stereotypical thinking 8.?More?highly differentiated
9.?More?crudely?integrated:?Dissociative,?emotional?
complexes;?context?specific processing 9.?More?highly?integrated:?Cross?context?proccessing
10.?Experienced?passively?and?preconsciously:?We?are?
seized by our emotions
10.?Experienced?actively?and?consciously:?We?are?in?
control of our thoughts? ? ? ?
11.?Self?evidently?valid:?!Experiencing?is?believing" 11.?Requires?justification?via?logic?and?evidence
FIGURE 2.2: Comparison of the Experiential and Rational System17
ologies arising from advances in technology. Most of these new methodologies can
be found within neuroscientific research. A short introduction of the history and
methodologies in neuroscientific research is provided in the next section.
2.1.3 Neuroscience
Research in neuroscience deals with the anatomy, physiology, biochemistry, and
molecular biology of nerves and nervous tissue and especially with their relation
to behavior and learning.20 The focus in this thesis is on the cognitive-affective in-
terplay within the decision making process. To provide the basis to understand the
neuroscientific studies introduced in Section 3.3 and further analyzed in Chapter 4
this section intends to introduce the history of the basic elements of neuroscientific
20Source: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/neuroscience
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Triggered 
Emotions
Affective StateInformation
Outcome
Probability
Risk Aversion
Risk Affinity
Desire
Hope
Pleasure
Happiness
Rejoice
Elation
Fear
Sadness
Rejection
Regret
Disappointment
Hope
Fear
Hotpositive
Coldpositive
Hotnegative
Coldpositive
Hotpositive
Hotnegative
Overall Negative
Overall Positive
Immediance
Expected
Immediance
Expected
Immediance
Immediance
Associative system Rule-based systemCharacteristic
Principles of operation
Source of knowledge
Nature of representation
Basic units
Relations
Nature of processing
Illustrative cognit ve 
functions
Similarity and contiguity
Personal ex erience
Concrete and generic concepts, 
images stere -types, and 
feature sets
(a) Associations
(b) Soft constraints
(a) Reproductive but capable of 
     similarit-based generalization
(b) Overall feature computation  
     and constraint satisfation
(c) Automatic
Intuition
Fantasy
Creativity
Imagination
Visual recognition
Associative memory
Symbol manipulation
Language, culture, and formal 
systems
Concrete, generic, and abstract 
concepts; abstracted features; 
compositional symbols
(a) Casual, logical, and 
     hierarchical
(b) Hard constraints
(a) Productive and systematic
(b) Abstraction of relevant 
     features
(c) Strategic
Deliberation
Explanation
Formal analysis
Verification
Ascription of purpose
Strategic memory
FIGURE 2.3: Characterization of Two Forms of Reasoning18
research on decision making. Considering decision making, neuroscientific research
can be structured along the two following questions: What brain regions are involved
in the decision making process? What can be inferred from these regions with respect
to the cognitive-affective interplay?
The idea, that the mind of human beings is in the brain dates back to ancient Greece,
where Hippocrates is said to be the first who considered that the brain is the lead-
ing part of intelligence.21 It is assumed, that already in these early years autopsies
were performed to gain information about how the brain works. A lot of the existing
knowledge about the brain structure and its functionality was gained by experiments
with animals and human lesion patients.
Early investigation on the role of affective and cognitive processing in human de-
21The interested reader may be referred to Finger (2001), Bear et al. (2007) or Panksepp (1982), who
provide an interesting overview of the history of neuroscience.
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cision making considered patients with lesions in different regions of the brain to
compare their behavior with the behavior of healthy subjects or with their behav-
ior before the lesion. One of the most famous studies in brain lesions is the case of
Phineas Gage. In his book Descartes’ Error, Damasio (1994) turns to the hypothesis,
that rational decisions are rather not independent of emotions and feelings. He in-
troduces the example of Phineas Gage whose case gained great attention in the 19th
century. It was the first time to consider the relation between impaired rationality
and specific brain lesions. Damasio states that when he decided to study the cogni-
tive and neuronal mechanisms which underly human thinking and decision making
on the one hand, he was rather forced into the study of emotion and feeling on the
other hand as it was not possible to understand the one without integrating the other.
He conducted similar studies (as the case Phineas Gage) with patients having differ-
ent lesions. This made him draw conclusions of which part of the brain is responsible
for decision making and how stimuli are processed in order to make decisions.
Damasio developed the SMH a neuroanatomical and cognitive framework for deci-
sion making and its influence by affect.22 To test for the predictions and assumptions
of the SMH Bechara et al. (1994) develop the so-called Iowa-Gambling task to investi-
gate human decision making under uncertainty by comparing patients’ with healthy
subjects’ behavior in conducting the Gambling-Task. Bechara et al. (1997, 1999) ex-
tend their investigation by measuring psychophysiological responses of the subjects
to draw conclusions of affective processing in human decision making.23
Neuroscientific research provides the methods and techniques to draw a picture
of the human brain and to determine the cognitive-affective interplay. There are dif-
ferent methods to investigate the role of affect in human decision making. The most
common methods in neuroscience are Lesion Studies (LS), functional Magnetic Reso-
nance Imaging (fMRI), Electroencephalography (EEG), Transcranial Magnetic Stimu-
22The SMH is introduced in detail in Section 3.3.1
23Refer to Section 2.1.2 where the discussion how to distinguish between different types of emotions
based on different psychophysiological responses is shortly introduced.
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TABLE 2.2: Selected Literature on Investigating the Role of Affect in (Economic) Decision
Making
Author(s) Published in fMRI LS PPM
D’Acremont et al. (2009) Neuroimage, Vol. 47 X
Martino et al. (2009) The Journal of Neuroscience, Vol.29, No.12 X
Christakou et al. (2009) The Journal of Neuroscience, Vol. 29, No. 35 X
Krajbich et al. (2009) The Journal of Neuroscience, Vol. 29, No. 7 X
Bault et al. (2008) Plos One, Vol. 3, No. 10 X
Xue et al. (2009) Cerebral Cortex, Vol. 19 X
Rao et al. (2008) Neuroimage, Vol. 42 X
Miu et al. (2008) Biological Psychology, Vol. 77 X
Clark et al. (2008) Brain, Vol. 131 X
D’Argembeau et al. (2008) Neuroimage, Vol. 40 X
Tom et al. (2007) Science, Vol. 315 X
Berntson et al. (2007) SCAN X
Weller et al. (2007) Psychological Science, Vol. 18, No. 11 X
Ben-Shakhar et al. (2007) Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 28 X
Fellows (2006) Brain, Vol. 129 X
Van’t Wout et al. (2006) Exp Brain Res, Vol. 169 X
Huettel et al. (2006) Neuron, Vol. 49 X
Denburg et al. (2006) International Journal of Psychophysiology, Vol. 61 X
Hsu et al. (2005) Science, Vol. 310 X
Oya et al. (2005) PNAS, Vol. 102, No. 23 X X
Shiv et al. (2005) Cognitive Brain Research, Vol. 23 X
Shiv et al. (2005) Psychological Science, Vol. 16, No. 6 X
Bechara and Damasio (2005) Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 52 X X
Smith and Dickhaut (2005) Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 52 X
Leland and Grafman (2005) Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 52 X
Houser et al. (2005) Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 52 X
Crone et al. (2004) Psychophysiology, Vol.41 X
Maia and McClelland (2004) PNAS, Vol. 101, No. 45 X
Sanfey et al. (2003) Science, Vol. 300 X
Lo and Repin (2002) Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, Vol. 14, No. 3 X
Breiter et al. (2001) Neuron, Vol. 30 X
Bechara et al. (1999) The Journal of Neuroscience, Vol.19, No. 13 X X
Bechara et al. (1997) Science, Vol. 275 X X
Bechara et al. (1994) Cognition, Vol. 50 X
lation (TMS) and Psychophysiological Methods (PPM).24 Some selected literature on
investigating the role of affect in decision making is listed in Table 2.2.
24The interested reader may be referred to Andreassi (2007), who provides a very detailed intro-
duction of the common neuroscientific techniques.
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However, research in neuroscience is more than just finding where things happen
in the brain. By identifying the parts of the brain that are activated during different
tasks, and especially by looking for overlap between diverse tasks, neuroscientists
learn how the brain works. Camerer et al. (2005) argues that, to see which parts are
more or less active during processes which are expected to be affective or cognitive
allows for conclusions of the cognitive or affective nature of the different tasks in the
decision making process and thus conclusions of the cognitive-affective interplay of
the processes. This is a very common technique used within neuroscientific experi-
ments labeled as the so called ’reverse inference’.
There are several limitations in neuroscientific studies. First, Poldrack (2006) dis-
cusses under what circumstances it might be possible to infer cognitive or affective
processes from neuroimaging data and when results from applying this technique
need to be treated cautiously. He states that confidence in reverse inference can be
improved by increasing the selectivity of response in the brain region of interest or
increase the prior probability of the process in question. Selectivity of response, i.e.
how often the brain region of interest is active corresponding to different processes is
not in the control of the researcher. Yet, there is a higher selectivity in smaller brain
regions and considering the analysis of sets of brain regions might also provide a
higher selectivity as a set of brain regions can be analyzed as a connected network
active during a process. In other words selectivity means, if a brain region of interest
is activated by a lot of processes it is harder to draw conclusions than if it is only
activated by a few processes. The prior probability of the cognitive process to be in-
vestigated however depends on the task that is performed. Therefore, to improve the
confidence of reverse inference it is highly necessary to conduct tasks which conduct
a cognitive process with a very high probability.
Second, LS are generally limited to the small sample of subjects who meet the cri-
teria of damage to a region of interest. fMRI studies also typically have small sample
size due to financial and time constraints. Furthermore, as Levin et al. (2012) argue,
the complexity and length of tasks that can be conducted in a scanner are limited.
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Understanding how the brain deals with affect interacting with cognition and how
this can be integrated into the economic theories of the decision making process is in
the focus of this thesis.
2.2 Contribution within the three Disciplines
The elaboration within Section 2.1 inspired me to approach the role of affect in de-
cision making under risk. As discussed, research on decision making in economics,
psychology and neuroscience has started from very different perspectives. Yet, in the
last years the idea has emerged that in fact there is a coherence between these disci-
plines, namely there is the upcoming assumption that within decision making, there
must be a cognitive-affective interplay. The goal of this thesis is to identify how af-
fect might possibly be integrated into the decision making process with respect to a
better understanding of decision making under risk by developing the ADMF. Thus,
integrating psychological and neuroscientific research into economics identifies the
cognitive-affective interplay to draw a more complete picture of the human decision
making process. The aim to integrate psychological and neuroscientific research and
methodologies into economics yet reveals several challenges and problems. These
challenges manifest in three dimensions.
• There is hardly a consensus of the relevant components of decision making un-
der risk within the three disciplines.
• The terminology of the relevant concepts is rather different including a some-
times very different understanding within and between the disciplines.
• The methodologies applied within the different disciplines to test the theories
and models follow rather different conventions.
The first point considers the challenge in this thesis to structure the theories and
models of economics, psychology and neuroscience along the relevant components of
30
2.2 Contribution within the three Disciplines
decision making under risk. That is, it is important, although not easy, to identify the
different parts and logical steps of the decision making process and to identify their
interrelation with each other as in every discipline there exist different assumptions
about how these tasks are processed when making a decision.
The terminology of the relevant concepts within the decision making process is not
consistent within the disciplines. This makes it difficult to draw conclusions from the
results of one discipline and transfer them to another. One important point here is
the definition of risk. In economics, decision making under risk is defined as a very
specific situation, where the probability of each prospective outcome is known. This
is an important distinction to a situation in which the probabilities are unknown. In
psychology and also in neuroscience however there are many theories, models and
tests in which the definition of risk is different from that in economics.
Besides the differences in terminology, there are very different conventions of cor-
rect experimentation. In experimental economics there are four key aspects according
to which good experimentation is classified as discussed in Hertwig and Ortmann
(2001).
• script enactment
• repeated trials
• monetary incentives
• proscription against deception
Experimental economics and psychology on behavioral decision making have dif-
ferent conceptions of good experimentation. That is, in psychological experiments
there is no constraint to provide the subjects with a detailed script, psychologists of-
ten do not repeat their trials, psychologists mostly pay their subjects a flat fee instead
of paying according to the subjects’ performance, and psychologists often deceive
their subjects.25 This implies why results from psychological studies are often not
25The subjects are for example fooled about the question the experimenter tries to answer in order
to avoid socially desirable answers.
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accepted by economists. Hertwig and Ortmann (2001) propose, that apart from the
debate about the differences in methodologies on experimental research, there is a de-
bate on a second level. Researchers in both disciplines are not at one in considering
the implications of the evidence of irrationality (which is the evidence of most of the
psychological studies about decision making). The different rules and conventions
in experimental testing within each discipline hardly affect the development of the
ADMF, yet they affect future experimental testing structured along the ADMF.
These challenges and problems impact the development of the ADMF. The follow-
ing of this thesis discusses and analyzes the relevant models and theories in each
discipline in order to identify the relevant components of decision making under
risk and the underlying relevant concepts which are important to understand deci-
sion making from the perspective of each discipline. These components are analyzed
within each discipline in Chapter 4 and merged to develop the ADMF in Chapter 5.
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T
HE last chapter discussed decision making under risk with respect to a possible
contribution of psychology and neuroscience to economics by integrating the
role of affect. It pointed out the different methodologies and the resulting challenges
and problems and it has been inferred that, in order to determine the contribution
of psychology and neuroscience in economic theories within the ADMF, the relevant
components of decision making and the underlying concepts within all three disci-
pline have to be identified firstly. Chapter 3 focuses on Research Question 2: "Which
are the appropriate models of economics, psychology and neuroscience with respect
to further analysis of the cognitive-affective interplay in the decision making process?
Based on these models:
(a) Which are, from an economic perspective, the relevant components of decision
making under risk?
(b) Which are the underlying concepts within economics, psychology and neuro-
science suitable to analyze the cognitive-affective interplay?"
This chapter first discusses these models within each discipline and second con-
cludes with a summary of the relevant components and underlying concepts which
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are analyzed in more detail within Chapter 4 in order to identify the cognitive-
affective interplay in decision making under risk.
3.1 Economics
This section introduces several models and theories dealing with economic decision
making under risk. I am aware of the fact that in economic literature there exists a
wide variety of other models also considering decision making under risk. However,
discussing them all would be far beyond the scope of this thesis. As all of the fol-
lowing models have EUT by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) as a common
origin, it is necessary and useful to discuss its basic elements and assumptions. Fur-
ther, as PT by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is still deemed as the most commonly
accepted theory of decision making under risk it is indispensable to discuss and an-
alyze its basic elements in order to develop the ADMF. I further decided to discuss
and analyze the model of Reference Dependent Preferences (RDP) by Köszegi and
Rabin (2006), Regret Theories (RT) by Loomes and Sugden (1982) and Bell (1982) and
Disappointment Theories (DT) by Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986) as these
theories are highly relevant in the economic literature and all of the theories some-
how include the idea that utility is not only derived by the prospective outcome itself
but that there are some emotions anticipated during decision making. The idea of in-
cluding emotions into preference formation reveals the acceptance that affect might
somehow influence decision making under risk. Economic theory usually models de-
cision making under risk by a choice problem over a set of lotteries P, where a lottery
is defined as a (known) probability distribution over a set of prospective outcomes
C and a binary relation  in P. The here discussed theories have in common that
they compute an overall utility U of each lottery in order to compare them to each
other. The overall utility of Lottery X is given by its expected utility such that U(X)
is either E(u(X)), where u denotes the intrinsic utility, E(v(X)), where v denotes the
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reference dependent utility or E(µ(X)), where µ denotes the modified utility.1 X
denotes a random variable corresponding to a lottery, expressed by the probability
distribution p and the prospective outcomes x. For the sake of simplicity, I denote
the random variable X, which is corresponding to a lottery, as Lottery X within the
rest of this thesis. A lottery with n prospective outcomes is typically represented as
X : (x1, p1; x2, p2; ...; xn, pn). Then, within each of the following theories it is possible to
say: Lottery X ≻,≺,∼ Lottery Y if U(X) >,<,= U(Y).
3.1.1 Expected Utility Theory (EUT)
The standard approach for decision making under risk is EUT by von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944). As the name of the EUT suggests, a subject’s decision under
risk is based on the comparison of the expected utilities of different lotteries. That is,
the subject decides in favor of the lottery which provides the highest expected utility.
In case of discrete prospective outcomes, for example, the expected utility is given
by the sum of the probability weighted utilities of the certain (riskless) prospective
outcomes. To be more precise, if the subject faces a binary choice problem of accepting
or declining a single lottery, it is assumed that a subject accepts the lottery if the utility,
resulting from integrating the lottery with one’s endowment, is higher than the utility
of one’s endowment alone. This means that the domain of the utility function is
determined by the final endowment, rather than by gains and losses.
Given (P, ) the EUT is based on four axioms:
1Please note that the terminology of ’modified utility’ (µ, ’intrinsic utility’ (u) and ’reference de-
pendent utility’ (v) is used for all theories with utility functions of this structure in the following of this
thesis. I decided to go on with this terminology because it intuitively describes the meaning of each
term. Other terminology would also be possible as e.g. choiceless utility, basic utility or consumption
utility instead of intrinsic utility.
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A1 (Completeness) For every Lottery X and Y ∈ P either X ≻ Y, X ≺ Y or
X∼Y holds. Completeness assumes that a subject has
well defined preferences to compare and evaluate two
alternatives.
A2 (Transitivity) For every Lottery X, Y and Z ∈ P with X ≻ Y and Y ≻
Z we must have X ≻ Z. Transitivity assumes that, as a
subject decides according to the completeness axiom,
the subject also decides consistently.
A3 (Independence) Let X and Y be two lotteries with X  Y, and let
t ∈ (0,1]⇒ tX + (1− t)Z ≻ tY + (1− t)Z for all Z. In-
dependence assumes that the preference order of two
lotteries mixed with a third one maintains the same
preference order as when the two are mixed indepen-
dently.
A4 (Continuity) Let X, Y and Z be lotteries with X ≻ Y ≻ Z ⇒ ∃t ∈
(0,1) with tX + (1− t)Z∼Y. Continuity assumes that
when there are three lotteries (X, Y and Z) and the
subject prefers X to Y and Y to Z, then there should be
a possible combination of X and Z in which the subject
is then indifferent between this mix and the Lottery Y.
For any rational subject satisfying the four axioms, there exists a function u assign-
ing to each prospective outcome x ∈ C a real number u(x) such that E(u(X)) denotes
the expected value of u.
Proposition 1 (Neumann/Morgenstern). Given (P, ), and let the axioms (A1 - A4) be
satisfied, then there exist functions
(3.1) u : C →R
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and
(3.2) U : P →R
such that U with
(3.3) U(X) = E(u(X)) = ∑
i
u(xi)p(xi)
is a utility function, which represents  in P.
EUT implies that rational individuals maximize expected utility and takes into ac-
count that a subject is risk neutral, risk averse or risk seeking.2
EUT has dominated the analysis of decision making under risk over years and is
generally accepted as a normative model. While a normative theory states how a
subject should decide, a descriptive theory in fact predicts how a subject will decide.
Both have in common the need for a rule of how to evaluate a lottery in order to
choose the best option. That is, to evaluate a lottery and thus compare it to another
lottery, a subject needs to evaluate the prospective outcomes as well as the probability
distribution. The predictive quality of EUT as a descriptive model for decisions under
risk has often been discussed and criticized, because it is often observed that subjects
do not decide as predicted by EUT.
3.1.2 Prospect Theory (PT)
With the PT, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose an alternative account of deci-
sion making under risk. The core idea of PT is to offer a descriptive model which
takes the observed phenomena in human decision making into account. Allais (1953)
presents empirical examples, known as Allais Paradoxa, where systematic violations
of the axioms of EUT are observed. The following experiments are illustrative exam-
2Please refer to Section 4.3.1, where the concept of risk attitude is discussed and analyzed in more
detail.
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ples of these phenomena:
TABLE 3.1: Example lotteries of PT (Kahneman and Tversky 1979)
(Number of participants is denoted by N and the percentage who chose each option is given in [])
Certainty Effect
Problem 1: X:(4.000, 0.8) < Y:(3.000, 1)
N = 95 [20] [80]
Problem 2: X’:(4.000, 0.2) > Y’:(3.000, 0.25)
N = 95 [65] [35]
Reflection Effect
Problem 3: X”:(-4.000, 0.8) > Y”:(-3.000, 1)
N = 95 [92] [8]
Isolation Effect
Problem 4: In the first step it is decided if a subject is rejected with a
probability of 75% with a prospective outcome of 0 or with a
probability of 25% the subject can can choose between
the following lotteries.
X:(4.000, 0.8) < Y:(3.000, 1)
N = 141 [22] [78]
Problem 5: In the first step a subject is allocated with 1.000.
In the second step he has to choose between the following lotteries:
X”’:(1.000, 0.5) < Y”’:(500, 1)
N = 70 [16] [84]
Problem 6: In the first step a subject is allocated with 2.000.
In the second step he has to choose between the following lotteries:
X””(-1.000, 0.5) > Y””(-500, 1)
N = 68 [69] [31]
The Certainty Effect refers to the phenomenon of certain outcomes being over-
weighted. This is shown in Problem 1 and 2. Most subjects prefer Lottery Y to Lottery
X and Lottery X′ to Lottery Y′. This shift of preferences is caused by adding a com-
mon ratio to Lottery X and Y, that is, Lottery X′ can be expressed as (X,0.25) and
Lottery Y′ can be expressed as (Y,0.25). The preference relation of Problem 1 (as-
sumed that u(0) = 0) implies that
u(3.000)
u(4.000)
< 45 while the preference relation of Problem
2 implies the opposite. This shift of preferences violates the independency axiom of
EUT. The Reflection Effect (Problem 1 and 3) refers to the phenomenon that prefer-
ences for lotteries change when the signs of these lotteries are inverted. Preferences
for lotteries with positive prospective outcomes (gains) are inverted to the prefer-
ences for lotteries with negative prospective outcomes (losses). The Problems 5 and 6
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refer to the Isolation Effect. That is, the phenomenon that preferences shift when, due
to another framing of the decision problem, one of these components becomes more
obvious. In Problem 5 and 6 the situations are identical with regard to the expected
outcome. But the framing of the lotteries is different. Problem 5 can be interpreted
as a chance to gain whereas Problem 6 can be interpreted as a chance to avoid a loss.
This seems to show, that the basis for the valuation of ones utility is not the final state
of endowment but the change of the endowment.
These phenomena hurt the axioms of EUT. PT has been developed to account for
this behavior. PT differentiates between two phases in decision making: editing and
evaluation. The purpose of the editing phase is to organize and reformulate given
lotteries which results in a simpler or better known presentation of lotteries and to
set a reference point which defines the domain of gains and losses. The reference
point is usually assumed to be the status quo. The editing phase is separated into
four steps:
• Coding: identification of gains and losses and determination of a reference point
• Combination of prospective outcomes of lotteries
• Segregation: isolation of riskless prospective outcomes
• Cancelation of those components which are identical considering the available
lotteries (i. e. isolation effect)
In a further step, the edited lotteries are evaluated and the lottery with the highest
overall utility is chosen. The overall utility of a Lottery X is expressed by U(X) in
terms of two scales, v and π . The first scale v assigns a real number v(x) to each
prospective outcome x, which reflects the reference dependent utility of the prospec-
tive outcome. As prospective outcomes are defined relative to the reference point, v
measures the utility of deviations from that reference point (gains and losses). Within
PT, the reference dependent utility function v is assumed to be concave in the domain
of gains and convex in the domain of losses (see figure 3.1). That is, subjects are risk
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FIGURE 3.1: A Hypothetical Value Function3
averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses.4 v is steeper
in the domain of losses, which means that losses loom larger than gains.5 The second
scale π associates a decision weight to each probability p, i.e. it reflects the impact
of a probability to the overall utility of a lottery. π is an increasing function with
π(0) = 0, π(1) = 1 and π(p) ∈ [0,1]. Within PT, the weighting function is assumed to
reflect that typically small probabilities are overweighted and large probabilities are
underweighted (see figure 3.2).6 PT differentiates between strictly positive, strictly
negative and regular lotteries8. For a regular lottery the overall utility of Lottery X is
3Source: Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Figure 3 on page 279
4Please refer to Section 4.3.1, where the concept of risk attitude is analyzed in more detail.
5The properties of v an its implications on the role of affect in decision making under risk are
discussed in Chapter 4.
6The properties of the weighting function an its implications on the role of affect in decision making
under risk are discussed in Chapter 4.
7Source: Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Figure 4 on page 283
8A lottery is given in form of: (x1, p1; x2, p2). A lottery is strictly positive if x1, x2 > 0 and p1 + p2 =
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FIGURE 3.2: A Hypothetical Weighting Function7
given by
(3.4) U(X) = π(p1)v(x1) + π(p2)v(x2).
with v(0) = 0, π(1) = 1 and π(0) = 0. This utility function generalizes EUT by
relaxing the expectation principle.
For a strictly positive or negative lottery the overall utility of Lottery X is presented
in a different way:
(3.5) U(X) = v(x2) + π(p1)[v(x1)− v(x2)]
1, strictly negative if x1, x2 < 0 and p1 + p2 = 1. A lottery is regular if it is neither strictly positive or
negative.
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with x1, x2 ∈ C and x1 > x2. The overall utility of such a lottery represents the util-
ity of the riskless component plus the difference of utilities between the prospective
outcomes multiplied with the weight of the more extreme prospective outcome.
With the PT, Kahneman and Tversky introduce the idea of a reference dependent
evaluation of lotteries. Without doubt, this idea (among others) led to a better un-
derstanding of decision making under risk by improving the predictability of the
economic models. The core idea of the prospect theory is to offer a descriptive model
which takes the observed phenomena in decision making under risk into account.
That is, PT includes more degrees of freedom. In general, this does not improve
the quality of a model but in this case, the explanatory value and predictive quality
of the model is considerably increased. However, PT shows some weak points. The
three main points of criticism are first, that with more than two prospective outcomes,
there is the possibility that First Order Stochastic Dominance may be violated.9 That
is, Lottery X might be preferred to Lottery Y even if the probability of receiving a
prospective outcome x or greater is at least as high under Lottery Y as it is under Lot-
tery X for all prospective outcomes x, and is greater for some prospective outcomes x.
A revised version by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), called Cumulative Prospect The-
ory (CPT) overcame this problem by using a probability weighting function derived
from Rank-Dependent Expected Utility Theory.10 CPT can also be used for infinitely
many or even continuous prospective outcomes (for example, if the prospective out-
come can be any real number). CPT employs cumulative rather than separable de-
cision weights. CPT applies to risky as well as uncertain lotteries with any number
of prospective outcomes and it allows for different weighting functions for gains and
losses. A subject evaluates the prospective outcomes of a lottery according to the ref-
erence dependent utility function v with the same properties described above. It is
assumed that, given n observations, thereof k observations are negative:
9Please refer to Section 4.2.1, where the concept of Stochastic Dominance is analyzed in more detail.
10cf. Quiggin (1982) and Quiggin (1992)
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(3.6) πi =


π−(p1 + ... + pi)− π
−(p1 + ... + pi−1) : i ≤ k
π+(pi + ... + pn)− π
+(pi+1 + ... + pn) : i > k
with π+(.) and π−(.) being strictly increasing in the interval [0;1] and with
π+(0) = π−(0) = 0 and π+(1) = π−(1) = 1. By meanings of CPT, the overall util-
ity of Lottery X is represented by:
(3.7) U(X) =
n
∑
i=1
πiv(xi)
Second, Kahneman and Tversky suppose the reference point to be static and third,
they do not make any further assumptions about how the reference point actually is
computed. That is, to apply PT or to conduct any experimental tests, there is a need
for some exogenous assumptions about the reference point. For the sake of simplicity,
most commonly it is assumed that the reference point is the status quo.
3.1.3 Regret Theory (RT)
With the RT, another alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty has been
proposed almost simultaneously by Loomes and Sugden (1982) and Bell (1982). RT
extends the basic assumptions of EUT by an emotional component. That is, besides
utility and probabilities, regret also influences a decision. Regret is an emotion which
occurs when a subject learns that the prospective outcome would have been better
if he had chosen the other lottery. The counterpart to regret is rejoice. Rejoice is an
emotion which occurs when a subject learns that the prospective outcome would have
been worse if he had chosen the other lottery. The intuitive idea of RT is that a subject
compares the prospective outcomes of the chosen lottery to the prospective outcomes
of the not chosen lottery. This implies that a subject knows about all prospective
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outcomes. In the sense of RT, a lottery can only be evaluated with respect to the not
chosen lottery. That is, the overall utility of a lottery changes with the content and the
context of the decision situation.
Loomes and Sugden (1982) approach the idea of integrating regret into decision
making under risk by modeling choices under risk as actions. Each action is an n-
tuple of prospective outcomes and associates, other than lotteries, prospective out-
comes with particular states of the world. The ith prospective outcome of an action
which realizes when the jth state of the world occurs is denoted as xij. There exist
n states of the world. n is a finite number and each state of the world j occurs with
a probability pj, where 0 < pj ≤ 1 and p1 + ... + pn = 1. Thus, prospective outcomes
can be depicted in a complete action-state- matrix. However, for the sake of compa-
rability with the other models, I interpret an action as a lottery such that the lotteries,
between which a subject decides, have the same probability distribution p (repre-
senting the probabilities for the states of the world), yet over different prospective
outcomes. That is, a subject prefers Lottery X : (xi, pi) to Lottery Y : (yi, pi) if
(3.8) U(X|Y) =
n
∑
i=1
piµ(xi|yi) > U(Y|X) =
n
∑
i=1
piµ(yi|xi)
The main difference between the models of Bell and Loomes/Sugden is, that Bell
only allows for the decision between two lotteries with two prospective outcomes
each. That is, given µ(xi|yi), Lottery X is preferred to Lottery Y if
(3.9)
U(X|Y) = pµ(x1|y1) + (1− p)µ(x2|y2) > U(Y|X) = pµ(y1|x1) + (1− p)µ(y2|x2)
The models developed by Loomes and Sugden (1982) and Bell (1982) are very simi-
lar in its basic ideas, however approached from different assumptions. While Loomes
and Sugden assume a specific functional form of µ to motivate the intuition of regret,
Bell derives its specific form from several behavioral assumptions. However, they
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share the same properties. A subject has a modified utility function µ of the follow-
ing structure:
(3.10) µ(x|y) = u(x) + v(u(x)− u(y))
µ(·) assigns a real number to every prospective outcome x with respect to the ref-
erence point y. µ comprises two components such that u is the intrinsic utility and v
is the reference dependent utility, reflecting regret or rejoice. u(x) assigns a real num-
ber to every prospective outcome x.11 That is, u(xi) is as subject’s intrinsic utility of
prospective outcome xi, i.e. the prospective outcome of Lottery X if the ith state of
the world occurs. v is a regret-rejoice function which assigns a real number to every
possible increment or decrement of the intrinsic utility. That is, if a subject prefers
Lottery X to Lottery Y and the ith state of the world occurs, the prospective outcome
xi has been realized. If he had chosen Lottery Y, the prospective outcome yi would
have realized. A subject is thus neither able to assign a unique modified value to any
prospective outcome x nor a unique overall value to Lottery X. Yet, a decision in
the sense of RT is always context sensitive in the sense that the overall value changes
with the lottery to which it is compared. In a situation where neither regret nor rejoice
is anticipated, a subject is assumed to follow the predictions of EUT. The properties
of the utility functions u and v and the following implications on the evaluation of
a prospective outcome compared to the other economical theories are discussed in
Section 4.1.1. Section 4.3.1 discusses how RT captures a subject’s risk attitude.
3.1.4 Disappointment Theory (DT)
Loomes and Sugden (1986) and Bell (1985) both propose a DT. DT is similar to RT be-
cause it also extends the basic assumptions of EUT by an emotional component. That
11Note, that in order to highlight the influence of regret on a decision, u is mostly assumed to be
linear. The implications derived from this assumption are discussed in more detail within Chapter 4.
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is, besides utility and probabilities, disappointment also influences a decision. Dis-
appointment is an emotion that occurs when expectations about a risky prospective
outcome are higher than the actually realized prospective outcome. If for example a
subject expects to receive a gratification of 1.000 Euros, yet he actually only receives
500 Euros, he might be disappointed. The counterpart to disappointment is elation.
Elation is an emotion that occurs when expectations about a risky prospective out-
come are lower than the actually realized prospective outcome. The higher the ex-
pectations the greater will be the disappointment. Yet, the main difference to RT is,
that a subject might very often be disappointed when he learns about the realization
of his decision. That is, a subject compares the realization of his decision to the al-
ternative prospective outcome that might have been realized if another state of the
world had occurred. Integrating disappointment into decision making under risk is
approached by integrating a subject’s expectations into decision making under risk.
The models introduced by Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986) are differ-
ent in their underlying assumptions. The main difference of Loomes and Sugden’s
model to the model introduced by Bell is, that they do not distinguish in the intensity
of the sensation of disappointment and elation. Loomes and Sugden assume that the
subject’s degree of experienced disappointment or elation only depends on the dif-
ference between the intrinsic utility of what is (u(x)) and what he expected to have x¯.
This makes it possible to introduce a more general model. It is possible to represent
the modified utility function with the same structure as within RT.
(3.11) µ(x|x¯) = u(x) + v(u(x)− x¯)
with u being the intrinsic utility and v) being the reference dependent utility, re-
flecting disappointment or elation.12 The difference to RT is the reference point with
12Note, that in order to highlight the influence of disappointment on a decision, u is mostly as-
sumed to be linear. The implications derived from this assumption are discussed in more detail within
Chapter 4.
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which the intrinsic utility is compared. It is assumed that the reference point is a sub-
ject’s expectations of the lottery, that is its expected value E(X) which is expressed by
x¯ = px1 + (1− p)x2, where p is the probability of yielding the prospective outcome
x1 and (1− p) is the probability of yielding the prospective outcome x2. Assume that
the prospective outcome x1 has realized. The subject experiences disappointment or
elation depending on x1 >,<,= x¯.
A subject decides for the lottery with the highest overall utility given with:
(3.12) U(X) =
n
∑
i=1
pi(u(xi) + v(u(xi)− x¯))
Other than Loomes and Sugden, Bell introduces parameters d, e ≥ 0, which con-
stantly reflect the degree with which disappointment/elation affects a subject’s deci-
sion. It can either be d >,<= e such that a subject suffers more from disappointment
that enjoying elation, vice versa or both emotions are experienced with an equal in-
tensity. He then develops his model of DT in two steps. He first presents a limited
model and then extends it to a more general model. In the limited model, lotteries
are represented as (x1, p; x2,1 − p) with x1 ≥ x2. That is, x1 is at least as desirable
as x2 and p is the probability of winning. For the sake of a focused analysis on dis-
appointment, Bell assumes constant marginal value for money such that u(x) = x.
He thus implies two characteristics of v such that disappointment/elation within the
reference dependent utility function can be expressed as:
(3.13) v(x− x¯) =


d(x− x¯)if x < x¯
e(x− x¯)if x > x¯.
A subject chooses the lottery with the highest overall utility. Thus, disappointment
or elation reflect the proportion of the difference between what the subject expected
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and what he got. µ(x1|x¯) and µ(x2|x¯) are given with:
(3.14) µ(x1|x¯) = x1 + e(x1 − x¯)
(3.15) µ(x2|x¯) = x2 + d(x2 − x¯)
The overall utility of Lottery X is given with:
(3.16) U(X) = p[x1 + e(x1 − x¯)] + 1− p[x2 + d(x2 − x¯)]
A subject prefers Lottery X to Lottery Y if U(X) > U(Y).
Thoughts about how expectations are formed and whether elation and disappoint-
ment depend directly on the involved probabilities led Bell (1985) to expand this sim-
ple model by further assumptions which allow to model disappointment and elation
as a function of probability p. He implies that L0(x1, p; x2,1− p) represent the state of
owning an unresolved lottery (x1, p; x2,1− p), L1(x1, p; x2,1− p) represents the state
in which L0(x1, p; x2,1− p) results in prospective outcome x1 and L2(x1, p; x2,1− p)
represents the state in which L0(x1, p; x2,1− p) results in x2.
13 Bell derives that the sit-
uations Li(x1, p; x2,1− p) i = 0,1,2 have certainty equivalents of x2 + (x1 − x2)πi(p)
for some functions πi(p) from introducing the following assumptions.
• Simple Orderings
• Sure-thing Indifference
• Monotonicity in the Probability of Winning
13Remember that always x1 > x2.
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• Monotonicity in Value of Prizes
• Solvability
• Constant Marginal Value for Payoffs
• Risk Neutrality in the Absence of Disappointment
Thus, each Lottery X with the form (x1, p; x2,1− p) can be evaluated according to
the certainty equivalents of the unresolved lottery, the winning and losing situation,
which can be expressed by two modified utility functions µ with:
(3.17) µ1(x1|x2) = x1 + (x1 − x2)w(p)
(3.18) µ2(x2|x1) = x2 − (x1 − x2)l(1− p)
(3.19) U(X) = CE(X) = x2 + (x1 − x2)π(p) = pµ1(x1|x2) + (1− p)µ2(x2|x1)
π is an increasing, w and l are decreasing functions of probability p with π(0) =
w(1) = l(1)− π(1) = 0 and π(p) = p + pw(p)− (1− p)l(1− p). The function w(p)
can be understood as the value of the elation that comes with winning the lottery (1, p;
0, 1-p). The function l(p) can be understood as the (positively valued) psychological
cost of losing in the lottery (1,1− p;0, p). A subject then prefers Lottery X to Lottery
Y if U(X) > U(Y) such that CE(X) > CE(Y).
For a more detailed discussion of the assumptions made within each model, espe-
cially the assumptions made for the reference dependent utility function please refer
to Chapter 4.
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3.1.5 Reference Dependent Preferences (RDP)
Köszegi and Rabin (2006) develop a model of RDP which takes two main points
of criticism about the PT into account: first, its assumption that the reference point
is static and second, the lack of any further assumptions about how the reference
point actually is computed. Motivated by research in psychology and behavioral
economics, nowadays it is assumed that a subject somehow incorporates expecta-
tions about the future into the computation of his reference point. In other words, it
is assumed that the reference point includes some stochastic elements. Köszegi and
Rabin build their model on the essential intuitions in PT but extend and modify it
to develop a more generally applicable theory. The model is based on the idea of a
stochastic reference point which is determined by a subjects expectations about the
future and it is computed endogenously by the economic environment within the
decision making process.
Within this model, a subject‘s modified utility depends on comparisons of prospec-
tive outcomes x to relevant reference points r (expressed by the reference dependent
utility function v) as well as on absolute components (expressed by the intrinsic util-
ity function u). That is, Köszegi and Rabin incorporate basic assumptions of EUT and
PT. The model is introduced step by step, beginning with the simple case where no
uncertainty is involved.14
For a riskless prospective outcome x ∈ C considered with respect to a riskless ref-
erence point r ∈ C, the modified utility µ : C× C → C is given by
(3.20) µ(x|r) = u(x) + v(x|r)
u(x) is a subjects intrinsic utility that corresponds to the outcome-based utility clas-
sically studied in economics and v(x|r) is the reference dependent utility, with similar
14For a better understanding I concentrate on the one dimensional version of this model and refer
the interested reader to the original paper where the k-dimensional version of the model is discussed.
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features as the value function in PT (see listing below).
The authors assume that
(3.21) v(x|r) = v(u(x)− u(r))
where v is a universal gain loss function which satisfies the following properties:
A0 (Regularity) v(0) = 0, and v is twice differentiable on R0
A1 (Preference Monotonicity) v is strictly increasing
A2 (Small Stake Loss Aversion) v′+(0) and λ :=
v′−(0)
v′+(0)
> 1
A3 (Large Stake Loss Aversion) x > x′⇒ v(x) + v(−x) < v(x′) + v(−x′)
A4 (Diminishing Sensitivity) v′′(x) ≤ 0 for x > 0 and v′′(x) ≥ 0 for x < 0
Incorporating some uncertainty about the reference point, the model extends as
follows. A riskless prospective outcome x ∈ C is now evaluated according to an un-
certain reference point Y ∈ P. That is, the reference point is expressed by a Lottery
Y with distribution function G. That is, x is compared to possible reference points
r ∈ C. A subject’s overall utility is then given by the modified utility weighted by all
reference points:
(3.22) U(x|Y) =
∫
µ(x|r)dG(r)
That is, a subject compares a prospective outcome x with what he, based on his
expectations about the future, considers possible.
If the prospective outcome to be evaluated is also uncertain, i.e. if the subject com-
pares a Lottery X with distribution function H with a reference Lottery Y with distri-
bution function G the overall utility is given by
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(3.23) U(X|Y) =
∫ ∫
µ(x|r)dG(r)dH(x)
That is, a subject evaluates each Lottery X according to its expected utility. The
expected overall utility of each lottery is determined by the average of how it feels
relative to each possible realization of the reference point Y. For example, if the refer-
ence lottery is a gamble between 0 Euro and 100 Euros, a prospective outcome of 50
Euros feels like a gain relative to 0 Euro, and like a loss relative to 100 Euros, and the
overall sensation is a mixture of these two feelings.
The authors propose that evaluating a lottery, a subject assesses the reference de-
pendent utility in each dimension (gains and losses) separately. This means that a
subject not only cares about both intrinsic utility and reference dependent utility but
there is also strong relationship between them.
Based on this model of RDP, Köszegi and Rabin propose two solution concepts
which model how a subject chooses between two or more lotteries out of a choice set
P. These concepts internalize the computation of the reference point within the deci-
sion making process. Both solution concepts require that expectations and choice of
a subject have to be consistent. This means, that in a Unacclimating Personal Equilib-
rium (UPE), on the one hand the subject correctly predicts his own behavior regarding
the choice of a lottery out of P and on the other hand he is not willing to deviate from
this plan when he actually faces the choice between the lotteries out of P.
A Lottery X ∈ P is a UPE if
(3.24) U(X|X) ≥U(X′|X)
for all lotteries X′ ∈ P. Maximizing his overall utility, a subject will consider his
expectations as given. If a subject expects to choose X in his UPE, choosing X needs
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to actually maximize his overall utility among all others options, i.e. he is willing to
go through with his plan. Obviously there might be more than one UPE regarding
the choice between a set of lotteries. A lottery is a preferred personal equilibrium
(PPE) if X is a UPE and
(3.25) U(X|X) ≥U(X′|X′)
for all UPE X′ ∈ P.
A subject can evaluate all his UPE according to their overall utility, i.e. he can
choose the one which brings the highest overall utility.
With respect to the analysis of the reference dependency of risk attitudes (refer to
Section 4.3.1, where the concept of risk attitude is discussed in more detail), Köszegi
and Rabin (2007) propose another solution concept, which is to be considered if there
is a greater time span between choice and the realization of the prospective outcomes,
as for example when buying an insurance. This longer time span enables the subject
to adapt his expectations to the actual situation after the choice was made. A Lottery
X ∈ P is a choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE) if
(3.26) U(X|X) ≥U(X′|X′)
for all lotteries X′ ∈ P.
When a subject is going to choose X ∈ P, he anticipates that X will later serve as
his reference point relative to which he will evaluate the prospective outcome. That
is, the lotteries are compared to a reference lottery which is identical with the lottery
under consideration. Observe, that within RDP (in CPE as well as in UPE and PPE)
the reference point always equals the lottery actually chosen by the subject, such that
the overall utility from choosing a sample Lottery X is always the same, independent
of wether the subject bases his choice on UPE or CPE. The main difference in these
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solution concepts is what this overall utility is compared to. In UPE, the overall util-
ity of choosing Lottery X is compared to the overall utility of not choosing Lottery X,
given that the reference point is choosing Lottery X. That is, the reference point does
not adjust to the deviation. In CPE, the overall utility of choosing Lottery X is com-
pared to the overall utility of not choosing Lottery X, given that the reference point
has changed to not choosing Lottery X. That is, the reference point does adjust to the
deviation.
3.2 Psychology
In the field of psychology, there is a broad spectrum of literature and research con-
sidering the human decision making process. The main focus in this thesis is the
cognitive-affective interplay within decision making and the two processing systems
which are triggered according to the affectivity of a decision in the sense of the Dual-
Processing Theory. It is assumed (as discussed in Section 2.1), that there exists an ex-
periential system which processes affective decisions and an analytical system which
processes cognitive decisions. This section introduces three psychological models
which address the role of affect in the decision making process from a different per-
spective: the Affect Heuristic (AH), the Feelings as Information Theory (FaI) and the
Risk as Feelings Theory (RaF).15 The focus within the AH is on the question of how
subjects rely on affect, expressed as mental images, while they make a decision. These
mental images are directly elicited by the decision task itself. The authors don’t make
any assumptions about the contrary role of the analytical system, yet they are aware
that there are two systems at stake. The main focus of FaI is on the idea that a sub-
ject’s mood also influences a decision to be made. Schwarz and Clore (1983) address
the circumstances under which even incidental emotional reactions may change a
15Please refer to Section 2.1.2, which shortly discusses the different possible definitions and charac-
terizations of emotions and feelings. As the different definitions of emotions and feelings are some-
times rather confusing, the end of this chapter will point out the understanding of each concept which
will be followed within the rest of this thesis. However, this literature review of the relevant theories
follows the notations of the according authors.
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subject’s mood such that this may change his preferences. RaF is similar to the AH,
unless it additionally focuses on the interplay between the experiential and the ana-
lytical system. Loewenstein et al. (2001) ask if the experiential system just informs the
analytical system or if there is any stronger influence or guidance in the decision mak-
ing process. Thus, discussing these three models comprises a wide range of research
about the role of affect in the decision making process and it seems to be promising
to further analyze these models with the focus on the development of the ADMF.
3.2.1 The Affect Heuristic (AH)
The AH is a theoretical framework, developed by Paul Slovic and his colleagues, that
describes the importance of affect in guiding judgments and decisions.16 Research
during the last forty years considered the questions of how subjects perceive risk,
loss, and benefit and how the provided information may influence decision making
under risk.
As introduced in Section 2.1.2, affect is one component of within the Dual-
Processing Theory. The authors consider affect as very important in the decision
making process. According to Zajonc (1980), affect indicates an instinctual reaction
to a stimulation which occurs before the typical cognitive processes. That is, affect
in the AH is defined as the specific quality of goodness or badness experienced as a
feeling. This feeling marks the positive or negative quality of a stimulus.
The term heuristic comes from the greek language and means "find" or "discover".
A heuristic is based on techniques which refer to the experiences already made with
similar situations for example decision making, solving a problem, or learning. The
solution of a heuristic is not guaranteed to be optimal. Heuristics may be practical in
use in situations where finding the optimal solution takes a very long time or costs
are very high. That is, a heuristic can speed up the process of making a good decision
by using mental shortcuts to ease the cognitive load of decision making.
16cf. Slovic et al. (2007), Finucane et al. (2000), Slovic et al. (2004), Slovic and Peters (2006)
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The AH, as proposed by Paul Slovic and his colleagues, specifies how affect guides
human judgement and decision making. Figure 3.3 depicts how the AH operates
while a subject evaluates a decision. The upper part of Figure 3.3 depicts the affective
and sometimes unconscious input, whereas the lower part of Figure 3.3 depicts the
observable input of a decision situation. In the AH, it is assumed that representations
of objects and events are tagged with affect, which means that there are mental images
of these objects, marked by positive or negative feelings. These mental images might
be based on experience in previous decisions or based on a comparison with similar
situations.
If a subject is confronted with a decision to be made, he consults an "object pool"
containing all the positive and negative tags which are consciously or unconsciously
associated with the representations. The basic research question which the authors
try to answer within the AH is how perceived risk and perceived benefit are balanced
against each other in order to announce: "How safe is safe enough?". It is assumed
that information which is provided may influence the quality of a tag. The perception
of risk and benefit is negatively correlated. That is, if information says benefit is high,
this tags the problem positive and leads to a lower perception of risk and vice versa.
If information says risk is high, this tags the problem negative and leads to a higher
perception of risk and vice versa. Thus, these findings reveal different risk attitudes
in different situations. The concept of risk attitude is discussed in more detail within
Section 4.3.
To include the AH into the decision making process, as it will be discussed and
analyzed in the following chapters, reveals challenges in two dimensions. First, the
definition of risk used in the sense of the AH is not the same as it is commonly es-
tablished in the economic conventions of decision making under risk as discussed in
Section 3.1. Here, risk in the authors’ definitions means the loss associated with an
event which may occur with a certain probability. Thus, it is highly needed to set up a
unified definition of the relevant concepts. Second, within their research considering
subjects to use an AH while making decisions, Paul Slovic and his colleagues focus
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FIGURE 3.3: The Affect Heuristic
on the role of affect and rather relieve the discussion of its interplay with a cognitive
processing of decision making. Yet, within the AH it is possible to "explain" several
phenomena observed in economic decision making. The following chapter goes into
more detail and analyzes how the findings coming from the AH can be integrated
into the cognitive-affective interplay within the decision making process.
3.2.2 Feelings as Information (FaI)
FaI is also known as the Affect as Information Theory or Mood as Information Theory.
It has been developed by Schwarz and Clore (1983) as a model to explain the role of
affect in social judgment where the authors conducted two experiments in which
happy and sad moods were induced to investigate the impact on a subject’s general
life satisfaction. The findings of this first study are applicable to more general feelings
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and judgments.
In the sense of FaI, Schwarz (2011) understands feelings as subjective experiences
towards a judgment situation such as moods, emotions, metacognitive experiences,
and bodily sensations, which occur mainly outside of consciousness. Within the
framework of FaI it is assumed that subjects attend to these subjective experiences
(feelings) as a source of information. That is, different feelings elicit different types of
information and information processing.
This framework differentiates between incidental and integral feelings. Integral
feelings are direct reactions towards a situation or problem. Incidental feelings are
not directly elicited by the situation or problem to be judged but may also serve
as informational input to guide the subject’s judgement. Incidental feelings are for
example elicited by sunny or rainy days which influence a subject’s overall mood.
Schwarz and Clore (1983) find that a subject judges his overall life satisfaction better
on sunny days than on rainy days. Schwarz (2011) states that, incidental feelings that
are due to an unrelated influence can lead a subject’s judgement astray. Incidental
and integral feelings provide information about goodness or badness of the current
situation. Schwarz and Clore (1988) consider that, subjects integrate this unconscious
evaluation by asking themselves "How do I feel about it?". How much a subject relies
on the information provided by this unconscious evaluation depends on the source of
these feelings. If a subject is aware that his good mood is due to the nice weather out-
side then the influence of these feelings on the judgement is mostly eliminated. On
the other hand it is possible to prime subjects to trust their incidental feelings which
leads to a greater influence on the judgement situation.
In FaI Schwarz and Clore (1996) assume, that depending on the value of the in-
formational input different systems of processing are addressed. That is, if the un-
consciously evaluated feelings signal a problematic environment, the processing is
systematic, bottom up and with much attention to detail. If a benign environment
is signalled, the processing is heuristic, top down and with the use of preexisting
knowledge .
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FaI has been developed in the context of social judgement rather than decision
making under risk. But as it makes generally applicable assumptions on human
judgement and problem solving it may also be applicable to the specific context of
economic decisions in a risky environment. Whereas within the AH, as discussed in
Section 3.2.1, the focus is on the role of affect which is directly related to the decision
task, in FaI the authors focus on the question of how a positive or negative "back-
ground" mood might influence decision making. The main difference to the AH is,
that a subject’s background mood might be changed due to incidental events. The
next chapter provides a discussion of how the findings of FaI might be integrated in
the cognitive-affective interplay within the decision making process.
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FIGURE 3.4: Feelings as Information
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3.2.3 Risk as Feelings (RaF)
Loewenstein et al. (2001) propose RaF as an alternative model to the consequential
perspective on decision making. The authors choose the term ’consequential’ because
in classic economic theory the lotteries of a decision problem are typically assessed by
their possible consequences: the prospective outcomes. The model differs from the
AH and FaI by highlighting the different role of expected and immediate emotions in
the decision making process. On the one hand, expected emotions are expected to be
experienced when the decision results in a positive or negative prospective outcome.
That is, they are part of the cognitive analysis of the decision problem as they are
part of the assessment of the prospective outcomes. These emotions are for example
considered in the RT and DT.17 On the other hand, there are immediate emotions or
feelings, which are experienced when confronted with a decision problem. That is,
immediate emotions are direct reactions to the input factors of a decision.18 RaF pro-
poses that, contrary to the AH and FaI, emotions do not only inform in the decision
making process but immediate emotions also lead to different behavior than a pure
cognitive evaluation would predict. That is, even if a subject is aware of the cogni-
tively evaluated best strategy, feelings will lead to a different behavior. Within the
framework of RaF these two strands of literature are brought together.
The main focus of the research by Loewenstein et al. (2001) is to investigate when
and why such divergences in emotional and cognitive analysis of a decision problem
occur and what can be learned in order to predict human behavior. As shown in
Figure 3.5 RaF assumes that both cognitive evaluation and feelings guide behavior,
which leads to a decision.
The authors propose that cognitive evaluation of a decision situation is on the one
hand based on the desirability of a prospective outcome, which means emotions such
17Please refer to Section 3.1, where I discussed the relevant economic models and theories.
18Please refer to Section 2.1.2, which shortly discusses the different possible definitions and charac-
terizations of emotions and feelings. As the different definitions of emotions and feelings are some-
times rather confusing, the end of this chapter will point out the understanding of each concept which
are followed within the rest of this thesis.
19Source: Loewenstein et al. (2001), Figure 3 on page 270
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as regret, relief, and disappointment are included in the assessment of a prospective
outcome. On the other hand the cognitive evaluation of a decision is based on sub-
jective probabilities.
Parallel to the cognitive evaluation however, there is an emotional evaluation of
the decision situation which results in immediate feelings towards the specific task.
These feelings are influenced not only by the desirability of the prospective outcome
and by subjective probabilities but also by other factors such as vividness and imme-
diacy of the decision and also by the subject’s mood. The authors propose that the
different factors influencing emotional and cognitive evaluation lead to the observed
discrepancy of behavior. Contrary to the AH and FaI, RaF focuses on both the af-
fective and the cognitive processing of decision making. However, the authors don’t
make any further assumptions about how the interplay between these two systems
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might be modeled. They rather focus on the idea that the affective and cognitive pro-
cessing might somehow work parallel. The following Chapter 4 analyzes how RaF
deals with the evaluation of prospective outcomes, the given probability distribution
and how a subject’s risk attitude can be captured and thus how the findings of RaF
can be integrated into modeling the cognitive-affective interplay.
3.3 Neuroscience
In neuroscience, there is an emerging field of research considering neural systems in-
volved in economic decisions under risk. Contrary to research in psychology where
the above described frameworks are proposed and widely accepted as an environ-
ment for testable variables considering the decision making process, in neuroscience
there is only one model that provides an overall environment of the decision mak-
ing process which is widely accepted, the SMH. Thus, neuroscientific research is still
at its beginning in providing a framework of the neural basis of economic decision
making under risk. There are however numeral experimental studies which investi-
gate specific tasks and identify the role of the different brain regions in the economic
decision making process. There is a strong need to bring these experimental results
together and provide a universal language which allows the definition of an overall
framework of the neural system of economic decisions under risk. This section first
introduces the SMH and second gives an overview of other existing neuroscientific
frameworks, experimental studies and reviews considering decision making under
risk and, with the focus on Research Question 2, identifies the relevant underlying
concepts that are important for further analysis of the neuroscientific input into the
decision making process.
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3.3.1 The Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH)
What the common economic models of decision making under risk, as discussed in
Section 3.1, do not explain is: Why do subjects evaluate gains unlike losses, for exam-
ple: Why are subjects risk averse facing gains and risk seeking facing losses? Why do
states of optimism lead to different choices than states of pessimism? Why, when the
market is crashing everyone rushes to sell, and when it is growing, everyone rushes to
buy? These questions are, to a certain extent, addressed by the psychological models
introduced in Section 3.2. The SMH assimilates the idea introduced by psychological
literature, that besides the cognitive processing of a decision, there might also be an
affective processing of a decision.
Within the SMH, it is suggested that prior to every cognitive processing there is an
unconscious evaluation of prospective outcomes by somatic markers, which strength-
ens the deliberations by Zajonc (1980) that affective processing in fact is prior to cogni-
tive processing.20 The unconscious preparing by the body may help to identify which
alternatives are advantageous and which are not. In other words, prior to every de-
cision there is an unconscious evaluation of different alternatives. The evaluation
results in physiological reactions, like for example changes in HR or SR. This means,
the body enters different somatic states when confronted with different decision sit-
uations. These somatic states are reactions to the anticipation of different prospec-
tive outcomes and guide the subject to advantageous decisions. The SMH provides
a systems-level neuroanatomical and cognitive framework for decision making and
shows how it is influenced by emotions. The key idea of this hypothesis is that de-
cision making is a process influenced by marker signals, which express themselves
in emotions and feelings (Bechara and Damasio 2005). According to the authors, an
emotion is defined as follows:
"An emotion is defined as a collection of changes in body and brain states
triggered by a dedicated brain system that responds to specific contents
20Please refer to Section 2.1.2 where the idea of a Dual-Processing Theory is briefly introduced.
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of ones perceptions, actual or recalled, relative to a particular object or
event." (Bechara and Damasio (2005), p. 339)
The trigger that elicits an emotion is "an emotionally-competent stimulus". The sub-
ject responds to this stimulus. This response results in a specific somatic state, which
is expressed by physiological reactions. These reactions are for example, as described
in Section 2.1.3, changes in HR, SC or respiration. A stimulus can be a primary or
secondary inducer. Primary inducers result in immediate emotions while secondary
inducers result in anticipated emotions. Primary inducers are innate or learned stim-
uli that cause pleasurable or aversive somatic states. Primary inducers automatically
trigger a somatic response, as for example a snake automatically induces fear. Sec-
ondary inducers are generated by remembering an emotional event, i.e. thoughts and
memories of the primary inducer, which then elicits a somatic state. Examples of sec-
ondary inducers are for example the memory of encountering a snake or the memory
of losing a large sum of money. The imagination of being attacked by a bear, winning
an award, or losing a large sum of money, are also examples of secondary inducers.
The authors suggest that the Amygdala is a critical substrate in the neural sys-
tem for triggering somatic states from primary inducers, whereas the Ventromedial
Prefrontal Cortex (VMPFC) is a critical substrate for triggering somatic states from
secondary inducers.
The somatic reactions that drive a subject’s decisions can be positive or negative
somatic reactions, whereas positive somatic reactions serve as a start-signal for a de-
cision and negative somatic reactions serve as a warning-signal against a decision.
The SMH is a commonly accepted model of neural systems of decision making.
However, as it doesn’t focus specifically on decision under risk, there is a wide variety
of future research questions which can be investigated and discussed.
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3.3.2 Neural Systems of Decision Making
Besides the SMH, there exist several other frameworks and theories which take the
neural systems of decision making into account. However, none of them provides
such a comprehensive study as the SMH. These frameworks and models are rather
mostly more focused on specific tasks within the decision making process which is
naturally not less important to develop a better understanding of decision making.
Studies of neuroscience with different methods such as fMRI and LS investigate how
the brain works and which parts of the brain are active during the different tasks
of the decision making process.21 In neuroscience as well as in psychology, there is
the upcoming interest of research how the brain includes affective and cognitive pro-
cessing. There are brain regions and systems that are suggested to be appropriate for
cognitive processes and others are suggested to be appropriate for affective processes.
By scanning the activation of these brain regions during a decision task it is inferred
how these regions might be involved in the decision task.
Table 3.2 provides an overview of literature relevant in this thesis. Within these
studies, the computational and neural basis of the decision making process is investi-
gated by combining the methods from the behavioral decision making literature such
as risky decision making tasks. The results and findings are extremely limited to the
underlying decision task that has been conducted during the experiment.22
Gold and Shadlen (2007) discuss the decision making process by considering how
it is implemented in the brain. Figure 3.6 depicts the elements of the decision making
process. The left side of the picture represents elements "in the world" and the right
side represents elements of the decision "in the brain". The black-rimmed elements
represent context. The red-rimmed elements form a decision. The blue-rimmed ele-
ments evaluate and possibly update the decision making process. They focus on very
simple sensory motor tasks such as wether to put ones hand up or down. However,
21Please refer to Section 2.1.3, where the history and methodology of research in neuroscience is
discussed.
22Refer to Section 2.1.3, where the limitations of neuroscientific methods are shortly discussed.
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they state understanding how such simple tasks are processed in the brain provides
the basis to understand more complex tasks.
FIGURE 3.6: The Neural Basis of Decision Making23
Rangel et al. (2008) present a framework which focuses on the decision making
process to be divided into five steps. Figure 3.7 depicts the five steps of the value-
based decision making process. The first step focuses on the representation of the
decision which includes the set of the feasible actions. The authors assume that these
feasible actions are evaluated differently according to which internal or external state
the subject is in. An internal state is for example the state of hunger, an external state
may consider the environment, i.e. how far is the next restaurants away.25 In the
23Source: Gold and Shadlen (2007), Figure 1 on page 537
24Source: Rangel et al. (2008), Figure 1 on page 546
25These assumptions underline psychological research in a way, that an internal state might be put
on one level with the idea of an affective state.
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FIGURE 3.7: The Neurobiology of Value-Based Decision Making24
second step the subject has to identify the value of each action and in the third step
the action with the highest value is chosen. In the forth step the prospective outcome
is evaluated according to how desirable it is. The representation, valuation and action
selection processes are updated according to what is learned in the fifth step in order
to improve the quality of future decisions.
Mohr et al. (2010) investigate the neural processing of risk. Figure 3.8 depicts a
potential mechanism of risky decision making. As the authors understand it, a risky
stimulus is for example a gamble, or a choice menu with different financial invest-
ments. This stimulus is initially evaluated on an emotionally level. The Anterior In-
sula (aINS) is suggested to estimate how possible it is that the risky stimulus results in
an unwanted prospective outcome. The thalamus is suggested to reflect other impor-
tant aspects of prospective outcomes, e.g. their variability. Mohr et al. (2010) suggest
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that after an initial emotional processing, there is a cognitive processing mediated by
the Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex (DMPFC). Emotional as well as cognitive process-
ing inform the actual decision process in the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC)
and the Parietal Cortex where actually the choice is made.
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FIGURE 3.8: A Potential Mechanism of Risky Decision Making26
Levin et al. (2012) conduct a meta study to investigate the question of distinct
neural systems processing gains and losses. Figure 3.9 depicts a neural model of
decision making under uncertainty. The authors suggest that uncertainty of a deci-
sion situation serves as a stimulus which is characterized as a primary inducer. Pri-
mary inducers are processed by the Amygdala, which then triggers the VMPFC. The
VMPFC is suggested to process uncertainty more deliberately on a cognitive level. It
is, however, suggested that decisions which involve potential losses (which primarily
26Source: Mohr et al. (2010), Figure 4 on page 6617
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induce a danger), trigger a redundant neural system in the Insula (anterior, poste-
rior, and both) and the adjacent Primary Somatosensory Cortices (SI) and Secondary
Somatosensory Cortices (SII), which are independent of the Amygdala. This is sug-
gested to be a back up system which guarantees for the fast processing of potential
danger in case of a lesion in one of these brain regions.
Choice
Behavior
Uncertainty
(Primary Inducer) 
Amygdala
VMPFC
Insula/
Sll, Sl
FIGURE 3.9: Neural Model of Decision Making Under Uncertainty27
These studies underline psychological research when they provide evidence, that
in fact affective processing can be prior to cognitive processing as suggested by the
meta studies of Mohr et al. (2010) and Levin et al. (2012). Based on these numeral
studies and experiments, in neuroscientific literature it is nowadays most commonly
accepted that the following brain areas are suggested to be involved in decision mak-
ing appropriate for different processes.
27Source: Levin et al. (2012), Figure 1 on page 2
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Amygdala: The Amygdala is involved in the formation of the immediate emotion
fear and plays an important role in the emotional evaluation, recognition and analyz-
ing of aversive situations and dangers. The Amygdala processes the external stimuli
and initializes the vegetative reactions. The Amygdala is suggested to process the
"Fight or Flight?" mode.
Prefrontal Cortex: The Prefrontal Cortex is located in the front parts of the frontal
lobe. It is the target of the dopaminergic reward system. The Prefrontal Cortex is
assumed to be involved in cognitive and executive functions of decision making. The
Orbitofrontal Cortex and the Ventromedial Cortex are part of the Prefrontal Cortex.
Insula: The Insula is assumed to be involved in the emotional evaluation of pain.
Striatum: The Striatum is part of the Basal Ganglia. The Nucleus Accumbens
(NAcc) is the reward system and is part of the Striatum.
3.4 The Important Concepts in Decision Making Under
Risk
This chapter provides a detailed literature review of the existing models of decision
making in economics, psychology and neuroscience, which are appropriate as a basis
for further analysis how to integrate affect into decision making under risk.
When a subject is about to make a decision, the most important factors are possibly
the prospective outcomes in which his decision might result. In the existing economic
literature, it has become a general assumption that a subject evaluates a prospective
outcome according to some subjective utility. The assumed properties of the utility
function differ to some extent within the economic theories. As discussed in Section
3.1, models of behavioral economics include the idea that preferences are not just
based on cognitive assessment but also on some anticipations and expectations. At
this point, the AH, FaI and RaF (as discussed in Section 3.2) can tie in with research
about the role of affect within decision making under risk. These theories extend the
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idea of integrating expected emotions into a subject’s utility function by providing
results which suggest that affective properties of a prospective outcome elicit direct
emotional reactions which lead to different processing. Research in neuroscience also
suggests that the properties of a prospective outcome are important for further eval-
uation of a decision to be made, as discussed in Section 3.3. Thus, it is a promising
approach to analyze how a prospective outcome is evaluated (as will be discussed in
Section 4.1) and how the findings from economics, psychology and neuroscience can
be merged to explain the cognitive-affective interplay in the evaluation of prospective
outcomes.
As, within this thesis, the focus is on decision making under risk, the probabil-
ity distribution over the prospective outcomes is known to the subject and needs to
be taken into account. Within economic literature, it is most commonly accepted
that probabilities are weighted subjectively as suggested by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979). However, for the sake of simplicity, in most theories probabilities are consid-
ered linearly. Yet, the authors are aware of the fact that subjects actually do not really
weight probabilities linearly. With regard to this Köszegi and Rabin (2006) state:
"Despite the clear evidence that people’s evaluation of prospects is not lin-
ear in probabilities, our model simplifies things by assuming preferences
are linear."(Köszegi and Rabin (2006), p. 1137)
Further, economic literature doesn’t make any assumption why probabilities are
weighted other than linear and how this weighting might depend on the properties
of a prospective outcome. At this point, research in psychology and neuroscience
might provide some explanations. Considering the role of affect in decision mak-
ing under risk reveals some interesting observations about the subjective weighting
of probabilities and implies that in fact this subjective weighting is due to the affec-
tive properties of a prospective outcome (Rottenstreich and Hsee 2001). There is also
research in neuroscience providing input to the question of how and why probabil-
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ities are subjectively weighted.28 Thus, it might be promising to discuss how the
probability distribution is evaluated by a subject and how the role of affect (from
the psychological as well from the neuroscientific perspective) can shed light on the
question why probabilities are weighted subjectively in Section 4.2. Research in neu-
roscience, especially within the imaging techniques however reveals one important
point: the concept of probabilities is somehow artificial, introduced in mathematics
and economics to overcome the lacking knowledge about future states of the world.
Thus investigating decision making with the focus on subjective probability weight-
ing in the brain is very hard to capture. To analyze how and why subjects subjectively
weight probabilities might be a promising approach in two ways: it first might extend
the understanding of the cognitive-affective interplay in decision making under risk
and second this might provide the opportunity for further research in neuroscience
and thus a better understanding how the brain deals with probabilities.
Subjects form their preferences based on the evaluation of the prospective out-
comes as well as on the given probability distribution. Yet, in some situations, sub-
jects seem to be different according to their risk preferences. Economics take a sub-
ject’s risk attitude into account, often following the observations of Kahneman and
Tversky that subjects are risk averse in the face of gains and risk seeking in the face
of losses. However, in economic literature, it is assumed, that a subject’s risk attitude
is given and does not change due to situational factors. Yet, it is commonly accepted
and often observed that one subject likes to gamble as well as to buy insurance.29 In
psychology as well as in neuroscience there is evidence, that a subject’s risk attitude
in fact is context specific. It is assumed that the affectivity of a decision situation influ-
ences a subject’s risk attitude.30 Thus, to analyze how a subject’s risk attitude can be
captured within decision making under risk and to further discuss how this helps to
understand the cognitive-affective interplay is an issue to be discussed in more detail
28cf. Paulus and Frank (2006), Hsu et al. (2009), Berns et al. (2008), Takahashi et al. (2010)
29cf. Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
30cf. Slovic et al. (2007), Loewenstein et al. (2001), Knoch et al. (2006), Kuhnen and Knutson (2005),
Engelmann and Tamir (2009)
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within Section 4.3.
Thus, based on the review of the economic literature in this chapter, the following
three components of decision making under risk are indispensable to discuss.
• How is a prospective outcome evaluated?
• How is the probability distribution evaluated?
• How can a subject’s risk attitude be captured?
The analysis of these three components of decision making under risk within the
disciplines of economics, psychology and neuroscience is based on several underly-
ing concepts. A clear definition of these concepts is important for the understanding
of the further discussion of decision making under risk within this thesis. In eco-
nomics, decision making under risk is defined as follows:
Decision Making under Risk: Decision making under risk in economics is mod-
eled by a choice problem over a set of lotteries, where a lottery is defined as a distri-
bution of probabilities over a set of prospective outcomes.
As discussed in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3, literature in psychology and neuro-
science suggests that affect and cognition are interacting while a decision is made and
that affective reactions are very often even primary to cognitive appraisal.31 Based on
the literature review within this chapter, the following psychological and neuroscien-
tific concepts are indispensable to understand the following deliberations and ana-
lyzes within Chapter 4. In Section 2.1.2 affect is suggested to be the "umbrella-term"
of all emotional concerns as the opposite to cognitive concerns. In the rest of this
thesis I follow the definition of Slovic et al. (2007) and understand affect as follows:
Affect: Affect encompasses emotions, feelings and mood by demarcating a positive
or negative quality of a stimulus.
There is no unitary definition of the three concepts emotions, feeling and mood.
Based on the discussed psychological and neuroscientific literature, I understand
31cf. Zajonc (1980) and Bechara and Damasio (2005)
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these concepts as follows. First, as discussed in Section 2.1.2 there is not one defini-
tion of an emotion but there exist several strands of literature which provide different
definitions and characterizations of emotions. I follow the definition of an emotion
by Bechara and Damasio (2005):
Emotion: An emotion is a collection of body and brain states triggered by a dedi-
cated brain system that responds to specific contents of a subject’s perceptions, actual
or recalled, relative to particular object or event.
Further, I follow the definitions of Loewenstein et al. (2008) who further distinguish
between the following characterization of emotions which are relevant in the decision
making.
Immediate Emotions: Immediate emotions are immediate visceral reactions to
stimuli.
Expected Emotions: Expected emotions are anticipated to be experienced as reac-
tions to stimuli in the future.
Integral Emotions: Integral emotions are immediate emotions, which are elicited
by a stimulus directly related to the decision.
Incidental Emotions: Incidental emotions are immediate emotions, which are
elicited by a stimulus not directly related to the decision.
Second, Bechara and Damasio (2005) provide a definition of feelings which is
widely accepted and adopted.
Feeling: A feeling is the subjective experience associated with an emotion.
Third, mood, other than feelings and emotions, can best be understood as a state
that is of low intensity and longer duration. In the rest of this thesis I understand
mood as suggested by Scherer and Peper (2001) and Bechara and Damasio (2005).
Mood: Mood is an emotional state which is positive or negative and extended in
time.
The affectivity of a stimulus within a decision under risk, for example a prospective
outcome, induces a mental image. That is, a subject can somehow imagine how it
will feel to receive such a prospective outcome. In the rest of this thesis, based on the
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definition in Slovic et al. (2007), I understand a mental image as follows.
Mental Image: A mental image is an image of an object or event marked with
positive or negative feelings and is induced by emotions.
Emotions, feelings and mood mark an object positive or negative with a mental
image of the object and trigger a change of a subject’s affective state. The context and
content of the provided information in the decision situation trigger affect (emotions,
feelings or mood) of different valence which leads to different affective states.
System 1 System 2
POSITIVE POSITIVE
NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
HOT COLD
Affective State
FIGURE 3.10: The Characteristics of an Affective State
As depicted in Figure 3.10, an affective state can either be positive or negative. De-
pending on how emotionally vivid and imaginable the information is presented, the
subject enters a hot, i.e. exited affective state, or cold affective state. As discussed
in Section 2.1, within psychology it is assumed that a subject forms his decision ac-
cording to the processing of two systems, as proposed by Epstein (1994) and Sloman
75
Chapter 3 Decision Making under Risk: A Literature Overview
(1996). The affective state is appropriate for triggering either System 1 or System 2.
A hot affective state triggers System 1 and leads to a fast, unconscious processing of
the decision. On the other hand, if the provided information is pallid and not very
impressive, the subject stays in a cold affective state. This triggers System 2 and leads
to slow, conscious and deliberate processing of the decision task. A subject may also
enter a hot affective state, independent of the decision task, which may also lead to a
change in preferences due to the processing by System 1. According to Schwarz and
Clore (1983) this will not be the case when the subject is aware of the fact that he is in
a hot affective state due to an incidental situation. If the affective state is cold, System
2 is triggered.
According to Loewenstein et al. (2001) I understand an affective state as follows:
Affective State: An affective state is characterized by a fourfold pattern. It can
either be hot or cold. Each state can adopt two attributes: positive or negative. It
changes spontaneously with the influence of feelings, mood and emotions.
System 1: The experiential or associative system bases its processing on affect. It
operates pleasure-pain oriented and evaluates according to "What feels good?".
System 2: The rational or rule-based system bases its processing on cognition. It
operates reason oriented and evaluates according to "What is sensible?".
As discussed in Section 2.1.2, psychophysiological research provides the know-
how to identify emotions according to physiological reactions. Using this method-
ology, Antonio Damasio and Antoine Bechara developed the SMH introduced in
Section 3.3.1, which suggests that somatic markers guide behavior in order to make
advantageous decisions and prove this suggestion by showing that these markers ex-
press themselves as somatic states which can in fact be measured prior the decision
making. This rather neuroscientific perspective underlines the psychological concept
of mental images which, via emotions, feelings and mood, influence a subject’s affec-
tive state and thus trigger either System 1 or System 2.
Somatic Marker: A somatic marker can either be positive or negative and serves
as a start signal for a decision or a warning signal respectively and expresses itself in
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an emotion or feeling.
Somatic Marker are triggered by primary or secondary inducers and result in a
somatic state.
Primary Inducer: A primary inducer is a direct reaction to a stimulus and results
in an immediate emotion.
Secondary Inducer: A secondary inducer is a thought about the reaction to a stim-
ulus and results in an expected emotion.
Somatic State: The body responses referred to a stimulus result in a somatic state
which includes physiological reactions, such as changes in HR, SC and respiration.
The current state of neuroscientific knowledge has broadened during the last cen-
tury. New technology, such as fMRI, allows for better understanding how the brain
works and which parts of the brain are relevant in different processes. As discussed
in Section 3.3, the following regions are known to be relevant for decision making:
the Amygdala, the Prefrontal Cortex, the Striatum and the Insula.
Part I of this thesis first focused on the interdisciplinary approach used in this thesis
and provided an introduction of the history and relevant methodology of economics,
psychology and neuroscience. Further it provided a detailed review of the existing
literature within the three disciplines. Based on this discussion the focus was on
Research Question 1 and Research Question 2. The following Part II analyzes how
economics, psychology and neuroscience deal with the relevant components of deci-
sion making under risk based on the above defined underlying concepts in order to
develop the ADMF.
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TABLE 3.2: Selected Literature on Investigating the Neural Systems in (Economic) Decision
Making
(ES = Experimental Study, RE = Review, FW = Framework)
Author(s) Problem ES RE FW
Levin et al. (2012) A neuropsychological approach to understanding risk-taking for
potential gains and losses
X
Mohr et al. (2010) Meta study on neural processes of risk X
Symmonds et al. (2010) A behavioral and neural evaluation of prospective decision-
making under risk
X
Christopoulos et al. (2009) Neural correlates of value, risk, and risk aversion contributing to
decision making under risk
X
Martino et al. (2009) The neurobiology of reference-dependent value computation X
Engelmann and Tamir (2009) Individual differences in risk preference predict neural responses
during financial decision-making
X
Fox and Poldrack (2009) Prospect theory and the brain X
Hsu et al. (2009) Neural response to reward anticipation under risk is nonlinear in
probabilities
X
Tobler et al. (2009) Risk-dependent reward value signal in human prefrontal cortex X
Knutson et al. (2008) Nucleus accumbens activation mediates the influence of reward
cues on financial risk-taking
X
Rangel et al. (2008) A framework for studying the neurobiology of value-based deci-
sion making
X
Coricelli et al. (2007) Brain, emotion and decision making: the paradigmatic example of
regret
X
Gold and Shadlen (2007) The neural basis of decision making X
Knutson et al. (2007) Neural predictors of purchases X
Seymour et al. (2007) Differential encoding of losses and gains in the human striatum X
Tom et al. (2007) The neural basis of loss aversion in decision-making under risk X
Weller et al. (2007) Neural correlates of adaptive decision making for risky gains and
losses
X
Martino et al. (2006) Frames, biases, and rational decision-making in the human brain X
Knoch et al. (2006) Disruption of right prefrontal cortex by low-frequency repetitive
transcranial magnetic stimulation induces risk-taking behavior
X
Yacubian et al. (2006) Dissociable systems for gain- and loss-related value predictions
and errors of prediction in the human brain
X
Gonzalez et al. (2005) The framing effect and risky decisions: Examining cognitive func-
tions with fMRI
X
Kuhnen and Knutson (2005) The neural basis of financial risk taking X
Matthews et al. (2004) Selective activation of the nucleus accumbens during risk-taking
decision making
X
Breiter et al. (2001) Functional imaging of neural responses to expectancy and experi-
ence of monetary gains and losses
X
Knutson et al. (2001) Anticipation of increasing monetary reward selectively recruits
nucleus accumbens
X
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Part II
Framework Development

Chapter 4
Decision Making under Risk: Affect
and Cognition
T
HE last chapter discussed the models and theories within economics, psychol-
ogy and neuroscience which are considered to be relevant to gain a better un-
derstanding of the cognitive-affective interplay in order to develop the ADMF. The
prospective outcomes, the probability distribution and a subject’s risk attitude are
the relevant components of decision making under risk which are analyzed within
this chapter. The literature review in Chapter 3 further identified the underlying con-
cepts in each discipline which are important for a profound understanding of decision
making from the perspective of each discipline.
4.1 Evaluating Prospective Outcomes
4.1.1 Economics
The evaluation of prospective outcomes is, as derived from the discussion in Chapter
3, one of the three relevant components of decision making under risk. How does
a subject assign value to a prospective outcome? Most of the decision situations a
subject is actually facing, allow for the comparison of prospective outcomes in the
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sense of better, equal or worse. That is, a subject has a preference relation over all
prospective outcomes. However, a preference ordering as the result of evaluating a
prospective outcome does not allow for further interpretation of the prospective out-
comes value for a subject which might in fact depend on several factors. Thus, it is not
possible to make further calculations as for example calculate the expected value of
a lottery. Thus, in economics it has become usual to assign a numerical value to each
prospective outcome, a so-called subjective utility. As shortly introduced in Section
2.1.1, Bernoulli first introduced the concept of utility to evaluate a prospective out-
come. The analysis of the St. Petersburg Paradox led him to the idea, that subjects in
fact evaluate prospective outcomes according to a subjective value or utility for each
prospective outcome. He proposed a utility function to explain a subject’s choice be-
havior which is not a linear function but it is a concave evaluation of prospective out-
comes. The concave shape of the utility function describes the decreasing marginal
utility which results from the assumption that changes of wealth that are farther away
from the initial endowment have less impact than changes that are close. That is, if
you start with nothing and receive 10 Euros this is a lot. If, however, you already
have 100 Euros, 110 Euros is not significantly more. Nowadays, in economics, it is
most commonly accepted that the value, which a subject assigns to a prospective out-
come, can be expressed by his subjective utility. That is, a utility function, e.g. the
intrinsic utility u(x), assigns a numerical value to each prospective outcome x ∈ C.1
However, in the sense of the economic models of decision making under risk, the
shape of the utility function expresses a subject’s risk attitude and not, as in the sense
of Bernoulli’s initial idea, the decreasing marginal utility.2
Utility Function A function u : C→R is a utility function representing the preference
relation  if, for all x,y ∈ C,
(4.1) x  y ⇔ u(x) ≥ u(y)
1Refer to Mas-Colell et al. (1995) for an introduction into utility functions.
2Refer to Section 4.3.1, where it is analyzed how economic models of decision making under risk
deal with a subject’s risk attitude.
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A preference relation  can be represented by a utility function if it is rational, that
is, if the preference relation is complete and transitive.3 Utility is a key concept in
economic theory to evaluate prospective outcomes. Utility can be ordinal or cardinal.
Ordinal utility is identified by the uniqueness of the utility function up to increasing
transformations. Cardinal utility is identified by the uniqueness of the utility func-
tion only up to linearly increasing transformations.4 That is, for ordinal utilities, a
subject’s utility for a prospective outcome can only be interpreted with respect to bet-
ter, equal or worse than another. It is not possible to draw any conclusion about how
much better a prospective outcome is compared to another. Cardinal utility, however,
assigns meaning to utility differences, which is necessary for mathematical operations
on utilities.5 The theories discussed in this section all have in common that, after the
evaluation, a subject decides for the lottery which provides the highest overall util-
ity, which is represented by the expected utility of its prospective outcomes.6 As the
utilities of the prospective outcomes are summed up and multiplied by their corre-
sponding probability, it is obvious that a subject’s utility is cardinal, as a numerical
utility is depending upon the possibility of comparing differences in utilities, not be-
tween subjects but within one subject. Monotone transformations of utility functions,
which are allowed for ordinal utility functions in the sense of Bernoulli, might for ex-
ample transform a concave utility function into a convex function which may change
a subject’s expected utility and thus his preferences over lotteries.
3Refer to Section 3.1.1 for a short explanation of completeness and transitivity.
4If u(x) is a utility function representing a subject’s preferences in an ordinal utility situation, any
transformation f [u(x)] of the utility function such that f ′ > 0, also represents his preferences. In a
cardinal utility situation, only linearly increasing transformations of the form au(x) + b, where b > 0,
represent the subject’s preferences. These transformations are also called "affine positive" (Fishburn
1970).
5In economic literature there is a large debate on ordinal and cardinal utilities. This debate is often
rather checkered. Refer to Niehans (1990) or Schumpeter (1954) for a detailed discussion of the history
in the debate on the concept of utility.
6The expected utility of a lottery’s prospective outcomes includes the corresponding probability
distribution. The evaluation of a probability distribution in order to derive a decision is captured
within Section 4.2, as I consider it to be promising to discuss the components of decision making
separately. This section only captures the evaluation of prospective outcomes.
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TABLE 4.1: Cardinal Utility in Economic Models of Decision Making under Risk
(EUT = Expected Utility Theory, PT = Prospect Theory, RT = Regret Theory, DT = Disappointment Theory, RDP = Reference Dependent Theory)
Theory Formal EvaluationRP
EUT u : C →R
u′(x) > 0, u′′(x) >,<,= 0
absolute no RP
PT v : C →R
v(0) = 0
v′(x) > 0, v′(x) < v′(−x)∀x > 0
v′′(x) < 0 for x > 0, v′′(x) > 0 for x < 0
relative status
quo
RT
(Bell)
µ : C× C →R
µ(x|y) = u(x) + v(u(x) − u(y)) ∀ pairs
x,y
u : C →R
v : R →R
v(0) = 0, v′(·) > 0, v′′(·) < 0
absolute
&
relative
foregone
asset y
RT
(Loomes&Sugden)
µ : C× C →R
µ(x|y) = u(x) + v(u(x) − u(y)) ∀ pairs
x,y
u : C →R
v : R →R; v(0) = 0, v′(·) > 0
absolute
&
relative
foregone
asset y
DT
(Bell (simple model))
µ : C× C →R
µ(x|x¯) = u(x) + v(u(x)− x¯))
x¯ = px1 + (1− p)x2
u : C →R
v : R →R; v(0) = 0
v(u(x)− x¯) =
{
d(u(x)− x¯) if x < x¯
e(u(x)− x¯) if x > x¯.
d, e ≥ 0 reflects degree of
disappointment/elation
absolute
&
relative
expectation
x¯
DT
(Loomes&Sugden)
µ : C× C →R
µ(x|y) = u(x) + v(u(x)− x¯)
x¯ = px1 + (1− p)x2
u : C →R
v : R →R; v(0) = 0
v′(·) ≥ 0; v′(·) < 1
v′′(z) > 0 for z > 0
v′′(z) < 0 for z < 0
absolute
&
relative
expectation
x¯
RDP µ : C× C →R
µ(x|r) = u(x) + v(u(x)− u(r))
u : C →R; u′(x) > 0
v : R →R; v(0) = 0
v′(z) > 0, v′(z) < v′(−z)∀z > 0
v′′(z) < 0 for z > 0, v′′(z) > 0 for z < 0
absolute
&
relative
expectation
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The question of how economic models and theories deal with the evaluation of
prospective outcomes can be captured within two dimensions. First, how are the
prospective outcomes evaluated per se, i.e. can the utility, derived from the prospec-
tive outcome, be interpreted absolutely or relatively? Second, if the prospective out-
come is evaluated relative to a reference point the question arises what the reference
point actually is.
Table 4.1 depicts the basic assumptions of a utility function as considered by the
economic models and theories, introduced in Section 3.1. All these theories have in
common that they use the concept of utility to assign value to a prospective outcome,
however each theory implies different assumptions about the properties of the utility
function and its formal implementation. The utility functions differ in the way how
value is assigned to a prospective outcome. The evaluation can be classified in three
categories. Value can be assigned absolutely, denoted by the intrinsic utility function
u, relative to a reference point r, denoted by the reference-dependent utility function
v, or by a combination of both, denoted by a modified utility function µ. This section
discusses, on the one hand, the basic idea, similarities and main differences of the
properties of the underlying utility function of each theory and, on the other hand,
how each theory deals with the idea of an underlying reference point.
To evaluate a prospective outcome x absolutely, as in EUT, means that a subject
only considers the intrinsic taste for the prospective outcome itself integrated into his
asset. von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) state that
"The conceptual and practical difficulties of the notion of utility, and
particularly of the attempts to describe it as a number, are well known
and their treatment is not among the primary objectives of this work. We
shall nevertheless be forced to discuss them in some instances [...]." (von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), p. 8)
Von Neumann and Morgenstern use u(x) to assign a numerical value to any
prospective outcome x ∈ C. u describes a subject’s preferences, that is, every sub-
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ject has an individual intrinsic utility function. An intrinsic utility function is char-
acterized by its shape, which can be concave, convex or linear.7 That is, a subject’s
individual properties are only expressed by his individual u.
With PT, Kahneman and Tversky propose an alternative approach of decision mak-
ing under risk.8 They also use the concept of utility, yet they follow a rather different
approach to identify how a subject assigns value to a prospective outcome. Other
than within EUT, where value is assigned absolutely, PT assigns value to changes
in wealth. That is, relative to a reference point, a prospective outcome is evaluated
as a gain or a loss. Kahneman and Tversky introduce a reference-dependent utility
function v which assigns a number v(x) to each prospective outcome x. v(x) can be
interpreted as the utility difference of prospective outcome x and a reference point
r. Thus, v(x) reflects the subjective value of a prospective outcome. Kahneman and
Tversky assume that, for a subject a loss looms larger than a gain, which is expressed
by the assumption that v(x) is generally steeper for losses than for gains. Further, the
value function is concave for gains and commonly convex for losses.9,10 To account
for these basic assumptions of the value function, Kahneman and Tversky need to
introduce the concept of a reference point, which serves as a benchmark to identify a
prospective outcome of a lottery as a gain or a loss. The concept of a reference point
is one of the major extensions compared to EUT and with this concept, it is possible
to approach the observation that subjects show a different attitude towards risks in
the domain of gains and the domain of losses and that losses loom larger than gains.
Kahneman and Tversky state, that
"Our perceptual apparatus is attuned to the evaluation of changes or
differences rather than to the evaluation of absolute magnitudes. When
7The shape of the utility function gives rise to the question of a subject’s risk attitude. Refer to
Section 4.3, where the concept of risk attitude is discussed in detail.
8Please refer to Section 3.1.2, where the basic assumptions of PT are discussed.
9The concavity for gains and convexity for losses of the value function further implies that subjects
are risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. The concept of risk
attitude is very important to capture how a subject deals with a risky decision, thus risk attitude is
analyzed in more detail within Section 4.3.
10Figure 3.1 depicts a typical value function.
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we respond to attributes such as brightness, loudness, or temperature, the
past and present context of experience defines an adaptation level, or ref-
erence point, and stimuli are perceived in relation to this reference point."
(Kahneman and Tversky (1979), p. 277)
However, the authors only propose a very ambiguous definition of how the ref-
erence point really is computed. In PT and its more generalized extension CPT, the
reference point is exogenous. It is most commonly assumed that this reference point is
the status quo. Yet, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) discuss three interesting situations
which might result in a shift of reference and the resulting evaluation of prospective
outcomes as gains or losses without a further specification of these points.
Expectations: There might be situations in which gains and losses are evaluated rel-
ative to expectations which differ from the status quo.
Adaption: The reference point might differ from the status quo if there are recent
changes in wealth which have not yet been adapted.
Problem Formulation: The reference point might differ from the status quo if the
decision situation is formulated in terms of final assets than in terms of gains
and losses.
Based on the observations that subjects show several systematic anomalies in be-
havior and the resulting idea that subjects in fact evaluate a prospective outcome rel-
ative to some reference point, other theories of decision making under risk have been
developed. RT was proposed simultaneously by Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden
(1982). As discussed in Section 3.1.3, the basic idea of RT is, that a subject incorpo-
rates both, the prospective outcome x as well as the foregone prospective outcome
y into his decision, with y being the reference point r. That is, the intrinsic utility of
x is increased or decreased by a reference-dependent ’regret/rejoice’ function v such
that the modified utility µ assigns a value to each x ∈ C with respect to the forgone
outcome y. Bell, as well as Loomes and Sugden understand regret as the difference
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between the utility of what a subject actually gets (u(x)) and what he would have got
if he had chosen differently (u(y)). The difference might be negative which induces a
decrease of utility or positive which induces an increase of utility. That is, other than
proposed earlier by Savage (1951), minimizing the maximum regret is not the only
criterion how to decide. Yet, regret relative to the foregone asset is traded off against
the absolute value of a prospective outcome. To be more precise, by incorporating re-
gret into his decision, a subject compares all prospective outcomes of one lottery to all
prospective outcomes of the other lotteries at choice. That is, a subject compares his
utility of what is, to the utility of the situation that might have been if he had chosen the
other lottery (given, that the same state of the world occurs). Then a subject’s degree
of experienced regret or rejoice depends only on the difference between the intrinsic
utility of what is and the intrinsic utility of the reference point what might have been. In
order to concentrate on the effect of regret and rejoice on the modified utility, u(x) is
assumed to be linear, such that u(x) = x.
The modified utility function µ expresses how u(x) changes when it is compared
to the (not chosen) prospective outcome y. The difference between µ(x|y) and u(x) is
interpreted as an increment or decrement of utility corresponding with the sensations
of regret or rejoice (expressed by v). That is, while choosing the best lottery, a subject
compares the prospective outcomes of the lottery with those of the reference point
in the same state of world and not with prospective outcomes in other states of the
world. Thus, the emotion of regret is expected if v(·) is negative, i.e. if the prospective
outcome of the chosen lottery is smaller than the reference point, given a state of the
world i. For example a subject has to choose between the two lotteries X and Y.
He decides for X and then the ith state of the world occurs. Now he experiences the
prospective outcome xi. He knows that, if he had chosen Y, he would now experience
the prospective outcome yi. This leads to the feeling of regret or rejoice, depending
on the fact if the not chosen prospective outcome is better or worse.
The RT as proposed by Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) are quite similar
in their assumptions. However, the models differ in one major point: Bell’s model
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only allows for the decision between two lotteries with two prospective outcomes.
Loomes and Sugden provide a more general model which allows for the choice be-
tween two lotteries with n prospective outcomes. Both models require to incorporate
regret as a reference point into a decision, thus a subject needs full information about
all prospective outcomes.
DT by Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986) were developed in addition to
RT rather than as a competing model.11 In fact, it is possible that a subject incorpo-
rates both, regret and disappointment, into his decision. However, for the sake of
simplicity and the clear focus on the possible explanations of a subject’s behavior,
which integrating disappointment can provide, the authors discuss regret and disap-
pointment separately. The basic idea of DT is, that a subject incorporates both, the
prospective outcome x as well as his expectations x¯ about the realization into his de-
cision. His expectations serve as his reference point. u(x) assigns a number to the
subject’s intrinsic taste of x. u(x) is increased or decreased by a reference-dependent
’disappointment/elation’ function v such that µ(x|x¯) = u + v finally assigns value
to each x ∈ C.12 Bell (1985), as well as Loomes and Sugden (1986) understand dis-
appointment as the difference between the intrinsic utility of what a subject actually
gets (u(x)) and what he expected to get. The difference might be negative which
induces a decrease of utility or positive which induces an increase of utility. As pro-
posed within PT, a subject’s expectations about the realization of a prospective out-
come might induce a shift of the reference point away from the status quo. Thus, DT
make more concrete assumptions about how to incorporate a subject’s expectations
into a decision. In order to anticipate disappointment (and its counterpart relief), a
subject needs to have some expectations about the realization of the lottery. That is, a
subject compares each lottery separately to his expectations of the other prospective
outcomes. Thus, a subject compares his utility of what is, to the utility he expected to
11Please refer to Section 3.1.4, where DT is discussed. If it is not explicitly mentioned I refer to Bell’s
simple model in the rest of this thesis. The intuition of disappointment as a factor of utility is sufficient
in the simple model.
12Note that, as in RT, intrinsic utility is assumed to be linear.
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have. In DT the reference point is the expectation about the realization of a lottery
and thus computed endogenous. As in RT, DT, proposed by Bell, only allows for the
evaluation of lotteries with two prospective outcomes x1, x2 ∈ C, where it is always
assumed that x1 > x2. DT, as proposed by Loomes and Sugden allows for a preference
relation over lotteries with n prospective outcomes.
Table 4.1 depicts the properties of µ(·) as assumed by Köszegi and Rabin (2006)
for riskless outcomes and deterministic reference points.13 This reveals, that up to
the additive constant u, µ is equivalent to Kahneman and Tversky’s value function
v. However, and these are their main contributions, they extend their model by a
stochastic component and they approach a subject’s content and context sensitivity
with respect to the properties of µ (Köszegi and Rabin 2007).14 RDP allows the refer-
ence point to be stochastic. That is, a subject compares a prospective outcome x to an
uncertain reference point represented by the Lottery Y with probability distribution
G. Then, the subject’s utility is given by the weighted modified utility µ(x|r) over all
reference points, such that:
(4.2) U(x|Y) =
∫
µ(x|r)dG(r)
That is, a subject who decides according to the model of RDP compares a prospective
outcome x to what he thinks might occur on the basis of his expectations. With their
model of RDP, Köszegi and Rabin adopt the idea that expectations in fact play a role
in decision making under risk. The idea, that expectations are somehow determining
the reference point is similar to DT. Yet, the main difference to DT is first, that the
reference point is stochastic and second, that the authors use an equilibrium concept
as solution how to evaluate a lottery.15 That is, their model requires consistency of
expectations and choice. One important question, which they address, is how do sub-
13Please refer to Section 3.1.5, where the model of RDP is discussed.
14As they mainly approach context sensitivity by analyzing reference dependency of risk attitudes,
I discuss this issue in more detail within Section 4.3.1.
15Please refer to Section 4.4, where I discuss how the utility, assigned to a prospective outcome, will
be incorporated into the overall utility of a lottery.
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jects react to deviations from their reference point, and a second interesting question
is: what is the reference point? They argue that the reference point might actually
be the status quo if a subject expects to maintain the status quo, but there might be
several circumstances leading to expectations different from the status quo. That is,
Köszegi and Rabin (2006) propose on page 1134, that a subject’s "reference point is
the probabilistic beliefs he held in the recent past about outcomes". When evaluating
a prospective outcome as a gain or a loss, it makes a difference if a subject’s reference
point is the status quo or expectations. If a subject receives an unexpected amount of
5.000 Euros this will probably be assessed as a gain. If a subject expects to receive a
gratification of 6.000 Euros but only receives 5.000 Euros, this may be perceived as a
loss.
To sum up, as suggested by economic literature, the evaluation of a prospective
outcome can be classified in one of three categories:
• Absolute evaluation with u
• Evaluation relative to a reference point with: v
• Combination of both with µ = u + v
Based on the above discussed theories, the underlying reference point may be de-
termined by either one or more of the following aspects:
• Status quo as assumed within PT
• Regret and rejoice, which are expected emotions of prospective outcomes
• Expectations of prospective outcomes are determined by the underlying proba-
bility distribution of a lottery and lead to disappointment or elation.
The discussion within this section reveals that economic models already incorpo-
rate the idea that the measurement of welfare might not be a one-dimensional eval-
uation but that other factors, such as expected emotions, might somehow play a role
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in the determination of utility. This section concludes that the assumptions within
the discussed models all reveal important factors which provide that including affect
into the evaluation of a prospective outcome seems to be a promising approach. This
can be captured within four different aspects:
1. Kahneman and Tversky suppose that losses loom larger than gains.
2. A reference point might be based on expectations and expected emotions about
the future
3. The discussion of how the economic models deal with the evaluation of a
prospective outcome reveals that they all differ between gains and losses. How-
ever, the definition of what a loss actually is, is quite contentious. Compared to
a reference point, receiving a positive prospective outcome might be perceived
as a loss. This leads to the result that there is a difference between a real loss
(compared to the status quo) and a relative loss (compared to unaccomplished
expectations).
4. The evaluation of a prospective outcome is context and content sensitive.
The next section discusses how psychological and neuroscientific research sheds
light on the role of affect while evaluating a prospective outcome.
4.1.2 Psychology
How does a subject psychologically assign value to a prospective outcome? As in-
troduced in Section 2.1.2, psychology research on decision making comprises emo-
tion theory and cognitive psychological as well as the idea of a cognitive-affective
interplay. Hereby, the important role of affect in the formation of preferences is in-
disputable yet, there exist different approaches how to capture this influence. On
the one hand, affective reactions result from the cognitive evaluation of a prospective
outcome. This has been, as derived from the analysis of the economic evaluation of
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prospective outcomes in Section 4.1.1, integrated into economic research. This ap-
proach is a rather consequential perspective as subjects base their decisions on the
consequences of a decision situation.
Loewenstein et al. (2001) state, that
"[...] EU-type theories posit that risky choice can be predicted by assum-
ing that people assess the severity and likelihood of the possible outcomes
of choice alternatives, albeit subjectively and possibly with bias error, and
integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calcu-
lus to arrive at a decision. Feelings triggered by the decision situation and
imminent risky choice are seen as epiphenomenal, that is, not integral to
the decision-making process." (Loewenstein et al. (2001), p. 267)
On the other hand, as introduced in Sections 2.1.2 and 3.2, there are psychological
models and theories considering the Dual-Processing Theory which, contrary to the
consequential perspective, suggest that immediate emotions directly influence a sub-
ject’s evaluation of prospective outcomes.16 Thus, this strand of literature suggests,
that affective reactions are also a source of information on which subjects base their
evaluation. Zajonc (1980) goes even further and states, that:
"In fact, it is entirely possible that the very first stage of the organism’s
reaction to stimuli and the very first elements in retrieval are affective. It
is further possible that we can like something or be afraid of it before we
know precisely what it is and perhaps even without knowing what it is.
And when we try to recall, recognize, or retrieve an episode, a person, a
piece of music, a story, a name, in fact, anything at all, the affective quality
of the original input is the first element to emerge." (Zajonc (1980), p. 154)
Integrating both approaches addressing affective meaning in the formation of pref-
erences results in the idea of a Dual-Processing Theory as discussed in Section 2.1.2.
16As discussed in Section 2.2.2, immediate emotions can be integral as well as incidental to the
concrete decision situation.
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The result from the analysis of the economic evaluation of prospective outcomes in
Section 4.1.1 reveals, that economic literature considers three categories how to assign
value: absolute, relative to a reference point or a combination of both. This section
discusses how affect influences the evaluation of prospective outcomes during deci-
sion making under risk in order to assign value to a prospective outcome and how the
integration of affect can be put in the context of this economic categorization of utility
functions. This section is structured as follows. It first discusses how the psycholog-
ical theories assign an absolute value to a prospective outcome. Second, it discusses
the psychological aspects of a reference dependent evaluation and third it identifies
a correlation of the prospective outcomes properties and the need for a reference de-
pendent evaluation.
Following the approach of Dual-Processing, the evaluation of a prospective out-
come serves as a stimulus which elicits affective reactions expressed by different types
of emotions, feelings or changes in a subject’s mood.17 Psychologists work with the
concept of mental images to capture how subjects assign value to prospective out-
comes in order to form preferences. Mental imagery is understood as the recall and
re-experiencing of a personal affective event. That is, when making a decision, a sub-
ject considers the prospective outcomes which may elicit strong positive or negative
emotional reactions. Therefore, as suggested within the RaI Theory by Loewenstein
et al. (2001), images of losses evoke vivid negative mental imagery whereas images of
gains evoke positive mental imagery. Within the AH, Slovic et al. (2007) make similar
suggestions. They suppose, that representations of prospective outcomes in subjects
minds are tagged to varying degrees with affect. In the process of decision making,
people consult or refer to an object pool containing all the positive and negative tags
consciously or unconsciously associated with these representations. That is, they re-
fer to mental images that are marked by positive and negative feelings in order to
build preferences.
To put this in the context of the cognitive-affective interplay, it is supposed that
17Please refer to Section 3.4, where the definitions of emotion, feelings and mood are summarized.
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a prospective outcome which evokes vivid positive or negative mental imagery is
considered to be affective. A prospective outcome, which doesn’t elicit such strong
mental images is considered to be non-affective. As discussed in Section 3.2 and 3.4,
strong mental images lead to a hot affective state whereas benign mental images lead
to a cold affective state.
The following example by Hsee (1996) illustrates the difference between an affec-
tive outcome and a non-affective outcome. If a subject is asked to evaluate a prospec-
tive outcome of 10.000.000 Euros, the challenge is not really hard. Probably every-
body would evaluate 10.000.000 Euros as a very attractive gain because the joy about
it elicits very vivid positive mental images how it would feel to have so much money.
A prospective outcome of 10.000.000 Euros is affective. Yet, there are also prospective
outcomes that do not elicit strong mental images. Consider for example the following
situation. If a subject were to evaluate a prospective outcome of 9 Euros he will find
it quite a hard challenge, because without any context he probably cannot tell how
much he would like those 9 Euros. A prospective outcome of 9 Euros is non-affective.
The situation changes as soon as there is some information added which makes it
possible to compare the 9 Euros with something. If, on the one hand, the alternative
outcome was 1 Euro, 9 Euros would probably have been perceived as quite attractive.
If, however the alternative outcome was 100 Euros, a 9 Euros outcome would rather
be perceived as a loss and not a gain.18
In order to adopt a categorization, which approaches a terminology that is more
related to the evaluation of prospective outcomes, it will further be denoted that,
according to their affectivity, prospective outcomes are easy-to-evaluate or hard-to-
evaluate.19
Easy-to-evaluate: A prospective outcome is easy-to-evaluate if it elicits positive or
negative emotions which trigger a mental image of how good or bad it feels to receive
18The affectivity or non-affectivity of a prospective outcome is not limited to monetary outcomes.
19I use the terminology of easy-to-evaluate and hard-to-evaluate on the basis of Hsee (1996). He
derived these notions from a slightly different context, when he investigated preference reversals ob-
served when alternatives are evaluated joint or separate. Yet, I expanded their applicability by several
assumptions, these notions in terms of my understanding can still be applied in the original sense.
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this outcome.
Hard-to-evaluate: A prospective outcome is hard-to-evaluate if it doesn’t elicit
strong emotions which trigger a mental image of how good or bad it feels to receive
this outcome.
These deliberations indicate, that a prospective outcomes property of being easy or
hard to evaluate corresponds with how a subject assigns value to it. A prospective
outcome which doesn’t carry strong affective meaning is hard-to-evaluate and thus
needs a reference to compare it with, that is, in terms of economics, utility is assigned
relative to a reference point. Hsee (1998) suggests that preferences are constructed
ad hoc and depend on whatever comparison information is available at the time of
the evaluation. This can also lead to the struggling result that a prospective outcome
which is objectively worse than another is evaluated as better. He comes to this con-
clusion by discussing the following example. If a subject buys ice cream and gets a 8
cl cup filled with only 7 cl and his friend buys a 5 cl cup filled with 6 cl this may lead
to a better evaluation of the smaller cup even though there is less ice cream. Subjects
seem to use different information as their reference points. If the reference associ-
ated with the high-value option is better than the high-value option itself, and/or if
the reference associated with the low-value option is worse than the low-value op-
tion itself, the less-is-better effect may emerge. These findings may possibly only
occur if first, the prospective outcomes to be evaluated are non-affective, thus hard-
to-evaluate and second, the prospective outcomes are quite easy to compare them to
a reference (i.e. the cup size). Hsee (1998) refers to this fact as the domination by the
relation-to-reference attribute. This relation-to-reference attribute can also be fleshed
out by consideration of the following pictures.20 Figure 4.1 depicts a grey, single-
colored bar. If this bar, however is considered in comparison to a shaded frame, it
seems that the bar was also shaded.
How to compute the reference point is an important question within this thesis. The
economic models, discussed in Section 4.1.1, make several assumptions how it is com-
20These pictures are often used examples for visual illusions.
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FIGURE 4.1: Relation to Reference
puted and the idea emerges that the reference point is computed ad hoc depending
on the specific content and context of the decision based on a subject’s expectations
and expected emotions about the prospective outcomes.
Based on the analysis in this section, the possible determinants of the reference
point are extended by the affectivity of the prospective outcomes.
• Status quo as assumed within PT
• Regret and rejoice, which are expected emotions of prospective outcomes
• Expectations of prospective outcomes, which are determined by the underlying
probability distribution of a lottery and lead to disappointment or elation
• Affectivity of the prospective outcomes
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The status quo, expected emotions and expectations of prospective outcomes as
possible determinants are derived from the discussion of the economic models in
Section 4.1.1.
Psychological deliberations, based on the models discussed in Section 3.2, extend
this list in two dimensions. First, it is assumed that the affectivity of prospective
outcomes, based on their properties, are relevant for the computation of a reference
point. Second, interpreting all determinants on the basis of the Dual-Processing The-
ory (as discussed in Section 2.1.2) reveals some interesting results with respect to how
a subject makes a decision under risk.
To consider the status quo as a reference point, as proposed by Kahneman and
Tversky, is definitely very practicable in some situations. A subject who is struggling
for his daily food will judge a gain of 9 Euros as great compared with the status quo.
The status quo also seems to be important when a subject evaluates a potential loss.
As discussed in Section 4.1.1, there might be a difference in the evaluation of a real
loss and a relative loss.21 In terms of loss aversion and the endowment effect there is
evidence that subjects do not want to lose anything of what they already have, i.e.
from their status quo.22
One would intuitively assume, that integrating expected emotions and expecta-
tions into a subject’s utility function, as proposed within RT, DT and RDP, addresses
the affective evaluation of a prospective outcome. However, regret, rejoice, disap-
pointment or relief are expected emotions for which it is assumed that they do not
change a subject’s affective state and thus might not trigger affective processing.23
Thus, as discussed by Loewenstein et al. (2001) expected emotions only address the
cognitive evaluation of a prospective outcome.
Expectations about a prospective outcome are influenced by the subject’s knowl-
21In neuroscience, there is a large body of research investigating the question of distinct neural
systems processing gains and losses to give rise to the question why losses loom larger than gains.
This issue is discussed in Section 4.1.3.
22Refer to Thaler (1980), who introduces the idea of the so-called endowment effect.
23Refer to Section 2.1.2, where the different categorization of emotions is discussed and Section 3.4,
where the concepts, as applied within this thesis, are established.
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edge and experience of similar situations. That is, a subject anticipates how it could
feel if his expectations were not fulfilled. According to RaF, incorporating these ex-
pectations is also part of a cognitive evaluation.
However, additionally to such a cognitive, consequential analysis of the prospec-
tive outcomes, the affectivity of a prospective outcome elicits immediate affective
reactions (e.g. immediate emotions such as: desire, greed, hope and fear) which
result in mental images and therefore lead to different affective states. Affective
prospective outcomes do not really need to be compared to a reference point. Yet,
non-affective prospective outcomes are hard-to-evaluate without a reference point.
Further, prospective outcomes may not be evaluated separately but by comparing the
alternatives to each other. To be more precise, sometimes it is not even possible at all
to evaluate a prospective outcome without a reference. That is, the reference point to
which a prospective outcome is compared might change as the possible alternatives
change.
To put this in the context of the Dual-Processing theory, this discussion summarizes
as follows. Prospective outcomes can be characterized as affective and non-affective
outcomes. Thus, a prospective outcome can be easy-to-evaluate or hard-to-evaluate.
Based on this characterization, the evaluation of a prospective outcome is more or less
based on the comparison to a reference point. The affectivity of a prospective outcome
influences a subject’s affective state which determines the processing system, System
1 or System 2.24
To sum up, when a subject evaluates a prospective outcome he assesses the follow-
ing three properties:
• Condition of a prospective outcome
– Monetary
– Material
24Refer to Section 2.1.2 and Section 3.4, where the characteristics of System 1 and System 2 are
discussed.
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– Non-material (emotional)
– Imminent
– Future
• The magnitude of the change
• The reference point, determined by
– Status quo as assumed within PT
– Regret and rejoice, which are expected emotions of prospective outcomes
– Expectations of prospective outcomes, which are determined by the un-
derlying probability distribution of a lottery and lead to disappointment
or elation
– Affectivity of the prospective outcome
The condition of a prospective outcome as well as the magnitude of the change
determine its affectivity which is a relevant determinant of the underlying reference
point.
4.1.3 Neuroscience
This section discusses how the brain reflects the cognitive-affective interplay while
evaluating a prospective outcome during decision making under risk in order to iden-
tify how neuroscience contributes to the development of the ADMF.
Despite the large progress in the development of new technology, it is still not easy
to test how the brain works. As discussed in Section 2.1.3, the usual approach is to
identify those regions in the brain that are active during a specific decision task. With
respect to what is already known about the function of such a specific brain area,
its activation during the decision task is interpreted and conclusions about decision
making are inferred. Thus, these results are dependent on the specific decision task
and do not allow drawing conclusions about a more general function about how the
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brain works while making decisions. Yet, it allows (to a certain extent) for approving
or rejecting specific hypotheses about how a subject processes a decision task. The
more profound and detailed the understanding of the specific decision task is, the
easier it is to control for some isolated variables. As derived from the discussion in
Section 4.1.1 and Section 4.1.2, it is not quite clear yet what actually serves as a ref-
erence point while evaluating a prospective outcome and how it is computed. Thus,
it is not easy to test for the reference dependent evaluation in the brain. However, it
is possible to test for the processing of absolute gains and absolute losses. Addition-
ally, in neuroscience there is much knowledge about those brain regions that process
emotional input and those regions that process cognitive input.25 To draw conclu-
sions from those areas, known to be involved in emotional and cognitive processes
may also give rise to the question of when stimuli are processed emotionally and
when cognitively.
Considering the cognitive-affective interplay, Weller et al. (2007) propose a model
which is based on the findings of the SMH. Within the SMH, it is assumed that deci-
sion making is guided by two separate neurological processes, both generating emo-
tion. Bechara and Damasio (2005) assign the Amygdala to be responsible for pro-
cessing primary inducers and the VMPFC for processing secondary inducers. Weller
et al. (2007) suggest that, on the one hand, the first process generates an automatic,
fast and affective judgment focused on immediate outcomes and that this judgement
is triggered by a primary inducer. A primary inducer puts affective value to a stim-
ulus and in neuroscience it is most commonly believed that this is processed by the
Amygdala. On the other hand they suggest a second process which operates more de-
liberative, focused on emotional responses associated with anticipated outcomes and
that this judgement is triggered by secondary inducers. A secondary inducer puts
affective value to the thought of a stimulus or the imagination of a stimulus and in
neuroscience it is most commonly believed that this is processed by the VMPFC. The
VMPFC is also responsible for linking together working memory and emotional sys-
25Refer to Section 3.3, where the relevant neuroscientific studies are discussed.
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tems. The authors propose that Amygdala-generated responses trigger the VMPFC.
Based on the findings of Kahneman and Tversky and other behavioral research, that
losses loom larger than gains, the authors conduct an experimental study to investi-
gate these origins in the brain. The results of this experiment reveal that in fact there
might be two distinct neural systems at stake, depending on the domain (gains or
losses). They find that patients whose Amygdala is destroyed are not able to make
advantageous decisions when gains are at stake. However this is not the case when
losses are at stake. They suggest that for decisions involving losses there are redun-
dant processes involving the Insula. They suppose that these redundant processes
have evolved to minimize the possibility to disrupt the processing of prospective
losses.
Gonzalez et al. (2005) propose a cognitive-affective tradeoff model which offers a
possible explanation for the observation that subjects tend to avoid sure losses and
also tend to avoid risky gains. The model differentiates between cognitive effort (for
example the effort to calculate expected values of a lottery) to evaluate a lottery and
the effort to identify the affective value of a lottery. It is assumed that a decision
is based on the tradeoff between a good decision in the affective sense (what feels
correct?) and a minimal cognitive effort. Subjects tend to avoid costly cognitive
processing as well as outcomes which might result in feelings of displeasure. This
cognitive-affective tradeoff is supposed to be easier in the domain of gains than in
the domain of losses. Thus, the model supports the idea that losses are processed
differently than gains. Using the "Asian Disease Problem" described by Tversky and
Kahneman (1981), Gonzalez et al. (2005) intend to show why the compromise is easy
to achieve in the domain of gains and more difficult in the domain of gains.
Positive frame:
If Program A is adopted, exactly 200 people will be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1 in 3 probability that all 600 people will be saved
and a 2 in 3 probability that no people will be saved.
Negative frame:
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If Program C is adopted, exactly 400 people will die.
If Program D is adopted, there is a 1 in 3 probability that nobody will die and a 2 in
3 probability that all 600 will die.
On the one hand, results of the underlying fMRI study reveal that the choice of
a sure gain requires less cognitive effort than the choice for the risky gain. The au-
thors suggest that the tradeoff between minimizing cognitive effort and minimizing
affective effort (expressed by feelings of displeasure) is easy in the domain of gains.
Thus, individuals execute a decision very fast and prefer the sure outcome. On the
other hand, the tradeoff between minimizing cognitive effort and minimizing affec-
tive effort is more complex in the domain of losses because both, the sure loss and the
lottery involve costs. Choosing the lottery, the subject needs to compute its expected
value and an affective cost involved in the possibility of accepting a loss. Yet, the
choice for the sure outcome involves a higher affective cost because the subject needs
to accept a sure loss.
Within neuroscience, it is most commonly accepted that the Amygdala and the
VMPFC are involved in the decision making process, whereas the Amygdala pro-
cesses emotional stimuli, mostly aversive such as fear or anxiety and that the VMPFC
mediates emotional and cognitive processing.26 That is, the neuroscientific perspec-
tive of understanding the decision making process also supports the idea that deci-
sion making is based on two different processes. Further, research in neuroscience
also supports the idea that gains and losses are processed differently, i.e. there might
be different neural systems at stake when evaluating a gain or a loss.27 With neurosci-
entific methods, most commonly fMRI studies, it is possible to identify those regions
which are involved in the processing of prospective outcomes. Levin et al. (2012)
provide a meta study to investigate if qualitatively and quantitatively different pro-
cesses may be involved in risky decision making for gains and losses. They find that,
in order to be able to answer this question, one has to take into account the point of
26cf. Weller et al. (2007), Bechara and Damasio (2005)
27cf. Tom et al. (2007), Yacubian et al. (2006), Seymour et al. (2007)
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time when the fMRI data is collected. If it is measured before the decision is made,
i.e. in the evaluation phase, most of the studies support the idea that there are dif-
ferent neural systems processing gains and losses. However if the data is collected
during the anticipation phase,i.e. when a decision has already been made there is less
support for the idea of different systems.
The results of the existing neuroscientific studies indicate that, in fact, affect influ-
ences the different perceptions of gains and losses because the driving positive and
negative emotions are processed by distinct neural systems. Aversive emotions are
mostly processed in the Amygdala which is, from an evolutionary point of view a
very old part of the human brain. This can interpreted such as nature prepared hu-
mans to be able to detect danger and potential loss very quickly, i.e. to decide very
fast between "fight or flight". Therefore it results in stronger reactions when a po-
tential loss is at stake instead of a potential gain. It seems that evolution prepared
humans to be able to spontaneously evaluate an absolute loss as well as a sure gain
without the need of a reference point.
4.2 Probability Distribution
4.2.1 Economics
As discussed in Section 4.1.1, a subject assigns value to a prospective outcome with a
subjective utility function. However, as this thesis considers decision making under
risk, a subject will not obtain the prospective outcome which provides him with the
highest subjective utility, yet each prospective outcome is associated to a probability
with which it might be realized.28 That is, in order to make a decision under risk, a
subject needs to evaluate both, the prospective outcomes as well as the underlying
probability distribution.
Approaching the probability distribution within decision making under risk allows
28Refer to Section 2.1.1, where I shortly introduce the history of probability theory and its use in
economics.
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for a discussion in two dimensions. First, there are several objective concepts which
provide the possibility to compare lotteries with regard to its risk. Second, there are
two approaches how to model a subject’s integration of a probability into his evalu-
ation of a lottery: linear or non-linear. This section will first introduce the objective
concepts to approach the probability distribution. Yet, as the thesis concentrates on
the subjective perspective of a decision making under risk, it skimps with this de-
piction. For a detailed discussion of these concepts please refer to Mas-Colell et al.
(1995) (Chapter 6) and Laux et al. (2012) (Chapters 4 and 5). Second, it will go into
detail analyzing the observation that subjects actually tend to weight probabilities
non-linearly.
The expected value is a simple concept which allows to compare two lotteries be-
cause it is very easy to compute. E(X) denotes the expected value of Lottery X. Lot-
tery X is expressed by the probability distribution p and the prospective outcomes x.
The expected value is the weighted average of the k prospective outcomes x ∈C of the
lottery. The weights are the probabilities p assigned to these prospective outcomes.
(4.3) E(X) =
k
∑
i=1
xi pi
However, the expected value is not really an appropriate concept to compare lotter-
ies because it does not take into account how risky a lottery is, i.e. how the prospective
outcomes are spread.
The concept of the variance takes the risk of a lottery into account. The variance
is described as the expected quadratic deviation from the expected value. Thus, the
variance measures how far a set of prospective outcomes is spread out. A variance of
zero indicates that all the values are identical. A non-zero variance is always positive.
A small variance indicates that the prospective outcomes of a lottery tend to be very
close to the expected value. A high variance indicates that there is a great spread from
the expected value and from each other.
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(4.4) Var(X) = E[(X − E(X))2]
These two concepts indicate, that there are two ways to compare probability dis-
tributions over prospective outcomes. The expected value of a lottery comprises the
outcome level whereas the variance comprises the dispersion of outcomes. However,
it is easy to construct examples which imply that these concepts often collide as for
example a higher variance of one lottery coexists with a smaller expected value of the
other. That is, the variance itself is as well not a sufficient concept to compare two
lotteries.
The (µ,σ)-principle combines those concepts. According to this principle, µ refers
to the expected value E(X), as defined in Equation 4.3, and σ refers to the standard
deviation which is the root of the variance Var(X), as defined in Equation 4.4.29,30
Thus, in the sense of the (µ,σ)-principle Lottery X is evaluated as follows:
(4.5) U(X) = E(X)− αVar(X)
That is, the expected value enters the (µ,σ)-principle positively such that subjects
prefer lotteries with a higher expected value and the variance enters negatively such
that subjects prefer lotteries with a smaller variance. Here, α > 0 weights the impor-
tance of the variance and thus represents the degree of a subject’s risk aversion.31
There is one major point of criticism towards the (µ,σ)-principle. There are exam-
ples which show that the evaluation according to the (µ,σ)-principle can collide with
First Order Stochastic Dominance (FSD).32 This however, contradicts the assumptions
of rationality as shown in the following.
29cf. Laux et al. (2012), Chapter 4
30Please note that, within this thesis µ(·) refers to the modified utility of a prospective outcome x.
However, as in the economic literature, the (µ,σ)-principle is a well known principle, I abstain from
changing its notation within this section.
31Refer to Section 4.3.1, where the concept of risk attitude is discussed.
32For an example cf. Laux et al. (2012)
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The concept of the stochastic dominance takes into account, that, as mentioned
above, there are lotteries which cannot be evaluated according to their expected value
and their variance: FSD and Second Order Stochastic Dominance (SSD).33 FSD eval-
uates a lottery according to its prospective outcomes. A lottery dominates another in
the sense of FSD if it tends to result in higher prospective outcomes.
FSD Given two lotteries X, Y with the distribution functions H, G. Then X stochas-
tically dominates Y (X ≻1 Y) in the sense of FSD if:
(4.6) ∀x : G(x)− H(x) ≥ 0
That is, Lottery X dominates Lottery Y in the sense of FSD if all subjects, who are
rational in the sense of Neumann and Morgenstern, prefer Lottery X over Lottery
Y. Thus, FSD is an appropriate concept to compare probability distributions over
prospective outcomes. However, FSD is not suitable to compare every probability
distribution.
SSD evaluates a lottery according to its risk. A lottery dominates another in the
sense of SSD if it contains lower risk.
SSD Given two lotteries X, Y with the distribution functions H, G. Then X stochas-
tically dominates Y (X ≻2 Y) in the sense of SSD if:
(4.7) ∀x :
∫ x
−∞
(G(x)− H(x))dx ≥ 0
Lottery X dominates Lottery Y in the sense of SSD if all subjects, who decide ra-
tional in the sense of Neumann and Morgenstern and who are risk averse, prefer X
over Y. However, this concept is not appropriate for all subjects. To evaluate a lottery
according to its risk requires assumptions about a subject’s risk attitude as every sub-
ject seems to perceive risk differently. That is, a subject who prefers lotteries in the
33cf. Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Chapter 6
107
Chapter 4 Decision Making under Risk: Affect and Cognition
sense of SSD is risk averse.34 FSD always implies SSD but not vice versa. However,
Stochastic Dominance does not necessarily represent a total ordering: there exist pairs
of lotteries, neither one stochastically dominates the other, yet they are not equal.
The above described concepts objectively compare two lotteries (given by their
probability distribution over a set of prospective outcomes). All these concepts are
different to some extent as they consider the riskiness and the prospective outcomes
of a lottery differently (if at all). Yet, they have in common, that it is assumed that a
subject considers each given probability linearly.
Besides one exception, the economic theories discussed in Section 3.1 follow the
expectation principle which claims that the utility of a lottery is linear in the underly-
ing prospective outcome probabilities. Nevertheless many of them are aware of the
evidence that subjects do not weight probabilities linearly.
Köszegi and Rabin (2007) state that:
"For simplicity, we abstract from nonlinear decision weights: given a
(stochastic or deterministic) reference point, a stochastic wealth outcome
is evaluated according to its expected reference-dependent utility. Our
model of how utility depends on beliefs could be combined with any the-
ory of how these beliefs are formed. As an imperfect but at the same time
disciplined and largely realistic first pass, we assume that a person cor-
rectly predicts her probabilistic environment and her own behavior in that
environment, so that her beliefs fully reflect the true probability distribu-
tion of outcomes."(Köszegi and Rabin (2007) p. 1048)
Instead, there is evidence that subjects tend to underweight large probabilities and
overweight small probabilities, which for example manifests in the certainty effect
on the one hand and simultaneous gambling and insurance purchasing on the other
hand.35 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) take these findings into account and introduce
34The economic concept of a subject’s risk attitude is discussed Section 4.3.1.
35Refer to Section 2.1.1, where I shortly announced that it was Allais (1953) who first introduced
the some examples to exploit the certainty effect. This effect has also been discussed by many authors
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a weighting function π(p), which associates decision weights to the given probabili-
ties. The probability weighting function measures the impact of the probability of an
event on the desirability of a lottery. It is not a linear function of probability, however,
and decision weights are not themselves probabilities.
PT is a rather procedural approach, that is, other than normative theories which
focus on the right prediction of choice, Kahneman and Tversky follow a descriptive
approach to model a subject’s behavior. As already mentioned in Section 3.1.2, it
is one point of criticism towards PT that the non-linear weighting of probabilities
leads to non-monotonicity.36 Quiggin (1982, 1992) accounts for this problem by de-
veloping the Rank-Dependent Expected Utility Theory (formerly "A Theory of An-
ticipated Utility"). He introduces a probability weighting function which transforms
the whole probability distribution over prospective outcomes rather than transform-
ing each probability by itself. By presenting CPT, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) in-
corporate this type of weighting function and thus attend to the criticism of PT’s
non-monotonicity.
As depicted in Figure 3.2 in Section 3.1.2, PT implies an inverted s-shaped form of
the probability weighting function, holding the following properties:
Endpoints The probability weighting function is not continuous in the endpoints.
This reflects the unpredictability of behavior under conditions of extremely
small or extremely large probabilities. In other words, the variance in the prob-
ability weighting function is not constant and is quite large in the region near 0
or 1.
Small Probabilities Small probabilities are overweighted. Experimental evidence
suggests that this holds for probabilities smaller than 0.3.
Large Probabilities Large probabilities are underweighted.
from a descriptive as well as normative perspective (cf. Slovic and Tversky (1974), MacCrimmon and
Larsson (1979)).
36To postulate monotonicity accounts for the fact that First and Second Order Stochastically Domi-
nating lotteries should be preferred to lotteries which they dominate.
109
Chapter 4 Decision Making under Risk: Affect and Cognition
Slope The weighting function is very steep near the endpoints. That is, changes in
probabilities near 0 or 1 have disproportionately large effects on the evaluation
of lotteries. Subjects are very sensitive towards changes in probabilities near
the endpoints. This captures the certainty effect. In the range of medium prob-
abilities the weighting function is flatter, i.e. subjects are not very sensitive to
changes in probabilities in this range.
Losses Capturing the modifications of CPT, the weighting function is slightly differ-
ent for gain and losses.
Yet, the shape of PT’s weighting function is not tested and estimated but rather
inferred from the observed preferences over lotteries. There exists a wide range of
literature with regard to the elicitation of the probability weighting function, both
parametric elicitation as well as non-parametric elicitation.37,38
Based on the fact that each subject subjectively weights the given probabilities, the
idea emerged, that there might exist some factors to influence probability weight-
ing. Lattimore et al. (1992), Abdellaoui (2000), and Cohen et al. (1985) find that the
prospective outcome domain, i.e. gains or losses, influences the weighting of proba-
bilities. Etchart-Vincent (2004) finds that the magnitude of the prospective outcome
as well influences the weighting of probabilities. Thus, approaching the idea of non-
linear probability weighting during decision making under risk consolidates the idea
that decision making is context and content specific.
The next section discusses the psychological side of this issue and shows how the
properties of the weighting function can be explained by discussing the role of affect
within the non-linear probability weighting.
37For a parametric elicitation cf. Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Prelec (1998), Camerer and Ho
(1994). For a non-parametric elicitation cf. Wu and Gonzalez (1996), Abdellaoui (2000). Their basic
tenet is the approval of an inverted s-shaped probability weighting function.
38Refer to Starmer (2000), who provides a very detailed literature overview and discussion of alter-
natives to the EUT and thus literature on the weighting of probabilities.
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4.2.2 Psychology
The psychological models and theories discussed in Section 3.2 provide several ap-
proaches which explain when and why subjects weight probabilities other than linear.
As derived from the discussion of the economic theories and models in Section 3.1,
evaluating a lottery’s probability distribution over the prospective outcomes is one of
the three relevant components of decision making under risk. Kahneman and Tver-
sky suggest that subjects seem to weight probabilities not linearly but by adding some
subjective weight to an objective probability and take these findings into account by
introducing an inverted s-shaped weighting function. However, they don’t make any
statements why subjects weight probabilities as they do.39 Psychological research on
non-linear probability weighting intends to explain the large jumps near the end-
points of the weighting function, i.e. considering very small and very large proba-
bilities and the diminishing sensitivity towards probabilities within a mid-range of
probabilities. The role of affect in the sense of the Dual-Processing Theory plays an
important role here.
Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) suggest that the shape of the weighting function is
influenced by affect. That is, the weighting function will be more inverted s-shaped
for lotteries involving affective prospective outcomes than for lotteries involving non-
affective prospective outcomes. Subjects are more sensitive to probabilities with non-
affective prospective outcomes than with affective prospective outcomes. The emo-
tions which are of interest to explain subjective probability weighting are hope and
fear. Hope and fear are immediate emotions which influence a subject’s affective
state.40 The affective state of a subject is important for triggering System 1 or System
2. Hope and fear come to play in a fourfold pattern, depending on the domain of
prospective outcomes (i.e. if gains or losses are at stake):
• Fear of missing a gain when probabilities are high
39Refer to Section 3.1.2 and Section 4.2.1 where the PT is introduced and discussed with respect to
the subjective weighting of probability.
40cf. Loewenstein et al. (2001), Loewenstein et al. (2008), Slovic et al. (2007)
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• Hope for avoiding a loss when probabilities are high
• Hope for winning when probabilities are small
• Fear of losing when probabilities are small
Within RAI, Loewenstein et al. (2001) suppose that immediate emotions are im-
mediately elicited as reactions towards risks. Those immediate emotions may serve
as an explanation for a subject’s insensitivity to probability variations. The impact of
changes in probabilities near the endpoints may be so high because emotions such as
fear and hope in the face of decisions under risk have an all or none characteristic.
They are sensitive to the possibility rather than the probability of negative prospec-
tive outcomes. When the probability of a prospective outcome turns greater than
zero, the emotions of fear and hope appear. That is, whenever the probability of
winning turns greater than zero there is a slight sparkle of hope arising and on the
other hand, whenever there is only a really small possibility of losing, fear is aris-
ing. Further increase of probability however does not change the perception of the
specific emotion and the mental image which has been elicited and therefore, fur-
ther changes in probabilities have little impact on the evaluation of a lottery. That
is, changes in probability within a broad mid-range have little effect on immediate
emotions maybe because, as discussed in 4.1.2, emotions arise in part as a reaction to
mental images. The mental image that arises when hoping for winning the jackpot of
a state lottery is probably the same, no matter if the probability to win is 1/10.000.000
or 1/10.000. Affective prospective outcomes, elicit greater degrees of hope and fear
and, therefore, larger jumps at the endpoints of the weighting functions. More pre-
cisely, as discussed in Section 4.1.2, prospective outcomes eliciting a hot affective state
lead to more pronounced overweighting of small probabilities, more pronounced un-
derweighting of large probabilities, and less sensitivity to intermediate probability
change, thus a more pronounced inverted s-shaped weighting function than lotteries
with non-affective prospective outcomes.
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Considering non-affective prospective outcomes however, Slovic et al. (2004) sug-
gest that there is a proportion or probability dominance when lotteries are evalu-
ated. That is, subjects are more sensitive to changes in probabilities with non-affective
prospective outcomes. This refers to lotteries where the associated prospective out-
come doesn’t elicit vivid mental images. The assumption of a proportion or proba-
bility dominance gives rise to the idea that subjects might develop mental images of
prospective outcomes when probabilities are presented as relative frequencies instead
of individual probabilities. This can be explained with the fact that subjects tend to
neglect the denominator and image the numerator when probabilities are represented
as relative frequencies. Slovic and Peters (2006) use the following example to imply
the difference of this probability representation. When subjects are asked to decide if
a psychiatric patient can be dismissed from the clinic, they might be provided with
the following information: Patients with the same history as Mr. Jones commit an act
of crime with a probability of 20% when they are dismissed. 21% of the subjects that
were asked would refuse to let him go. If the information was provided differently
in the way of: 20 out of 100 patients like Mr. Jones commit an act of violence when
they are dismissed, 42% of the subjects refused to let him go. When the information
is provided as an individual probability, this leads to the mental image of one indi-
vidual. This individual can either commit an act of crime or not. This may lead to
a slightly pallid image of Mr. Jones and thus, lead to a more analytic and cognitive
evaluation of the lottery and therefore to a more deliberate over- and underweighting
of probabilities near the endpoints and less diminishing sensitivity in the mid-range.
In contrast, a frequency format elicits a mental image that includes a number of vio-
lent patients and is thus frightening and affective. This leads to fast and experiential
processing and results in a more pronounced over- and underweighting and highly
diminishing sensitivity.
Hertwig et al. (2004) make another interesting observation with respect to non-
linear probability weighting. Subjects do not always overweight very small probabil-
ities, but instead they sometimes underweight them. When this phenomenon occurs,
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subjects do not decide on the basis of numerically presented probabilities but instead
they learn about the probabilities by experience. This leads to the suggestion that
there may be a difference in behavior when subjects are provided with a description
of probabilities instead of when they learn about probabilities through experience.41
The main result from the discussion within this section is, that subjects do not eval-
uate prospective outcomes and probabilities independently. Instead, the properties
of a prospective outcome are important for the information processing system which
is elicited.42 If a prospective outcome elicits very affective mental images the sub-
ject will be in a hot affective state, either positive or negative. This leads to a neglect
of probabilities besides the large jumps near the endpoints. The jumps are higher if
losses are at stake, probably because losses evoke stronger emotional reactions and
therefore a more affective evaluation.
If prospective outcomes are non-affective, the form of the weighting function is less
pronounced. Changes in probabilities have more impact on the evaluation of a lottery
and the shape of the weighting function is close to the identity line.
4.2.3 Neuroscience
Although there has been a lot of research investigating the shape of the weighting
function, little is known about the underlying neural systems responsible for the non-
linear weighting of probabilities (Paulus and Frank 2006).43 Research in psychology
provides evidence that the affective nature of the corresponding prospective outcome
influences how a subject weights the given probability. Neuroscience studies usually
identify those regions which are critical in specific tasks and draw conclusions from
other known functions of the identified areas to interpret the results. As discussed
41This observation is important in the context of capturing a subject’s risk attitude. I further discuss
this in Section 4.3.2.
42Please refer to Section 4.1.2 where the condition and the magnitude of the change of a prospective
outcome are pointed out to be the characteristics of a prospective outcome, derived from the discussion
of the relevant psychological models and theories.
43Fox and Poldrack (2009) provide a very good overview of studies considering the PT and the
brain.
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before, results from neuroscientific experimental studies depend on the decision task
to be investigated.
Experiments in neuroscience consider the perception of risk from different perspec-
tives. There are several studies that investigate which brain areas are active while
processing risky decisions and how the brain might possibly integrate value and
probabilities to compute an expected value.44 However, there are only few (espe-
cially compared with the number of studies on risk and reward as a whole) studies
which take into account that subjects tend to transform objective probabilities into
a subjective decision weight, i.e. that subjects weight probabilities other than lin-
ear. What these studies have in common, is that they all try to reveal those brain
regions which are active during a decision task considering the non-linearity of prob-
ability weighting. Neuroscientific studies reveal several brain regions to be involved
in a non-linear transformation of probabilities. Paulus and Frank (2006) find that the
Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) shows different activation among subjects who dis-
play different degrees of non-linear probability weighting. Subjects with a stronger
activation in ACC show a more linear probability weighting whereas subjects with a
smaller activation level show a more non-linear probability weighting. The authors
interpret these results with both, a cognitive approach and an affective approach. The
ACC is supposed to be involved in the processing of various tasks: planning, conflict-
monitoring, implementation of strategic processes to reduce cognitive conflicts, de-
cision making, reward or goal expectancy.45 It is also hypothesized that strong acti-
vation in ACC is related to behavior with focused attention whereas weak activation
should be related to less focused attention. The revealed ACC activation pattern sup-
ports the idea that linear probability weighting is associated with the cognitive eval-
uation of a lottery and non-linear probability weighting is associated to the affective
evaluation of a lottery.46
44cf. Christopoulos et al. (2009), Tobler et al. (2009), Mohr et al. (2010), Engelmann and Tamir
(2009), Gonzalez et al. (2005)
45cf. Paulus and Frank (2006)
46Refer to Section 4.2.2, where this association is discussed from the psychological perspective.
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Hsu et al. (2009) find that activity in the Striatum during evaluation of monetary
gambles is non-linear in probabilities in the pattern predicted by PT, suggesting that
probability distortion is reflected at the level of the reward encoding process. This
underlines the results from psychological research, where it is suggested that the
weighting of probabilities depends on the evaluation of the prospective outcome, as
discussed in Section 4.2.2. The degree of non-linearity reflected in individual subjects’
decisions is also correlated with striatal activity across subjects.
Berns et al. (2008) conduct an fMRI study in which subjects choose between two lot-
teries which result, with a given probability, in an electric shock. They find a sequence
of several brain regions to be active during the decision task. The regions activated
first are the Visual and Parietal Cortex. These regions are supposed to be important
for perceptual accounts. That is, the non-linear weighting of probabilities might be
interpreted as a result from the way how probabilities are presented visually. This
underlines psychological research, which suggests that it is in fact important for the
evaluation of a lottery, how probabilities are presented.47 They suggest this question
to be interesting for future research. Takahashi et al. (2010) find in a Positron Emission
Tomography (PET) study, that lower striatal D1 binding is related to non-linear prob-
ability weighting. They suggest that non-linear probability weighting which leads to
gambling behavior or drug abuse might be modulated by dopamine transmission.
To learn which regions are involved in the non-linear weighting of probabilities
helps to draw conclusions how and why subjects weight probabilities other than lin-
ear. However, neuroscientific studies often have very strong limitations. Fox and Pol-
drack state that each neuroscientific study is only as good as the underlying decision
task. A better understanding of the decision making process itself and the associ-
ated economic, psychological and neuroscientific concepts might, on the one hand,
provide an environment to develop decision tasks which can reveal a more detailed
picture of how the brain works. On the other hand, a more detailed picture of the
47There is a difference if a probability is presented as a relative frequency or as an individual prob-
ability. Please refer to Section 4.2.2 where it is discussed how a subject deals with a probability distri-
bution from a psychological perspective.
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human brain provides the basis for a more profound analysis of the decision making
process. That is, there exist a lot of questions which still are not close to be answered.
4.3 Capturing Risk Attitude
4.3.1 Economics
The introduced economic theories all assume a subject to evaluate each prospective
outcome according to its subjective utility function and to decide for the lottery with
the highest utility.48 However, subjects show different attitudes towards risk. That is,
the subject’s preference relation over a set of lotteries is not only determined by the
prospective outcomes and the probability distribution but also by his risk attitude.
The basic idea behind risk attitude is, that a subject faces a decision between a lottery
and the sure outcome of the lottery’s expected value. Within EUT it is possible to
express a subject’s risk attitude by the curvature of the utility function. Based on
EUT, the most prevalent definition of risk attitude is the following.49 A subject is risk
neutral if he is indifferent between a sure outcome and a risky alternative with the
same expected value. In other words, the expected utility of Lottery X, is as high
as the utility of the expected value of X, such that E(u(X)) = u(E(X)). Risk neutral
subjects are modeled by linear utility functions. A subject is risk averse if he prefers
a sure outcome to a risky alternative with the same expected value. In other words,
the expected utility of Lottery X is smaller than the utility of the expected value of
X, such that E(u(X)) < u(E(X)). Risk averse subjects are modeled by concave utility
functions. A subject is risk seeking if he prefers a risky alternative to a sure outcome
with the same expected value. In other words, the expected utility of Lottery X is
higher than the utility of the expected value of X such that E(u(X)) > u(E(X)). Risk
48Please refer to Section 3.1, where the economic models and theories are discussed and Sections
4.1.1 and 4.2.1, where I analyze how economic models evaluate a prospective outcome and the under-
lying probability distribution.
49see for example Kreps (1990)
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seeking subjects are modeled by convex utility functions. A real number CE(X) is
called Certainty Equivalent of Lottery X if u(CE(X)) = E(u(X)), that is, a CE implies
the value for which the subject is indifferent between the utility of the CE and the
expected utility of the lottery. A subject is risk neutral if CE(X) = E(X) for all X , risk
averse if CE(X) < E(X) for all X, and risk seeking if CE(X) > E(X) for all X. The
Risk Premium (RP) is defined as RP(X) = E(X)− CE(X). That is, RP describes the
value which a subject is willing to pay in order to avoid risk. A subject is risk neutral
if RP(X) = 0, risk averse if RP(X) > 0, and risk seeking if RP(X) < 0.
In economics, it is most commonly assumed that subjects are risk averse. Raiffa
(1968) states that:
"Studies of utility commonly make hypotheses about properties of the
utility function that should hold for "most people." These studies generally
assume that people are risk averse in monetary gambles and for the extent
of their risk aversion (Pratt) to decrease as they become wealthier." (Raiffa
(1968) p. 91)
As mentioned above, risk aversion is a subject’s objection to accept a lottery with
an uncertain outcome rather than another lottery with a more certain, but possibly
lower, expected outcome. For example, a risk averse subject will put his money into a
bank account with a sure but small interest rate, rather than into a stock where there
might be a much higher interest rate but also the risk of losing all the money. That
is, if it is assumed that a subject is risk averse and rational according to EUT, two
lotteries can objectively be compared according to their risk by the use of the concept
of SSD.50 The Arrow Pratt Measure of absolute risk aversion is given as follows:51
(4.8) ARA(x) = −
u′′(x)
u′(x)
50Refer to Section 4.2.1, where the concept of SSD is introduced.
51cf. Arrow (1965), Pratt (1964)
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If ARA(x) is increasing with x, this displays an increasing absolute risk aversion.
If ARA(x) is decreasing with x, this displays a decreasing absolute risk aversion and
if it is constant, this displays a constant absolute risk aversion. In economic experi-
ments, a subject’s risk attitude is usually tested with a risk aversion test by Holt and
Laury (2002), which allows to measure the individual degree of a subject’s risk aver-
sion. This allows to control for possible influences of a subject’s risk aversion during
a laboratory experiment such as bidding and pricing tasks for example in auctions or
by eliciting selling and/or buying prices for simple lotteries.
However, there is evidence that subject’s do not only show risk aversion. Tversky
and Wakker (1995) state:
"Three clusters of phenomena reflecting risk attitude have challenged
the descriptive validity of the classical theory. First, although risk aver-
sion is prevalent, there are situations in which risk seeking is commonly
observed. Gambling is a case in point. Second, there is a considerable
body of evidence that preferences between risky prospects are not lin-
ear in probabilities. The certainty effect, demonstrated by Allais, is the
best-known example of this phenomenon. Third, people’s preferences de-
pend not only on the degree of uncertainty but also on the source of un-
certainty."(Tversky and Wakker (1995) p. 1255)
There are several approaches to capture mixed risk attitudes, which are not in line
with EUT: theories introducing a decision weight (cf. PT, Tversky and Kahneman
(1992), Quiggin (1982) as discussed in Section 4.2.1), theories introducing expected
emotions as an additional attribute within the utility function (cf. RT and DT) and
theories which differentiate the source of risk (cf. Tversky and Wakker (1995), Köszegi
and Rabin (2007).52
52There exist many other attempts to explain risk attitude, see for example Yaari (1987), Gilboa
(1987), Schmeidler (1989), Luce and Fishburn (1991). However, I don’t go into detail with these ap-
proaches as they, to varying degrees, imply different assumptions of the probability distribution (e.g.
subjective probabilities, ambiguity).
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PT approaches risk attitude from two sides: First, the utility function which is in-
ferred from the observation of subjects’ behavior as discussed in Section 4.1.1, im-
putes a fourfold pattern of risk attitudes to a subject:
• Risk aversion in the domain of gains when probabilities are moderate/high
• Risk affinity in the domain of gains when probabilities are small
• Risk aversion in the domain losses when probabilities are small
• Risk affinity in the domain of losses when probabilities are moderate/high
Second, a probability weighting function, as discussed in Section 4.2.1, with an in-
verted s-shape is introduced. Tversky and Wakker (1995) argue that "[...] such a
weighting function gives rise to fourfold pattern described above, under plausible
assumptions concerning the value function."(p. 1257).
While PT introduces probability weights as well as a value function to approach
mixed risk attitudes, RT approaches risk attitude with so-called regret aversion. With
respect to the above mentioned pattern of risk attitude Bell (1982) states that:
"It is also easy to explain such behavior in terms of regret. In a long odd
situation where the potential payoff to gambling is great, the consequence
with the largest regret is that in which you choose not to bet but hear that
you would have won." (Bell (1982) p. 971-972)
To analyze risk attitude within RT, Loomes and Sugden (1982) consider two inde-
pendent lotteries of the following form: X = (x, p; −px1−p , (1− p)) and Y = (0,1), with
x > 0, 0 < p < 1 and E(X) = E(Y) = 0.53 That is, depending on p these lotteries can
describe different situations. The subject decides between buying a tombola-ticket
(Lottery X) or not (Lottery Y) or between buying an insurance (Lottery Y) or not (Lot-
tery X). Depending on p, Lottery X comprises a high prospective outcome with small
53Bell (1982) considers slightly different lotteries, yet of the same structure.
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probability (e.g. winning the tombola ) compared to a small loss with high probabil-
ity (not winning the tombola but having paid for the ticket) or a small prospective
outcome with high probability (saved cost for not bought insurance) compared to an
extremely negative prospective outcome with small probability (damage in case of
no insurance). Since the expected value of X and Y is equal, observed shifts in pref-
erences point to different risk attitudes. Applying that u(x) = x the modified utility
function is given with µ(x|y) = x + v(x − y).54 With v being decreasingly concave
it can be shown that Y ≻ X if p > 0.5 (risk aversion), Y ≺ X if p < 0.5 (risk affinity)
and Y ∼ X if p = 0.5 (risk neutrality).55 Mixed risk attitudes thus are consistent with
RT. However, this only holds for constant marginal utility of a prospective outcome:
u(x) = x. Implying u to be concave only allows for a prediction of risk aversion if
p ≥ 0.5. Bell (1982) even states that:
"As [u] is made more and more concave, the decreasing marginal value
of dollars is eventually sufficient to counteract the influence of regret and
produce risk averse behavior even for low probability, high payoff bets."
(Bell (1982) p. 972)
Within DT, risk attitude can be analyzed similar to RT. Here, subjects are assumed
to be disappointment-averse and elation-loving. Bell (1982) models the influence of
disappointment with the factor d and the influence of elation with the factor e with
d, e > 0 such that µ(x|x¯) = x + d(x− x¯) if x < x¯ and µ(x|x¯) = x + e(x− x¯) if x > x¯.56
Thus, he implies constant marginal utility. Within DT as proposed by Bell, risk atti-
tude is strongly depending on the individual attitude towards disappointment and
elation. If his experience of disappointment and elation is equally compelling in its
intensity, such that d = e, they are traded off against each other such that the subject
54Refer to Section 4.1.1, where it is discussed how utility is assigned to a prospective outcome with
respect to the different formal implementation of a utility function within the economic theories.
55Refer to Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) who both provide a detailed analysis of mixed
risk attitudes.
56Refer to Section 3.1.4, where DT is introduced and to Section 4.1.1, where it is discussed how
utility is assigned to a prospective outcome with respect to the different formal implementation of a
utility function within DT.
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is, due to constant marginal utility, risk neutral. If a subject suffers very much from
experiencing disappointment but is quite less influenced by elation (d > e) he is risk
averse, if he is very exited when he experiences elation but suffers not very much from
being disappointed (d < e) he is risk-seeking. This implies a global risk attitude for
every subject. This led Bell to introduce another assumption, which implies that the
sensation of disappointment and elation depends on probability p. He considers the
following lotteries. Lottery X′ is given with ( 1p , p;0,1− p). It is assumed that disap-
pointment from receiving 0 increases with p. Lottery Y′ is given with (1, p; −p1−p ,1− p).
It is assumed that elation from receiving 1 decreases with p. This implies that there
exists a probability p∗ (which can also be 0 or 1) such that a subject is risk averse if
1 > p > p∗, risk neutral if p = p∗ and risk seeking if 0 < p < p∗.
As discussed in Section 3.1.4, Loomes and Sugden (1986) introduce a more general
idea of DT, as they do not imply any differences in the intensity of disappointment
and elation such that v(x − x¯) = −v(x¯ − x) for all x, x¯.57 As they assume constant
marginal utility and imply that v′′(z) > 0 for z > 0 and v′′(z) < 0 for z < 0, it can be
shown that, using the same lotteries X and Y: X = (x, p; −px1−p , (1− p)) and Y = (0,1),
with x > 0, 0 < p < 1 and E(X) = E(Y), DT is consistent with mixed risk attitudes
such that a subject does both, gamble where the probabilities to win are very low and
insure against low probability losses. That is, v in the sense of Loomes and Sugden
(1986) incorporates a subject’s attitude towards disappointment and elation such that
he is generally disappointment averse and elation loving. These attitudes implicitly
lead to risk aversion for p > 0.5 and risk affinity for p < 0.5.
PT, RT and DT indeed allow for mixed risk attitudes in the sense of risk aversion,
risk neutrality or risk affinity. It is mostly assumed that risk attitude depends on the
domain of gains or losses (compared to the underlying reference point) and the given
probability distribution, that is, risk attitude in the sense of PT and DT is content spe-
cific. As RT assigns value to a lottery by comparing it to the other lottery included
57Refer to Section 4.1.1, where it is discussed how utility is assigned to a prospective outcome with
respect to the different formal implementation of a utility function within DT.
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in the decision situation, risk attitude in the sense of RT is content and context spe-
cific. RDP goes one step further and specifically analyzes how the environment of a
decision influences a subject’s risk attitude, that is, in how far risk attitude is context
specific.58 RDP replicates PT’s pattern of risk attitudes for immediately-resolved sur-
prise modest-scale risks. However, considering modest scale risk, Köszegi and Rabin
(2007) analyze two different contexts in the sense of decision environments to imply
different patterns of risk attitude. First, they compare surprise risk (a subject did not
expect the loss, which can also be a forgone gain) to situations in which a subject ex-
pected the loss and the possibility to insure it. They imply that a subject shows more
risk aversion to expected risks than to surprise risks.
Second, they analyze risk attitudes towards expected risks as a function of how
far in advance decisions are committed to. That is, risk attitudes regarding prospec-
tive outcomes that are resolved long after all decisions are committed to. This sit-
uation applies to most insurance decisions. The expectations, to which a decision’s
prospective outcomes are evaluated, are formed afterwards. Thus, the expectations
incorporate the implications of the decision. RDP distinguishes between two solution
concepts, suitable to model content and context specific risk attitude. UPE/PPE is ap-
plicable in situations where the prospective outcome soon realizes after the decision
is made and CPE is applicable in situations with a long time span between decision
and realization.59 Thus, Köszegi and Rabin (2007) adopt the observation that subjects
are sensitive to the source of risk within modest scale risk environments as follows:
"We identify two implications of our model: a person is more risk averse
when she anticipates a risk and the possibility to insure it than when she
does not - always displaying first order risk aversion - and among such
decisions regarding anticipated risk, she is more risk averse when she can
commit to insure ahead of time." (Köszegi and Rabin (2007) p. 1049)
58Refer to Section 3.1.5, where RDP is introduced and Section 4.1.1, where it is discussed how RDP
assigns value to a prospective outcome.
59Refer to Section 3.1.5
123
Chapter 4 Decision Making under Risk: Affect and Cognition
However, a subject’s sensitivity towards the economic environment of the deci-
sion is restricted to situations with modest scale risk, that is, in situations where the
reference dependent component of the utility function dominates the absolute com-
ponent.60 In situations with large scale risk, the absolute component dominates the
reference dependent component and subjects show a different pattern of risk attitude.
In other words, in situations with large scale risk, the reference dependent component
of the modified utility function can become irrelevant in determining risk attitudes
as the intrinsic utility can no longer be assumed to be linear anymore. Then, risk
attitudes are mostly determined by u which corresponds to the classical notion of
outcome-based utility. That is, for large scale risks, RDP reconciles risk attitudes cor-
responding to context unspecific classical economic theory. Thus, RDP models both,
context specific and context unspecific risk attitudes.
Table 4.2 depicts the basic assumptions of a subject’s risk attitude as supposed by
the economic theories.
Remembering, that the affectivity of a prospective outcome predetermines the ab-
solute or reference dependent evaluation of this outcome it seems to be promising to
take a closer look at the role of affect within a subject’s risk attitude to gain a deeper
understanding of how the content and context influences the risk attitude.
4.3.2 Psychology
In the economic sense, a subject can either be risk neutral, risk averse or risk seek-
ing. It is commonly assumed that a subject’s risk attitude is given by nature and isn’t
influenced by any factors - integral or incidental of the concrete decision situation.61
There is evidence however, that a subject’s risk attitude will change in different situa-
tions. The core idea in psychology is that affect in fact "affects" a subject’s risk attitude
within decision making under risk. Integrating affect into the decision making pro-
60Refer to Section 4.1.1 where the classification of absolute and reference dependent evaluation is
discussed.
61Please refer to Section 4.3.1, where the economic concept of risk attitude is introduced and dis-
cussed.
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TABLE 4.2: Risk Attitude in Economic Models of Decision Making under Risk
(EUT = Expected Utility Theory, PT = Prospect Theory, RT = Regret Theory, DT = Disappointment Theory, RDP = Reference Dependent Theory)
Theory Risk Attitude static
content
specific
context
specific
EUT
risk neutral
risk averse
risk seeking
x
PT
risk aversion for gains and
risk aversion for losses
x
RT
(Bell)
mixed risk attitudes x x
RT
(Loomes&Sugden)
mixed risk attitudes x x
DT
(Bell)
mixed risk attitudes x
DT
(Loomes&Sugden)
mixed risk attitudes x
RDP
modest scale risk: more
risk aversion if risk is ex-
pected than surprising; if
expected, more risk aver-
sion if possible to commit
ahead of time
large scale risk: classical
economic predictions
x x
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cess, especially by investigating the role of the cognitive-affective interplay, may help
to explain when and why a subject’s risk attitude changes and where this will lead to
a change in preferences.62
This section identifies the content- and context-specific nature of risk attitude by
discussing the role of affect in the sense of the Dual-Processing Theory in decisions
under risk. It identifies possible factors, characterized by their different nature, which
might be responsible for influencing a subject’s risk attitude because they influence a
subject’s affective state.
The first question which needs to be answered here is: ’What are the determinants
of risk attitude?’ The second question is: ’What role does a subject’s risk attitude play
within the decision making process?’ Considering the question of the determinants of
a subject’s risk attitude, it is assumed that these factors are defined by very different
characteristics and attributes. Within the RaI Theory, Loewenstein et al. (2001) sug-
gest that fear and anxiety (and thus a negative affective state) tend to favor cautious
risk averse decision making whereas happiness and pleasure (thus a positive affective
state) tend to favor risk seeking decision making. These issues have also been studied
within the AH, where it is discussed how the differently communicated information
affects a subject’s risk attitude. If it says benefit is high, the positive affective state
leads to more risk seeking behavior whereas the information, that a potential loss is
high leads to a negative affective state which induces risk aversion.
Based on the deliberations within this section, the following factors to be influenc-
ing a subject’s risk attitude ar suggested. These factors can be distinguished by their
characteristics and are assigned to different categories:
• Direct relation to the decision task
– Vividness (content)
– Time course (context)
62Please refer to Chapter 2 for the details of the two-system based processing as proposed by Epstein
(1994) and Sloman (1996).
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– Time pressure (context)
– Experience (context)
• Individual properties of a subject
– Experience
– Cognitive ability
– Evolutionary preparedness
• No relation to the decision task
– Mood
The factors which are directly related to the decision task are all determined by the
structure and presentation of the decision task itself. Vividness considers the way
how a decision problem is presented. On the one hand it can contain pure num-
bers and pale facts. On the other hand the prospective outcomes and probabilities
can be described as being rather vivid and imaginable. That is, the more vivid the
description of a decision problem is, the more images and associations are released
in a subject (Loewenstein et al. 2001). A prospective outcome presented as "many
thousands road casualties" evokes more images and associations than a prospective
outcome presented as "10 % higher rate in road casualties". In this case, this may
lead to a more risk averse behavior because there is a negative affective state. Using
an example by Epstein (1994), Slovic et al. (2007) show that the same is true for the
way a probability is presented. Subjects are offered to receive a reward when they
drawing a red jelly bean from an urn. They could choose between an urn with a pro-
portion of 7 in 100 or 1 in 10. As most of the subjects chose the first urn Slovic and his
colleagues suggest that these subjects are imaging the enumerator and neglecting the
denominator. That is, 7 winning beans in the first urn seem to dominate 1 winning
bean in the second urn regardless of the higher winning chance. This obviously leads
to risk seeking attitude. Representations of risk in the form of individual probabilities
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(10%) lead to relatively benign images whereas frequentistic representations lead to
affective images.
Loewenstein et al. (2001) suggest that the time course of a decision task addresses
the immediacy with which a prospective outcome is realized. A prospective outcome
which is only realized far in the future might not elicit such strong emotional reac-
tions as a prospective outcome which is realized immediately. That is, a subject may
decide more risk averse if the prospective outcome will be realized very soon. This
underlines the findings within RDP as discussed in Section 4.3.1.
Several decisions need to be made in a certain time span. If this time span is short
due to the complexity of the task this may result in time pressure. Time pressure may
influence decision making by changing the affective state. A higher level of arousal
makes experiential, affective processes more salient than analytic processes (Finucane
et al. 2000). Maule et al. (2000) report changes in strategies under time pressure
although none of these changes are directly associated with risk taking. But there is
a strong reliance between strategy effectivity and risk attitude. Risk attitude is not
affected as long as the chosen strategy is successful in solving the task in the given
time. If the strategy isn’t appropriate, an increase in risk aversion is observable.63
This might be due to a negative affective state.
Experience is a factor which needs to be considered in two different ways. Expe-
rience, as a factor which is directly related to the decision task, plays an important
role in the distinction between decision from description and decision from experi-
ence. Decisions made from experience result in underweighting rare events contrary
to decisions from description. According to the context of a decision this may lead to
a change in a subject’s risk attitude either towards more risk seeking or risk averse
decisions. The available information relevant to the decision task may either be pro-
vided by description or is based on the subject’s experience with similar decisions.
Decisions from experience and decisions from description can lead to different be-
havior (Hertwig et al. 2004). Hertwig and his colleagues posit a very intuitive ex-
63For a good literature overview on time pressure research refer to Maule et al. (2000).
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ample to explain how the different processing of experience and description results
in different behavior: Why are doctors and patients often at odds with each other?
Concerning the question of whether to vaccinate children or not doctors and parents
base their decisions on different types of information. While most parents can only
rely on the numbers and facts stated in newspapers or books, i.e. on description say-
ing that one child out of 14.000 might experience seizure, doctors can also rely on
their personal experience, which shows that in their career no child ever experienced
seizure after vaccination. Tobler et al. (2009) state that there might be a difference in
behavior when subjects rely on experience rather than description of a lottery. In the
case of decisions from description, subjects overweight the probability of rare events,
as described by PT. In the case of decisions from experience, subjects underweight
the probability of rare events. That is, subjects may rely on relatively small samples
of information and overweight recently sampled information which may cause the
underweighting of probabilities in information sampled from experience.
In addition to the factors related to the decision task there are also factors which
are individual properties of a subject, which may also influence the risk attitude. Ex-
perience as an individual property considers the experience of prospective outcomes.
That is, a subject’s experience of gains and losses in former similar decision tasks, as
well as a subject’s education and life experience can affect a subject’s risk attitude. The
image of a recently perceived gain or loss may elicit strong emotions which change
the affective state. If the decision situation changes the affective state, because of emo-
tional reactions towards the decision, this may lead to fast and unconscious changes
in risk attitude. If a decision leads to a cold affective state, this may result in a change
of the reference point which leads to a change in risk attitude in further decisions:
experiencing an anticipated gain results in a change towards risk aversion and vice
versa (Barkan and Busemeyer 1999). A subject’s cognitive ability may also play a role
as a factor influencing risk attitude. Dohmen et al. (2010) suggest that risk aversion
may be related to cognitive ability. Evolutionary preparedness may help to explain
why some decisions are made much more risk averse than others. Smoking and the
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abuse of other drugs, in the evolutionary sense, are considered as relatively young
risks. This may explain why subjects are not able to take them into account.
It is also possible, that factors which are not even directly related to the decision
task may influence a subject’s risk attitude. Stress which is due to other circumstances
may be misinterpreted and result in time pressure within the decision task. Porcelli
and Delgado (2009) induce stress by putting a subject’s hand in ice-cold water before
the experiment. This affects the subject’s risk attitude expressed by an increase in the
reflection effect. That is, under stress due to ice-cold water, a subject decides more risk
seeking in the face of losses and more risk averse in the face of gains. Consistent with
dual process theories this might be explained with a hot affective state when subjects
fall back to automatized reactions under stress instead of analyzing the task deliber-
ately. This is supported by the FaI Theory by Schwarz and Clore (1983). According to
this theory, a good or bad background mood may result in a change of risk attitude
even though the mood does not belong to the decision task itself. However, if the
subject is aware of its incidental affective state, there is no influence on the subject’s
risk attitude (Schwarz and Clore 1983).
Surely, the individual differences in subjects concerning how emotions and feelings
are processed play an important role here. There might be subjects who react very
strongly towards emotional triggers whereas there might be others who might stay
cool in the same situation.
4.3.3 Neuroscience
As suggested in psychology, risk attitude may not be a static individual property but
may be a context as well as content specific variable which is influenced by differ-
ent factors. By using neuroscientific methods, it is possible to take a look at those
brain regions which might be involved in processing risk preferences.64 Research in
64Within neuroscientific studies considering a subject’s risk attitude there are several appropriate
methodologies. As introduced in 2.1.3 there is a long history in neurological studies of the brain with
a development from very invasive methods to noninvasive methods.
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neuroscience underlines the results from psychology, which suggests that a positive
affective state leads to risk affinity and a negative affective state leads to risk aver-
sion.65 To date little is known about how the brain processes risk and individual risk
preferences. However, it is suggested that risk attitude is a modifiable behavior that
depends on right hemisphere prefrontal activity. Kuhnen and Knutson (2005) suggest
that risk attitude may be driven by distinct neural circuits. NAcc indexes positive af-
fective states. aINS respectively indexes negative affective states and activating one
of these can lead to a shift in risk preferences. NAcc leads towards more risk affinity,
aINS leads towards more risk aversion. NAcc is related to positive emotions such as
the pleasure for anticipated reward which activates NAcc. aINS is related to negative
emotions such as fear or anger.
Risk
Affinity
Positive 
Events
Negative 
Events
aINS
Negative
Affective State
Risk 
Aversion
NAcc
Positive
Affective State
FIGURE 4.2: Distinct Neural Circuits Drive Risk Attitude
65Please refer to Section 4.3.2 for a discussion of the psychological research on risk attitude.
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As discussed in 4.2.2, psychology research assumes that risk processing is influ-
enced by affect. However, it is not yet fully specified how emotions are implicated
in the decision making process. Mohr et al. (2010) use quantitative meta-analyses
of fMRI studies on risk processing in the brain to investigate how risk processing
is influenced by emotions. Underlining the results from psychological studies dis-
cussed in Section 4.3.2, they find that aversive emotions such as fear and anger are
implicated in risk processing independent of the context. That is, also incidental emo-
tions which are not related to the decision situation influence a subject’s judgement
of risk. Precisely, risk preferences may shift when subjects perceive fear or anger no
matter if they are related or not to the decision task. Knoch et al. (2006) find that
risk attitude is a modifiable behavior that depends on right hemisphere prefrontal ac-
tivity. They use low frequency, repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS)
to disrupt the left or right DLPFC before applying a gambling task. They show that
subjects display significantly riskier decision making after disruption of the right, but
not the left, DLPFC. The possible reason for the more risk seeking decision making
after right prefrontal stimulation is that happy individuals tend to overweight prob-
abilities of positive and underweight probabilities of negative prospective outcomes.
More precisely, risk seeking behavior after rTMS could be caused by an increase in
happiness induced by rTMS. That is, positive emotions such as happiness may also
be implicated in risk processing.
Engelmann and Tamir (2009) investigate the individual differences in risk prefer-
ences when making decisions. They separate the decision making process into three
steps: the selection phase where the decision between two lotteries is made, the an-
ticipation phase where a subject waits for the risk to be resolved while anticipating a
prospective outcome and the outcome phase where the risk actually is resolved.
The difference between the anticipated and the realized prospective outcome forms
the Reward Prediction Error (RPE) which "provides the basis for adjustments of fu-
ture behavior and reward expectation" (Engelmann and Tamir 2009). They summa-
rize that risk attitude is related to the decision strategy. That is, if a subject is driven
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Outcome
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Reward
Reward 
Prediction 
Error
FIGURE 4.3: Reward Prediction Error
by affect, this manifests in more risk averse behavior, whereas if as subject follows a
rather deliberate strategy this leads to more risk neutral decisions. These results are
partly in accordance to the psychological findings and the above discussed assump-
tions. Yet it skimps that risk aversion is related to a negative affective state.
4.4 Aggregation and Implications
Chapter 4 structured the analysis of decision making under risk along two dimen-
sions. First, the decision making process has been separated into three relevant com-
ponents: evaluation of a prospective outcome, evaluation of a probability distribution
and a subject’s risk attitude. Second, each component, from the perspective of eco-
nomics, psychology and neuroscience has been discussed with respect to the role of
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affect within decision making under risk.
Economics Psychology Neuroscience
Evaluating
Prospective 
Outcomes
Probability
Distribution
Absolute evaluation or
evaluation relative to a
reference point
~ Underweighting small
   probabilities
~ Overweighting large
   probabilities
~ Dimeinishing sensitivity
~ For simplicity, many theories
   ignore the subjective weighting 
   of probabilities and just assume
   linearity
Static, content sensitive, context 
sensitive
Condition of outcome and 
magnitude of the change relative 
to a reference point
~ Subjective probability weighting
   depends on the affectivity of the 
   prospective outcome
~ Fear of missing a gain when 
   probabilities are high
~ Hope for avoiding a loss when 
   probabilities are high
~ Hope for winning when 
   probabilities are small
~ Fear of losing when probabilities 
   are small
~ Representation of probabilities 
   influences subjective weighting
Content and context specific
Identification of several
categories of factors
influencing risk attitude
~ Two systems for affective and
~ cognitive processing
~ Two systems for gains an 
~ Losses
~ ACC, striatum and visual cortex 
   are involved in nonlinear proba-
   bility weighting 
~ Support for the assumption that 
   probability weighting depends on 
   the affectivity of the prospective
   outcome
~ Support for the assumption that 
   presentation of probabilities 
   influences subjective weighting
Two systems for capturing risk 
attitude: Nacc and aINS
ADMF
~ Real loss vs. relative loss
~ Reference dependent evaluation 
   depends on affectivity of outcome
~ Losses are always more affective 
   than gains
~ Specific pattern of non-linear 
   probability weighting can be
   explained with respect to the
   cognitive-affective interplay
   on the basis of the dual 
   processing theory
~ Positive affective state leads to 
   risk affinity
~ Negative affective state leads to 
   risk aversion
~ Decision Rukes most commonly 
   implies maximizing the expected 
   overall utility
~ Evaluation of the probability 
   distribution is independent of the 
   prospective outcome
~ A subjects risk attitude manifests 
   in his decision
~ Prospective outcomes can be easy-   
   to-evaluate or hard-to-evaluate
   (depending on ist affectivity) 
   which leads to the activation of 
   either System 1or System 2
~ Evaluation of the probability distri-
   bution depends on the afectivity 
   of the prospective outcome
~ A subjects risk attitude changes 
   with his affective
Observed anomalies in human 
behavior can be studied with 
respect to activated brain regions 
and interpreted on the basis of what 
is already known about the task of 
these specific brain regions. Hypo-
theses of behavior can thus becon-
firmedor rejected to a certain 
extent.
Capturing 
Risk Attitude
FIGURE 4.4: Discussion
Figure 4.4 provides the main results of the discussion within this chapter. The last
row of this table, represented by red boxes, provides how each discipline actually
puts the three relevant components of decision making together. In the economic
literature it has not been usual to look at these components separately within deci-
sion making under risk. Thus, identifying the economical decision rules within each
model, which actually integrate all three components of decision making, is no part
of the "hard work". To put together how psychology and neuroscience deal with the
three components of decision making however provides deeper understanding of de-
cision making under risk as in these disciplines the focus of research in recent years
has been more punctual on specific research questions rather than on decision mak-
ing under risk as a whole. However, the main focus of this thesis is not to understand
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the results provided by each column of Figure 4.4 but to understand the conclusions
that can be drawn from each row, represented by the green boxes. That is, how can
psychology and neuroscience be integrated in the economical aspects of each compo-
nent of decision making in order to finally put the results of each row together. This
will finally result in the ADMF as discussed in Chapter 5.
Table 4.3 depicts the main results from the discussion of the economic models and
theories. For each theory, it is first represented how a prospective outcome is eval-
uated, second if the underlying probability distribution is integrated linearly or not,
third how the subject’s risk attitude can be captured within the model, and fourth
how these components are integrated into a decision rule. All theories have in com-
mon, that they compute an expected overall utility, yet they differ in the content and
context on which they base a subject’s utility function. A subject is context sensitive
if he incorporates the context of a decision situation into his utility function and if the
utility of a lottery changes with changes in the context. A subject’s context sensitiv-
ity within a decision can be expressed by his utility function. A reference-dependent
utility function indicates context sensitivity whereas an absolute evaluation with an
intrinsic utility function indicates context insensitivity. A subject’s degree of context
sensitivity can also be expressed by his risk attitudes, such that risk attitudes can be
context specific, content specific or static. Besides EUT, where utility is only context
insensitive, all theories capture a subject’s context sensitivity in the sense of a refer-
ence dependent utility function. RT, DT and RDP approach utility with respect to
the fact that there is a modified utility function composed of a context insensitive in-
trinsic utility and context sensitive reference dependent utility. However, RDP is the
only theory to approach the different impact of u and v on the overall utility with re-
spect to context specific risk attitudes in large scale or modest scale risk situations.66
As discussed in Section 3.1.5 Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) introduce two equilib-
66Note, that RT as well models context specific risk attitudes. However, this is not for the purpose
to capture the impact of different risk situations (different context) but context specific risk attitudes
are implicitly given as a subject can only assign value to a lottery by incorporating the context of a
decision (i.e. the other lottery).
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TABLE 4.3: Decision Rules of Economic Models of Decision Making under Risk
POE = Prospective Outcome Evaluation, PD = Probability Distribution, RA = Risk Attitude, DR = Decision Rule
Theory POE PD RA DR
EUT absolute linear risk averse for u′′(x) < 0
risk seeking for u′′(x) > 0
risk neutral for u′′(x) = 0
max U(X) = ∑i u(xi)p(xi)
PT relative decision
weight π
risk averse for x > 0
risk seeking for x < 0
max U(X) = π(p1)v(x1) + π(p2)v(x2)
RT
(Bell)
absolute
+
relative
linear mixed risk attitudes U(X|Y) > U(Y|X) if pµ(x1|y1) +
(1 − p)µ(x2|y2) > pµ(y1|x1) + (1 −
p)µ(y2|x2)
RT
(Loomes&Sugden)
absolute
+
relative
linear mixed risk attitudes U(X|Y) > U(Y|X)i f ∑ni=1 piµ(xi|yi) >
∑
n
i=1 piµ(yi|xi)
DT
(Bell - simple
model)
absolute
+
relative
linear mixed risk attitudes U(X) > U(Y) if p[x1 + e(x1 − x¯)] + (1−
p)[x2 + d(x2 − x¯)] > p[y1 + e(y1 − y¯)] +
(1− p)[y2 + d(y2 − y¯)]
DT
(Loomes&Sugden)
absolute
+
relative
linear mixed risk attitudes max U(X) = ∑ni=1 piµ(x|x¯)
RDP absolute
+
relative
linear modest scale risk: more
risk aversion if risk is ex-
pected than surprising; if
expected, more risk aver-
sion if possible to commit
ahead of time
large scale risk: classical
economic predictions
UPE, CPE
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rium concepts (UPE, CPE), which model how a subject should choose between two
or more lotteries. Differentiating between these two solution concepts, RDP captures
how subjects are sensitive to different decision contexts. Within the concept of UPE,
the utility of the chosen lottery is compared to the utility of all other lotteries, given
that the reference point is the chosen lottery. According to the authors, this solution
concept is best to be applied when the time between the commitment to a decision
and its realization is short. Within the concept of CPE, it is assumed that the reference
point can be adapted. That is, the authors discuss the underlying time span as an as-
pect of a decision situation which determines a subject’s choice expressed by context
specific risk attitudes. They imply context sensitivity which is expressed by different
risk attitudes within a different context.
Figure 4.5 depicts the psychological relations between the prospective outcomes
and the probability distribution, the hereby triggered emotions, the associated im-
plications for the affective state and the resulting change of a subject’s risk attitude.
The main result of the discussion of the psychological models and theories within
this chapter is, that a decision may be processed by two systems. System 1 is the
experiential or associative system which bases its processing on affect. It operates
pleasure-pain oriented and evaluates according to "What feels good?". System 2 is
the rational or rule-based system which bases its processing on cognition. It oper-
ates reason oriented and evaluates according to "What is sensible?". The processing
of either System 1 or System 2 is triggered by a subject’s affective state. It changes
spontaneously with the influence of mood and emotions. A hot affective state trig-
gers System 1 and a cold affective state triggers System 2. The affective state changes
with the input of the different components of decision making and thus influences a
subject’s risk attitude.
Table 4.4 depicts the results from the neuroscientific discussion of prospective out-
come evaluation, probability evaluation and the according risk attitude.
In order to develop the ADMF in the following chapter, the issue of affect has been
discussed in this chapter, structured along the evaluation of prospective outcomes,
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TABLE 4.4: Neuroscientific Perception of Decision Making under Risk
POE = Prospective Outcome Evaluation, PD = Probability Distribution, RA = Risk Attitude
POE PD RA
Involved Brain Region Amygdala
VMPFC
ACC
Striatum
Visual Cortex
NAcc
aIns
Coherence primary inducer trigger
Amygdala
secondary inducer trigger
VMPFC
the identified brain regions
correlate with non-linear
probability weighting
NAcc processes positive
events
aIns processes negative
events
Interpretation Cognitive-Affective trade-
off during the evaluation
of a prospective outcome
cognitive evaluation
leads to linear probability
weighting
affective evaluation leads
to non-linear weighting
correlation of visual
process underlines the im-
portance of presentation of
probability format
integral as well as inciden-
tal affective reactions in-
duce a shift in risk attitude
such that positive events
lead to risk affinity and
negative events lead to risk
aversion
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Triggered 
Emotions
Affective StateInformation
Prospective Outcome
Probability Distribution
Risk Aversion
Risk Affinity
Desire
Hope
Pleasure
Happiness
Rejoice
Elation
Fear
Sadness
Rejection
Regret
Disappointment
Hope
Fear
Hotpositive
Coldpositive
Hotnegative
Coldnegative
Hotpositive
Hotnegative
Overall Negative
Overall Positive
Immediate
Expected
Immediate
Expected
Immediate
Immediate
FIGURE 4.5: Aggregation of Psychology
the probability distribution and a subject’s risk attitude. At this point, the horizon-
tal discussion (see Figure 4.4) comes into the focus, where research in psychology
and neuroscience ties in by integrating the role of affect within the evaluation of the
decision making process.
The discussion of the economic evaluation of a prospective outcome in Section 4.1.1
concludes with the following points, which reveal how economics assigns value to a
prospective outcome.
• Absolute evaluation with intrinsic utility u
• Relative evaluation with reference dependent utility v
• Combination of both with modified utility µ = u + v
In economics, a subject’s preferences are usually expressed by a subjective utility
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function to assign value to a prospective outcome. Economic theories differ in how
this subjective utility is derived. It is either measured absolutely, relative to a refer-
ence point or with a combination of both. In order to highlight the influence of regret
or disappointment, RT and DT imply u(x) = x, such that µ(x|·) = x + v(x|·). That is,
they do not approach the different impact of u and v for a decision. RDP however ap-
proach different situations. They state that within situations with modest-scale risk,
u can be considered linearly, within large-scale risk situations however, u cannot be
assumed linearly. Instead its influence on the modified utility predominates the in-
fluence of v. In other words, in situations with large risk, the reference point becomes
less important and the subject is less sensitive to any context. Yet, they only motivate
this differentiation with respect to the risk of a situation and not with different char-
acteristics of a prospective outcome. This is, where psychology ties in, suggesting
that there are conscious and unconscious processes which associate a value to each
prospective outcome of a lottery, which can explain when value is assigned absolutely
or relatively. Prospective outcomes seem to differ not only in their valence (gains or
losses) but also in their property of being easy-to-evaluate or hard-to-evaluate. Liter-
ature in psychology suggests that easy-to-evaluate prospective outcomes are affective
and provide vivid mental images. They are therefore intuitively desirable or undesir-
able and don’t need a reference to be compared to. Yet, hard-to-evaluate prospective
outcomes need a reference point to be compared to, to get a clue how much a prospec-
tive outcome is actually worth to a subject. As suggested by the reference dependent
theories, discussed in this thesis, there may be two types of losses to be relevant in
the decision making process. The first is a real loss, in the sense that, compared to
the status quo, the subject’s wealth is reduced after the realization of the prospective
outcome. This type of loss seems to be easy-to-evaluate. A real loss elicits a vivid
mental image of how it feels to lose it and thus immediate emotions. The second type
of loss is a loss compared to the expectations and beliefs of a subject. These types of
prospective outcomes seem to be hard-to-evaluate and the computation of a reference
point is an important step to evaluate such a prospective outcome. Neuroscientific re-
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search suggests that there are two different processes for evaluating gains and losses.
This may explain why "real" losses generally seem to be evaluated more easily than
gains and, in the same sense seem to loom larger, as implied by PT. The Amygdala is
suggested to play an important role in processing losses. In the evolutionary sense,
the Amygdala is a very old part of the brain. The Amygdala is known to be a proces-
sor of aversive emotions which help to identify and to recognize dangerous stimuli.
The Amygdala helps to decide between fight or flight - very fast, unconscious and
necessary to survive. This may give rise to the idea that, whenever the Amygdala is
active, this may be with respect to easy-to-evaluate prospective outcomes and thus
may lead to a hot affective state.
Besides the evaluation of a prospective outcome, a lottery needs to be evaluated ac-
cording to its probability distribution. Economic literature suggests, that prospective
outcomes and probabilities are evaluated independently during the decision mak-
ing process. That is, a prospective outcomes properties do not influence a subject’s
perception of the given probabilities. However, based on several observations that
subjects do not weight probabilities linearly, PT introduces a subjective probability
weighting function, which shows that subjects tend to overweight very small prob-
abilities, underweight high probabilities and that changes in probabilities only have
little impact on the evaluation of a decision within moderate probabilities. As Sec-
tion 4.2 discusses, the evaluation of probabilities and prospective outcomes in fact
is not independent. Intuitively and confirmed by psychological and neuroscientific
research, one assumes, that when making a decision, the characteristics of a prospec-
tive outcome are clearly not independent of the probability with which they are
distributed. To be more precise, the evaluation of both seems to be dependent of
the properties of the prospective outcome. An affective prospective outcome which
evokes strong mental images is easy-to-evaluate. Further, such a prospective outcome
seems to bring a subject into a hot affective state which leads to a more pronounced
inverted s-shaped weighting function. The more affective a prospective outcome is,
the more pronounced is the inverted s-shape of the weighting function. That is, there
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are large jumps at the endpoints describing highly overweighting and underweight-
ing and the function is very flat in the middle, describing disproportional low impact
of changes in probabilities to the evaluation of a lottery. That is, subjects tend to ne-
glect probabilities when evaluating lotteries, except when the certainty of a gain or a
loss turns to the possibility of not winning or maybe winning/not losing. As a poten-
tial loss seems to be more affective, the shape of the probability weighting function is
more pronounced for losses than for gains. If the prospective outcome of a lottery is
benign and pallid, i.e., non-affective, the jumps near the endpoints are moderate and
there is larger impact of changes in probabilities to the evaluation of the lottery. This
means that probabilities are taken into account cognitively when evaluating a lottery.
Not only prospective outcomes can induce vivid mental images which lead to a hot
affective state. If probabilities are represented as relative frequencies this may induce
a more pronounced affective reaction. Neuroscientific research underlines these as-
sumptions. As discussed in Section 4.2.3, neuroscientific studies reveal that cognitive
evaluation leads to linear probability weighting whereas affective evaluation leads
to non-linear weighting. Found correlation of visual processes underlines the impor-
tance of the probability format. To sum up, it is assumed that if subjects subjectively
weight the probabilities, this weighting is more or less pronounced according to the
affective state which changes with the affectivity of the prospective outcome. That is,
the evaluation of the probability distribution and the resulting subjective weighting
of the probabilities depend on the properties of the prospective outcomes.
When a subject evaluates a lottery, he evaluates the prospective outcomes, the prob-
ability distribution and thereby computes somewhat of a subjective utility function.
However, subjects seem to react differently to the presence of risk. This manifests
in a different risk attitude. Within EUT, it is assumed that risk attitude is a static in-
dividual property. A subject can either be risk averse, risk neutral or risk seeking,
expressed by the shape of its utility function, as discussed in Section 4.3.1. Human
behavior, however, shows that risk attitude is a context and content specific variable.
PT, RT and DT allow for mixed risk attitudes which depend on the decision content.
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RDP even reveals how, in this model, risk attitude is context specific. In psychology
and neuroscience it is assumed that affect plays a role in influencing a subject’s risk
attitude. Psychological research reveals different factors influencing a subject’s risk
attitude. These factors can be classified in three categories: relation to the decision
task, no relation to the decision task and individual properties, whereof factors with
relation to the decision task can be further categorized as context specific and con-
tent specific. As discussed in Section 4.3.2, all these factors, to some extent, change a
subject’s affective state and thus influence his risk attitude. A positive affective state
leads to more risk seeking behavior whereas a negative affective state leads to more
risk averse behavior. Neuroscientific research underlines the psychological results
and suggests that there are two different systems in the brain processing positive and
negative affective states. NAcc is responsive to positive emotions such as pleasure
and happiness. There is evidence that subjects decide more risk seeking if they are
happy. aINS is responsive to negative emotions such as fear and anger. Subjects de-
cide more risk averse if they are scared. Engelmann and Tamir (2009) state that risk
averse subjects seem to base their decisions more on affect than risk neutral or risk
seeking subjects. But the causality is not quite clear here. Risk averse subjects rely on
System 1 which is triggered by a hot affective state. The reason for the hot state may
be a negative emotion such as fear or anger. It may be more accurate to say that the
activated System 1 leads to a risk averse decision than to say that a risk averse subject
relies on System 1. In fact, it is important that only a hot negative state leads to a risk
averse decision if System 1 is triggered. If the hot affective state is positive due to
pleasure or happiness, System 1 is also triggered but leads to a risk seeking decision.
The following Chapter 5 develops a formal framework which integrates the affec-
tivity of a decision situation into the computation of an expected overall utility of a
lottery.
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Chapter 5
A Framework for Affective Decision
Making under Risk (ADMF)
T
HE review of the existing theories and models of decision making under risk
in economics, psychology and neuroscience and the analysis how these disci-
plines deal with prospective outcomes, probability distribution and a subject’s risk
attitude show, that subjects base their decisions not only on cognitive but also on
affective processing. It is suggested that there are two parallel processes which are
activated depending on the subject’s affective state. This chapter focuses on Research
Question 4: "How can affective decision making under risk be described and ana-
lyzed in a formal decision making framework?" Thus, it provides the ADMF which
reveals the human decision making process in its particular steps. By providing this
ADMF, this Chapter introduces a standardized environment to identify the cognitive-
affective interplay in decision making under risk and its implications as a testable
environment of the relevant variables.
5.1 Requirements of the ADMF
The literature review in Chapter 3 shows that, on the one hand, economic approaches
exist to structure decision making under risk with respect to some affective compo-
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nent.1 These models, however, concentrate on expected emotions like regret or dis-
appointment. Yet, expected emotions are part of the cognitive processing not the af-
fective processing. Kahneman and Tversky address affective components, e.g. a sub-
jective probability weight, without further specification of their source. On the other
hand, the literature review shows that psychological and neuroscientific approaches
exist to model the role of affect in decision making in detail.2 These models indeed
focus on immediate emotions, expected emotions and mood. Yet, there doesn’t exist
a structured approach to first specify the triggers of such affective reactions within
an economic decision under risk and second its impact on a subject’s affective state.
Thus, the ADMF is required to structure the decision making process such that differ-
ent types of emotions and mood, subsumed under the name affect, can be analyzed
with respect to their triggers within the evaluation of a lottery.
The economic models account for the fact that the objective elements of each lottery
are somehow subjectively perceived, by introducing a subjective probability weight
and a subjective utility function and further allowing for different risk attitudes. Psy-
chological models work with the concept of mental images to account for the fact that
a subject transforms an objective lottery into a subjectively perceived lottery. Kah-
neman and Tversky describe this transformation as the editing phase from a rather
cognitive perspective, Slovic describes this transformation as the AH from a rather
affective perspective. Loewenstein indeed accounts for subjectively perceived com-
ponents of the lottery as he models the influence of anticipated outcomes and sub-
jective probabilities on the cognitive evaluation which is influenced by feelings. Yet,
he doesn’t account for any specification of how the objective lottery is transformed
into the subjectively perceived components. Thus, the ADMF is required to struc-
ture the decision making process such that it can be analyzed how affect impacts the
transformation of the objective lottery into the subjectively perceived components of
1cf. Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Bell (1982, 1985), Loomes and Sugden (1982, 1986), Köszegi
and Rabin (2006, 2007)
2cf. Slovic et al. (2007), Finucane et al. (2000), Slovic et al. (2004), Slovic and Peters (2006), Loewen-
stein et al. (2001), Schwarz and Clore (1983), Schwarz (2011), Bechara and Damasio (2005), Gold and
Shadlen (2002), Rangel (2008)
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a lottery.
Research in psychology and neuroscience reveals that there are distinct neural sys-
tems processing the affective and cognitive evaluation of a lottery, elicited by the
subject’s affective state. However, neither economic nor psychological and neurosci-
entific theories provide a structured approach how to model the difference between
the cognitive and affective evaluation of a lottery and its impact on the decision. Thus,
the ADMF is required to structure the evaluation of a lottery such that it can be an-
alyzed when and why a lottery is evaluated by the affective system or the cognitive
system and to specify the different computation of an overall value of the lottery.
The economic models, discussed in Section 3.1, all have in common that a subject
bases his decision between lotteries on the overall utility of a lottery. The overall util-
ity of a lottery is given by the subjective utility of each prospective outcome, weighted
by the corresponding probability influenced by the subjective risk attitude. Therefore,
the analysis of the decision making process within each discipline has been structured
along these three components of decision making under risk. The decision making
process has been disassembled in order to shed light on those constituents, where it
is possible and promising to integrate the idea that affect is also a crucial part of de-
cision making under risk. Based on this analysis in Chapter 4, the economic decision
making process is now reassembled, extended by the results of the psychological and
neuroscientific analysis. This Chapter develops a framework which realistically mod-
els human decision behavior under risk. It allows to interpret the cognitive-affective
interplay within each decision such that economic decision behavior can be modeled
in a detailed standardized way in the sense of economics, psychology and neuro-
science. To sum up, the ADMF should be structured such that:
• Economic decisions under risk can be analyzed by integrating psychological
and neuroscientific components.
• Prospective outcomes, probability distribution and risk attitude can be analyzed
separately as well as with respect to their interplay.
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• Each trigger of the affective state can be identified and analyzed.
• It can be analyzed how affect is involved in the transformation of the objective
lottery into a subjectively perceived lottery.
• The cognitive or affective computation of lottery’s overall value can be analyzed
and specified.
5.2 Development of the ADMF
The ADMF is based on a Decision Making Process which is composed of four phases
which are briefly discussed in the following. The discussion then goes into detail
with the analysis of the Evaluation Phase, as the role of affect and its interplay with
cognition can best be analyzed within this phase.3 The Evaluation Phase is analyzed
graphically. Hereby, on the one hand, this section concentrates on the elements of the
Evaluation Phase, as derived from the analysis within Chapter 4 and, on the other
hand, it concentrates on the relations between these elements.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the four phases of the Decision Making Process: the Evalua-
tion Phase, the Decision Phase, the Anticipation Phase and the Reaction to Realization
Phase. The Evaluation Phase is the most important phase within this thesis and its
components are illustrated in detail within the ADMF, which is developed within this
section. Within the PT it is distinguished between the Editing Phase and the Evalu-
ation Phase which are merged here as the Evaluation Phase. The Evaluation Phase
is followed by the Decision Phase. In the Decision Phase, a subject actually makes a
decision. So far, the phases of the Decision Making Process coincide with standard
economic literature. The Anticipation Phase, as an important phase within the Deci-
3Surely, affect also plays a prominent role in the remaining phases of the Decision Making Process.
Analyzing this impact on decision making under risk provides a large spectrum of future research.
However, I believe that this research applies to sequential decision making in most cases. As the
standard economic literature of decision making under risk usually considers one-shot decisions I did
so too.
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sion Making Process, is mostly suggested by neuroscientific literature.4 During the
Anticipation Phase, a subject anticipates the expected realization of the decision he
made. That is, he is waiting for the prospective outcome which he expects to be real-
ized. These expectations finally are either delivered or not. The Anticipation Phase is,
as discussed in Section 4.3.3, important for further decisions as a subject’s Risk Atti-
tude correlates with the subject’s reward prediction error. In the fourth and last phase
the subject learns about the realization of his decision and reacts to it, consciously or
unconsciously. This phase is also important from a psychological as well as neuro-
scientific point of view. The realization of a decision triggers immediate emotions,
which in turn influence a future decisions (cf. the psychological and neuroscientific
models discussed in Chapter 3 and analyzed in more detail in Chapter 4).
Prospective
Outcome
Probability
Distribution
Risk 
Attitude
Direct Relation
Individual Properties
No Relation
 Cognitive Processing    Affective Processing
   Evaluation results in the choice of one option.
Choice of one option results in the anticipation of the
   expected and desirable outcome.
  Reaction to the realization depends on the realized 
outcome, its anticipation and the not chosen option. 
The realization impacts future decisions.
Affective State
Probability Weighting
Probability Representation
DECISION MAKING PROCESS
Realization
Anticipation
Decision
Evaluation
Absolute Evaluation
Relative Evaluation
FIGURE 5.1: The Decision Making Process
4cf. Levin et al. (2012), Engelmann and Tamir (2009)
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The following of this section concentrates on the Evaluation Phase in order to il-
lustrate the ADMF in detail, analyzing each element and its corresponding relation
to the other elements within the ADMF. Figure 5.2 depicts the ADMF and the rela-
Overall
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FIGURE 5.2: The Affective Decision Making Framework (ADMF)
tions between its elements. The ADMF represents a scheme which analyzes how an
Overall Value is assigned to a Lottery.5 Each Lottery is represented by a Probabil-
ity Distribution over Prospective Outcomes. Within the ADMF this is depicted as
the Objective Lottery (OL). Prospective Outcomes, the Probabilities and a subject’s
Mood trigger a change of the Affective State. The Affective State transforms the OL
5Within the ADMF, a subject is typically confronted with a decision problem of the following struc-
ture. A subject generally has to choose between two lotteries. A lottery can be any kind of problem with
the following properties. A lottery consists of two alternatives. Each alternative results in an outcome
with a given probability. The probabilities of the two alternatives of one lottery add up to one. The
decision for a lottery results in an subject’s choice. In the end a subject learns about the realization of
his choice. The Decision Making Process, as it is described here, evaluates a lottery from a subject’s
perspective. That is, changes in any state of the world are not taken into account here.
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into a Subjectively Perceived Lottery (SPL). The transformation from the OL into the
SPL ends with an overall Affective State which finally triggers System 1 or System 2.
Either one of these systems (however, as discussed in Section 5.3, both Systems are
processing mostly parallel) computes an Overall Value of the SPL.
The sequence of action within the ADMF and its consequences can best be catego-
rized in three steps.
1. Trigger (Prospective Outcome, Probability Distribution, Mood)
2. Subjective Transformation
3. Affective or Cognitive Processing of SPL: Overall Value
Trigger
The central element of the ADMF is the Affective State. It serves as a mediator dur-
ing the Evaluation Phase. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Affective State can either
be hot or cold, with each state being either positive or negative. On the one hand,
the Affective State is triggered by immediate integral emotions.6 The emotions are
triggered by the representation of the elements of the OL: the Prospective Outcomes
and the Probabilities. On the other hand, the Affective State is triggered by incidental
emotions. Incidental emotions are immediate emotions which influence a subject’s
Mood and thus change the Affective State.
(T1) Outcome Properties Relation (T1) links a Prospective Outcome (as an element
of the OL) to the subject’s Affective State. That is, this relation describes how the
properties of a Prospective Outcome trigger the Affective State.7 Thus, the properties
of a Prospective Outcome impact the intensity of the triggered immediate emotions.
These emotions triggered by the imagination of achieving a Prospective Outcome
6Please refer to Section 2.1.2, where I shortly discuss emotion theories and possible definitions
Section 3.4, where I summarize the underlying concepts used within this thesis.
7The analysis in Section 4.1.2 and Section 4.1.3 reveals, that from a psychological and neuroscien-
tific point of view, Prospective Outcomes differ in their properties. Such properties are for example:
monetary, material, non-material, imminent, future.
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are either positive as desire, happiness, pleasure or negative as rejection, fear, sad-
ness. The Affective State changes with the intensity of the triggered emotions. These
emotions are expressed and experienced by vivid mental images about how it would
feel to achieve this Prospective Outcome. Intense emotions which lead to vivid men-
tal images trigger a hot (either positive or negative) Affective State. If, however, a
Prospective Outcome doesn’t trigger intense immediate emotions and thus there are
only pallid, if at all, mental images about how it would feel to achieve this Prospective
Outcome, the Affective state is cold (either positive or negative). A Prospective Out-
come of 1 Million Euros triggers positive emotions. Then, a subject has vivid mental
images about how it would feel to have 1 Million Euros. Thus, the subject is in a hot
Affective State. A Prospective Outcome of 9 Euros does not trigger intense emotions.
That is, a subject doesn’t have vivid mental images about how it would feel to achieve
this Prospective Outcome. This leads to a cold (either positive or negative) Affective
State.
To sum up, Relation (T1) describes a Prospective Outcome as a trigger of emotions
which change the subject’s Affective State.
(T2) Probabilities Relation (T2) links the Probabilities (as an element of the OL) to
the subject’s Affective State. That is, this relation describes how the given probabili-
ties trigger the Affective State. As discussed in Section 4.2.2, probabilities can trigger
immediate emotions. These immediate emotions, which are triggered with respect to
high and small probabilities, can be represented in a fourfold pattern8:
• Fear of missing a gain when probabilities are high
• Hope for avoiding a loss when probabilities are high
• Hope for winning when probabilities are small
• Fear of losing when probabilities are small
8Please note how this pattern shows that it is not consequently given that the Affective State is
positive if gains are at stake and negative if losses are at stake. Rather this pattern shows why a
very desirable Prospective Outcome might be tagged with Fear. This issue is depicted within Relation
(ST1), which describes how the OL is affectively transformed into the SPL.
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Further, probabilities can be presented as relative frequencies or individual probabil-
ities. A relative frequency carries more affectivity than the representation as an indi-
vidual probability. With the representation as a relative frequency the subject tends
to neglect the denominator and image the numerator. The difference between these
two representation formats can best be understood with the example from Section
4.2.2. The potential criminality of a psychiatric patient can be represented with an
individual probability: Patients with the same history as Mr. Jones commit an act of
crime with a probability of 20% when they are dismissed. It can also be represented
as a relative frequency: 20 out of 100 patients like Mr. Jones commit an act of violence
when they are dismissed. When the information is provided as an individual prob-
ability this leads to the mental image of one individual. This individual can either
commit an act of crime or not. This may lead to a slightly pallid image of Mr. Jones
and trigger a rather cold Affective State. In contrast, a frequency format triggers a
mental image that includes a number of violent patients and is thus frightening and
affective and triggers a rather hot Affective State. However, there is no such thing
like intuitive statistics. That is, as derived from the discussion in Section 4.2, subjects
are not capable of evaluating slight changes in probabilities without a given context.
To evaluate the Probability Distribution of a lottery a subject needs a context. This
is captured within the Subjective Transformation which depicts how Probabilities are
tagged with affective information.
(T3) Mood The Affective State also changes with the influence of a subject’s Mood.
The subject’s Mood captures incidental emotions, that is, emotions which are trig-
gered by factors not related to the evaluation of the lottery. As discussed in Section
2.1.2, the Affective State changes quite fast, whereas the Mood is a background emo-
tional state extended in time, that can either be positive or negative.9 The valence
of the Mood influences a decision mediated by the Affective State. That is, a nega-
tive Mood triggers a negative Affective State and a positive Mood triggers a positive
9The FaI Model, introduced in Section 3.2, mostly concentrates on a subject’s Mood and its impli-
cations on decision making.
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Affective State.
Subjective Transformation
During the evaluation of a lottery, the OL is transformed into the SPL with the trig-
gered Affective State playing the central role. That is, the OL is transformed such that
there is Subjective Perception SP added to the objective factors. This information
prepares the Lottery for the evaluation in the sense that the subject can answer the
question: "How do I feel about the Lottery?"
(ST1) Outcome - Probability - Dependency The Subjective Transformation tags the
Prospective Outcomes and the corresponding Probability Distribution with affectiv-
ity such that the SPL is prepared for the Computation of the Overall Value. Thus,
on the one hand, a Prospective Outcome is tagged as a gain or a loss as well as be-
ing easy-to-evaluate or hard-to-evaluate. On the other hand, the Probabilities are
tagged with the subjective perception of probabilities. The reciprocal arrow of Rela-
tion (ST1) implies that the Subjective Transformation of the OL into the SPL has to be
understood as a finite cycle. That is, the subjective perception can in turn update the
Affective State such that other affective information is tagged to the SPL (e.g. the de-
sire elicited by the presence of a gain turns into fear of not winning it if probabilities
are high). However, it is implied, that this update is finite such that in the end of the
Subjective Transformation, there is an overall Affective State which initiates System 1
or System 2.
From the analysis of how a Prospective Outcome is evaluated in economics, psy-
chology and neuroscience, Section 4.4 derives that the three disciplines complement
one another in three points.
• The reference dependent evaluation of a Prospective Outcome depends on its
affectivity
• There is a difference between a relative loss and a real loss
• Losses are more affective than gains
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First, where economic literature presumes that the subjective utility, which assigns
value to a Prospective Outcome, is either derived absolutely, relatively or by a combi-
nation of both, psychology approaches this issue with the affectivity of the Prospec-
tive outcome. That is, the evaluation of a Prospective Outcome is determined by its
properties (condition, magnitude, reference point). As discussed in Section 4.1.2, a
Prospective Outcome can, from the perspective of psychology, be easy-to-evaluate or
hard-to-evaluate with respect to its Affectivity. Thus, with respect to the Subjective
Transformation of the OL into the SPL, the Affective State handles the Prospective
Outcomes properties and tags the Prospective Outcome as a gain or a real loss as well
as being easy-to-evaluate or hard-to-evaluate. Two dimensions of a loss are implied.
On the one hand, if a Prospective Outcome is easy-to-evaluate the identification as a
gain or loss is easy. Usually, this comes along with a clear positive or negative quality
of the Prospective Outcome, such as gaining or losing 1 Million Euros. On the other
hand, if a positive Prospective Outcome is hard-to-evaluate, it might be perceived as
a loss compared to another Prospective Outcome, such as gaining 9 Euros compared
to 1.000 Euros. From these facts it is deduced that a subject’s reference point de-
pends very strongly on the Prospective Outcomes property of being easy-to-evaluate
or hard-to-evaluate. If a Prospective Outcome evokes such strong mental images of
desire, the reference point may be influenced by the 1 Million Euros themselves and
every other Prospective Outcome would be perceived as a loss. If a subject has the
possibility to gain 1 Million Euros, the imagination of not gaining it feels like a loss.
If one outcome does not evoke any images, such as 9 Euros, there is a need to com-
pare it to the alternative outcomes. 9 Euros compared to 1 Euro are great, whereas
9 Euros compared to 1.000 Euros are quite bad. In that case, the reference point is
more determined by the status quo and the subject’s expectations of all Prospective
Outcomes. That is, after the Subjective Transformation of a Prospective Outcome it
is prepared for the Computation of the Overall Value in the sense that the subject
knows if it is easy-to-evaluate such that he immediately knows if he wants to achieve
it or avoid it. In this case, the Prospective Outcome will be tagged as a gain or a real
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loss. If it is not possible to identify a Prospective Outcome as a gain or a real loss, it
is tagged as hard-to-evaluate. The domain of gain or loss determines the slope of the
subject’s utility functions (Impulsive Value β and Deliberate Valueδ) such that losses
loom larger than gains.
Relation (ST1) further describes how the evaluation of a Probability depends on
the affectivity of the Prospective Outcomes. This dependency is connected to the
subject’s Affective State, such that the properties of the Weighting Function w are
predetermined by the affectivity of a Prospective Outcome. The non-linear weighting
can be described by four features: small probabilities are usually overweighted and
large probabilities are usually underweighted. These phenomena are usually more
pronounced near the endpoints of the weighting function, expressed by ’jumps’. This
leads to a diminishing sensitivity in the mid-range of the Weighting Function.10 There
is evidence that the affectivity of a Prospective Outcome directly influences the shape
w. Fear and hope triggered by the Probabilities are more intense if the Prospective
Outcome is affective and thus the Affective State is hot. That is, affective Prospec-
tive Outcomes induce a more pronounced inverted s-shaped probability weighting
function whereas non-affective Prospective Outcomes induce a weighting function,
which is closer to the identity line. In other words, when there is an affective Prospec-
tive Outcome, small probabilities are more overweighted because the triggered hope
for winning or fear of losing is more intense than with a non-affective Prospective
Outcome and large probabilities are more underweighted because the triggered fear
of missing a gain or hope for avoiding a loss is more intense. Subjects playing Lotto
is a good example of how a slight sparkle of hope leads to overweighting of very
small probabilities. Further, sensitivity is more diminished in the mid-range of prob-
abilities. Thus, after the Subjective Transformation, the properties of the Weighting
Function w are determined such that probabilities can be transformed in subjective
decision weights during the computation of the Overall Value.
(ST2) Affective Risk Attitude The Affective State also transforms the subject’s Risk
10Refer to Section 3.1 for a typical probability weighting function as proposed within the PT.
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Attitude. As derived from the discussion in Section 4.3, a subject’s Risk Attitude
changes with the influence of several factors. That is, a subject’s Risk Attitude is
specific to the content and context of the decision situation and is mediated by the
valence of the Affective State. Research in psychology and neuroscience reveal that
the following factors influence a subjects Risk Attitude.
• Directly related to the decision task
– Vividness in representation of Prospective Outcomes and probabilities
(content)
– Time course (context)
– Time pressure (context)
– Decision from experience or description (context)
• Individual properties of a subject
– Experience
– Cognitive ability
– Evolutionary preparedness
• Not related to the decision task
– Mood
A positive Affective State leads to a more risk seeking behavior, whereas a negative
Affective State leads to a more risk averse behavior. Yet, the reciprocal relation indi-
cates that each subject has a given Risk Attitude such that a very risk averse subject
might generally rely more on his Affective State.
(ST3) Shift in Risk Preference This relation links the subject’s Risk Attitude to the
SPL. In economics, it is generally assumed that a subject’s Risk Attitude is expressed
by the shape of his utility function. That is, within the ADMF, ST3 describes how
the shape of the Impulsive Value and Deliberate Value is determined such that risk
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affinity implies convexity, risk aversion implies concavity and risk neutrality implies
linearity. Thus, ST3 describes the fact that a change in Risk Attitude leads to a shift
in risk preferences.
158
5.2 Development of the ADMF
To sum up, the three relations ST1, ST2 and ST3 describe the role of the Affective
State within the Subjective Transformation. In the sense of the ADMF, the Subjective
Perception SP adds affective information to the OL, as for example: How much is
the Prospective Outcome liked or disliked? What is the subject’s Reference Point?
How are the probabilities perceived in the sense of a non-linear weighting? What
is the subject’s Risk Attitude? That is, SP = {a,β,δ,r,w} is a set which contains the
following elements. a ∈R reflects the degree of Affectivity of a Prospective Outcome
such that ax >,<,= ay implies that the Prospective Outcome x is more affective, less
affective, equal to the Prospective Outcome y. The Subjective Perception of an OL
determines the properties of the Impulsive Value β : C → R, which finally assigns
an absolute value β(x) to a Prospective Outcome x ∈ C during the computation of
the Overall Value.11 SP as well determines the properties of the Deliberate Value δ :
C×R →R, which finally assigns a reference dependent value δ(x,r) to a Prospective
Outcome x ∈ C compared to a Reference Point r ∈ R during the computation of the
Overall Value. In line with the assumptions of PT and RDP, Risk Attitude enters the
Subjective Perception via the shape of β and δ. The Subjective Perception determines
the properties of the Weighting Function w : [0,1]×R→ [0,1] such that w(p, a) finally
assigns a weight to each probability p, depending on the Affectivity a. The higher
a, the more pronounced inverted s-shape has w. As will be discussed in more detail
in Section 5.3, each economic theory implies different assumptions of SP such as the
properties of the utility function, the underlying reference point and other context
to be taken into account. The Subjective Transformation of an OL into a SPL can
formally be expressed as follows. Typically, OLs are given in the form of (x1, p; x2,1−
p). Let LOL be the set of all OLs and LSPL be the set of all SPLs. Then, the Subjective
Transformation of the OL is a function F which maps an OL and particular Subjective
Perception SP onto a SPL, i.e.
(5.1) F : LOL × SP → LSPL
11Relation P3 is described in more detail in the following of this section.
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A SPL is then given in the form of (x1, p; x2,1− p; ax1 ; ax2 ;β;δ;w;r) which means that
every Prospective Outcome is tagged with the degree of Affectivity a. If x1 is a very
high loss, a → ∞. Reflecting that subjects are risk seeking in the domain of losses,
β and δ are convex and w incorporates a very pronounced inverted s-shape with
large jumps near the endpoints and diminishing sensitivity such that the subject is
insensitive to changes in probabilities in the mid-range. Thus, after the the Subjective
Transformation, the Affective State has tagged the OL with affective information such
that it is determined if System 1 or System 2 is dominant in the computation of the
Overall Value.12
Cognitive or Affective Processing
The review of psychological and neuroscientific models and theories in Section 3.2
and 3.3 as well as the detailed analysis of the relevant components of decision making
under risk in Chapter 4 reveals that, within the decision making process, there are two
systems processing the given information in different ways.
(P1) System 1 and System 2 A hot Affective State, which can either be positive or
negative, triggers System 1. A cold Affective State, which can be positive or nega-
tive, triggers System 2. System 1 is characterized by fast and unconscious processing,
literally spoken, it operates decisions from the heart. System 2 is characterized by de-
liberate and rational processing, literally spoken, it operates decisions from the head.
It is assumed, that System 1 and System 2 are not processing exclusively. Instead,
both systems are most likely processing parallel, with, depending on the Affective
State, one system is dominant.
(P2) SPL as Input Relation (P2) depicts that either System 1 or System 2 evaluate
the subjectively transformed SPL in order to compute its Overall Value.
(P3) Computation of SPL’s Overall Value Figure 5.3 depicts how the Overall Value
V(X) is computed.
12Refer to Section 5.3, where examples of the Subjective Transformation are discussed with respect
to the existing economic theories.
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FIGURE 5.3: The Overall Value of a Lottery
Prospective Outcome x1 and Prospective Outcome x2 are tagged with affectivity
measured by a. As described within Relation (T1), an affective Prospective Outcome
(i.e. a is large) is easy-to-evaluate whereas a non-affective Prospective Outcome (i.e.
a is small) is hard-to-evaluate. System 1 is dominant when the Prospective Out-
come is easy-to-evaluate, System 2 is dominant if the Prospective Outcome is hard-
to-evaluate.
Within the ADMF, a subject’s Overall Value V(X) depends on an absolute com-
ponent as well as on comparisons of the prospective outcomes x1, x2 to relevant ref-
erence points r. The absolute component is the Impulsive Value, expressed by β(x)
and the reference dependent component is the Deliberate Value, expressed by δ(x,r).
These two components have a different impact ̺ on the Overall Value of the SPL,
depending on the affectivity a of the lottery: ̺(a) ∈ [0,1] with ̺(a) = 0 for a = 0 and
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̺(a) = 1 for a → ∞. That is, the more affective a Prospective Outcome of a lottery
is, the higher is the influence of the Impulsive Value. As for a less affective outcome
it is not so easy to assign a value, in this case the influence of the Deliberate Value is
higher. Each term is weighted with the Weighting Function w(p, a) which depends on
the associated probability p and affectivity a. For a = 0, w(p, a) = p. The higher a, the
more pronounced is the inverted s-shape of the probability weighting function. That
is, if a is large, changes in the endpoints of w(w, p) have a huge impact on the Overall
Value. If a is small, changes in the mid range of w(p, a) are linear in the Overall Value.
That is, the value of a lottery is composed of an Impulsive Value which is reduced or
increased by a Deliberate Value. The Overall Value V(X) of Lottery X in the sense of
the ADMF is given as follows:
(5.2)
V(X) = w(p, a)[̺(a)β(x1)+ (1− ̺(a))δ(x1,r)]+ w(1− p, a)[̺(a)β(x2)+ (1− ̺(a))δ(x2,r)]
In Section 5.3 the ADMF’s workflow and implications are applied to the economic
models of decision making under risk. This finally reveals, that the these models can
all be subsumed under the ADMF as "special cases".
5.3 Discussion and Examples
The ADMF shows that expanding decision making under risk by affect offers several
possibilities for a better understanding. In fact, this section provides in the following,
that all the discussed theories of decision making under risk can be integrated into
the ADMF as special cases. Interpreting them on the basis of the ADMF shows that all
discussed economic theories can be approached as different cognitive decision rules,
each appropriate in different situations due to the implemented reference point. It
is shown that, although explicitly addressing the emotions of regret, rejoice, disap-
pointment and elation, these models do not include affective accounts in the sense of
the ADMF.
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There are two desperate situations within the ADMF, a situation in which only Sys-
tem 2 is processing such that a lottery is evaluated purely cognitive and a situation
in which only System 1 is processing such that a lottery is evaluated purely affective.
However, it is assumed that in most cases economic decisions under risk comprise
System 1 as well as System 2. Thus, the ADMF enables the analysis of different sit-
uations in the sense of economic context and its implications on a decision under
risk. This section discusses the economic theories in the sense of a purely cognitive
evaluation. It shows how each theory broadens its mind with respect to the context
taken into account to derive the subjective utility function and deduce the possible
implications made from the analysis in the sense of the ADMF. It further shows how
the economic theories approach the idea that there are decision situations in which
the intrinsic utility and the reference dependent utility have different impact on the
modified utility function. That is, there are decision situations, in which a subject is
more sensitive to the decision context than in other situations. This analysis derived
from the discussion within this thesis highlights that, in order to describe and pre-
dict a subject’s behavior correctly, every discussed economic theory makes different
assumptions on the context to be taken into account. The economic interpretation is
mostly based on the observation that subjects show different risk attitudes in differ-
ent situations. The discussion in Section 4.3.1 highlights that these specific patterns
of risk attitude are interpreted differently, e.g. with a subjective probability weight-
ing function, with regret and disappointment aversion, with the differentiation of
the source of risk. Eventually, all these economic descriptions and interpretations of
decision making under risk can be reduced to the fact that, subjects obviously seek
for pleasure and avoid pain wherever this is possible and are willing to tradeoff to
achieve this. Thus, the economic theories mostly describe subjects behavior correctly
however the analysis of the economic theories in the sense of the ADMF gives rise to
the question why this is the case.
As developed in the last section, the ADMF evaluates a lottery in three steps.
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• The Affective State is triggered.
– (T1) Prospective Outcomes
– (T2) Probability Distribution
– (T3) Mood
• The OL is transformed into the SPL.
– (ST1) Outcome-Probability Dependency
– (ST2) Change of Risk Attitude
– (ST3) Shift in Risk Preferences
• The SPL is evaluated by System 1 or System 2 resulting in V(SPL).
The Overall Value of Lottery X, in the sense of ADMF, is computed as follows:
(5.3)
V(X) = w(p, a)[̺(a)β(x1)+ (1− ̺(a))δ(x1,r)]+ w(1− p, a)[̺(a)β(x2)+ (1− ̺(a))δ(x2,r)]
It can be shown that, specifying w(p, a), ̺(a) and δ(·), every economic theory dis-
cussed within this thesis can be represented as the above equation.
EUT is the common origin for all the theories of decision making under risk dis-
cussed within this thesis, where the context of a lottery is not taken into account when
it is evaluated. As discussed in Section 4.1, a Prospective Outcome is thus evaluated
absolutely. Predictions of subject’s behavior in the sense of EUT can be interpreted in
the sense of the ADMF when the decision situation is cold in its characteristics such as
for example the choice between Lottery X : (9,0.75;0,0.25) and Y : (8,0.85;0,0.15). As
EUT doesn’t allow for any affective processing, a subject’s Affective State is always
cold. That is, neither the Prospective Outcomes (T1), the Probability Distribution (T2)
nor the Mood (T3) immediately trigger any emotions such as hope or fear. Based on
the Affective State, the OL is then transformed into the SPL. The only element in
SP is the intrinsic utility function u, induced by the subject’s Risk Attitude. In the
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sense of the ADMF, every subject is characterized by a naturally given Risk Attitude
(which a positive or negative Affective State might change). In fact, a subject’s given
(pattern of) Risk Attitude is the only subjective factor within a cold evaluation. It is
assumed that each subject is characterized by his individual u such that each subject
reacts differently to risk. Neither content nor context of a decision situation influence
a subject’s Risk Attitude. In the sense of EUT, this simply means that the SPL only
differs from the OL by the influence of the Risk Attitude, expressed by the shape of
the intrinsic utility function. Based on the subject’s cold Affective State, System 2 is
triggered to evaluate the lottery’s Overall Value of the SPL. A Prospective Outcome
which doesn’t elicit any immediate emotions and thus mental images is categorized
as hard-to-evaluate. As there is no affectivity associated to the SPL, ̺(a) = 0. That is,
there is no Impulsive Value assigned to the Prospective Outcomes and the lottery is
only evaluated according the Deliberate Value. A subject, who decides in the sense
of EUT, doesn’t consider a reference point. Instead he evaluates each Prospective
Outcome absolutely. With w(p, a) = p, ̺(a) = 0 and δ(x,r) = u(x) this leads to
(5.4) V(X) = U(X) = pu(x1) + (1− p)u(x2)
which is equal to the expected utility in the sense of EUT. Figure 5.4 depicts the
computation of V(X) in the sense of EUT graphically.
Many observations of a subject’s behavior imply that mostly, lotteries are not eval-
uated as predicted by EUT. Thus, the other theories are extended by several assump-
tions which allow to approach differences in behavior with respect to sensitivity to
the decision context. Yet, they still only consider the cognitive side of decision making
as they do not intend to model how a subject decides. They differ in the underlying
reference point and thus make different assumptions about the properties of u and
v.13
13Refer to Section 4.1.1, where it is discussed how a prospective outcome is evaluated from the
perspective of the economic theories.
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FIGURE 5.4: The Expected Utility Theory as a Special Case in the ADMF
PT extends the assumptions of EUT by modeling some sensitivity towards the de-
cision context, i.e. specific pattern of risk attitude, larger looming of losses and a spe-
cific pattern of probability weighting. This sensitivity to the context is incorporated
into the properties of v and π. This makes PT a descriptive theory, as it describes sub-
jects’ behavior by these subjective functions. In the sense of PT, a subject evaluates
each Prospective Outcome according to an exogenously given reference point, mostly
to be considered the status quo. Thus, in the sense of PT, SP contains the reference
dependent utility function v and the probability weighting function π which both in-
corporate a subject’s specific pattern of risk attitude. Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
state, that:
"According to the present theory, attitudes toward risk are determined
jointly by v and π, and not solely by the utility function." (Kahneman and
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Tversky (1979), p. 285)
That is, the subjective factors of the SPL in the sense of PT are v and π. PT doesn’t
allow for any affectivity, thus the affectivity of a Prospective Outcome is not taken
into account. That is, a subject’s Affective State is supposed to be cold and a subject
treats every Prospective Outcome as if it was hard-to-evaluate. In the sense of PT, this
simply means that the SPL differs from the OL by the influence of the Risk Attitude,
expressed by the shape of the reference dependent utility function and the probability
weighting function. This leads to the fact that Lottery X’s overall value V(X) only
includes the Deliberate Value, with a reference point r being the status quo. That is,
with w(p, a) = π(p), ̺(a) = 0 and δ(x,r) = v(x), this leads to
(5.5) V(X) = U(X) = π(p)v(x1) + π(1− p)v(x2)
which is equal to the Overall Value in the sense of Kahneman/Tversky. Figure 5.5
depicts the computation of V(X) in the sense of PT graphically.
As already mentioned above, PT is a descriptive theory which incorporates the
observed economic behavior with respect to the value function and the probability
weighting function. However, the authors do not make more than some vague state-
ments about why subjects behave as they do. The ADMF can explain this context
sensitivity with respect to the affectivity with which a lottery is described. The fact
that losses loom larger than gains, as expressed by the slope of v, is not a secret in psy-
chology and neuroscience. Evolution prepared subjects to intuitively identify losses
and react unconsciously to avoid them.14 In the sense of the ADMF this simply means
that the imagination of a loss elicits strong immediate negative emotions such as fear,
which leads to a hot negative Affective State (T1). Negative emotions are generally
more affective than positive emotions. Consider the Certainty Effect as an example
how the ADMF interprets the subjective weighting of probabilities. Subjects mostly
14Refer to Section 4.1.2 and 4.1.3, where this is discussed.
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FIGURE 5.5: The Prospect Theory as a Special Case in the ADMF
prefer X : (3.000,1) to Y : (4.000,0.8). The transformation of the OL into the SPL de-
pends very much on the subjective situation a subject is in such that it serves as a
good example of the parallel processing of System 1 and System 2. How easy is it to
assign an Impulsive Value to 4.000 Euros? A student who doesn’t know how to pay
rent for the next months will be more exited about 4.000 Euros than a manager who
earns twice per months. From the student’s perspective, the Prospective Outcome of
4.000 Euros is firstly imagined as very desirable. The Probability Distribution is then
interpreted as a reduction from probability 1 to 0.8 (T2). This immediately elicits the
fear of missing this desirable gain such that the probability of 0.8 is underweighted
(ST1). The fear of missing this gain leads to a negative Affective State and the sub-
ject’s Risk Attitude is (more) risk averse (ST2). Thus, System 1 and System 2 are most
likely to be processing parallel as the student might be aware of the fact that choosing
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Y might provide him the higher expected value however System 1 is dominant. The
manager however might not perceive 4.000 Euros as very desirable (T1) such that
evaluating the Probability Distribution doesn’t immediately elicit the fear of not win-
ning (T2). That is, in this case the Affective State is moderate, which leads to a less
pronounced probability weighting (ST1) such that the probability of 0.8 is evaluated
more linearly which might lead to the decision in favor of Lottery Y with System 2
being dominant (̺student(a) > ̺manager(a)).
RDP, RT and DT are similar in the sense that they approach an endogenously given
reference point and they presume a Prospective Outcome to be evaluated according
to a value with an intrinsic component and a reference dependent component. Thus,
what these theories have in common, is that each underlying utility function can be
represented as µ = u + v. The second component within these models, v, depends on
an endogenously given reference point, which is either determined by the subject’s
expectations (sometimes in the sense of disappointment) or expected regret. Neither
expectations in a general sense nor expected emotions as regret or disappointment
are part of the affective processing in the sense of the ADMF.15 The theories differ in
what they assume to be the underlying Reference Point r and in how they approach
sensitivity to the decision context.
RT incorporate the expected emotions regret and rejoice into the evaluation of a
Prospective Outcome by comparing it to the forgone outcome y resulting from the
not chosen lottery. The intrinsic value of a Prospective Outcome is considered lin-
early, the only transformation of the OL into the SPL, which is allowed within RT,
is the regret/rejoice function v. The specific pattern of mixed risk attitudes in the
sense of RT is correlated with a general regret-aversion, expressed by the shape of v.
Comparing each Prospective Outcome to the forgone outcome is a purely cognitive
deliberation, a subject’s Affective State is cold and a subject treats every Prospective
Outcome as if it was hard-to-evaluate. RT doesn’t account for the weighting of proba-
15Please refer to Section 5.2 where the trigger of a hot Affective State and thus affective processing,
are discussed and specified.
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bilities. Thus, this leads to the fact that Lottery X’s Overall Value V(X) only includes
the Deliberate Value, with a reference point r = y. That is, with
w(p, a) = p, ̺(a) = 0 and δ(x,r) = µ(x|y) = x + v(x− y)) this leads to
(5.6) V(X) = U(X) = pµ(x1|y1) + (1− p)µ(x2|y2)
which can be interpreted as the Overall Value in the sense of RT.
Figure 5.6 depicts the computation of V(X) in the sense of RT graphically.
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FIGURE 5.6: Regret Theories as a Special Case in the ADMF
RT has been developed as an alternative to PT in order to explain the observed
anomalies in behavior (hurting the EUT axioms). Other than directly approaching
mixed risk attitudes in the domain of gains and losses (exogenously predetermined
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as within PT), RT argues with a general aversion of regret. That is, gains and losses
are identified endogenously by the comparison to the foregone outcome. Yet, this
leads to a similar specific pattern of risk attitude.16 The fact that subjects try to avoid
the sensation of regret can be pictured with the example of playing Lotto. Consider
the following decision between playing Lotto or not: X : (−10,0.999;150Mio,0.001),
Y : (0,1). If a subject does not buy the Lottery-Ticket he will experience maximum
regret if he learns afterwards that his numbers would have won. This implies that the
subject is always better choosing Lottery X. However, as discussed in Section 3.1.3, it
is essential for this motivation that a subject always knows in which state of the world
a (not) chosen lottery results. Yet, it is obvious that this is not always possible. The
analysis of this decision in the sense of the ADMF offers a different explanation. 150
Million Euros are imagined as a very desirable gain (T1). The probability of 0.001
is perceived as a move from zero to the slight possibility of winning the jackpot.
This immediately induces hope for winning which leads to a hot positive Affective
State (T2). Thus, 0.001 is very much overweighted (ST1) and the subject turns risk
seeking (ST2). That is, a subject swaps the possibility of experiencing regret, which is
associated to pain, against hope, which is associated to pleasure. To be more precise,
minimizing expected regret goes along with maintaining the hope for winning. As
the above discussed Certainty Effect, the Lotto-Phenomenon is also a good example
for the parallel processing of System 1 and System 2, one of which being dominant.
Obviously, there are two groups of subjects. First, there are subjects in Group 1 who
base their decisions on affect, namely they are willing to pay for maintaining the hope
for winning the jackpot even if they are fully aware of the fact that playing Lotto has
a negative expected utility. Yet, the Prospective Outcome of winning the jackpot is so
affective, that it is mostly evaluated according to its Impulsive Value β instead of its
Deliberate Value δ. Group 2 bases its decisions on System 2, namely they are able to
cushion their hope for winning the jackpot such that ̺group1(a) > ̺group2(a).
DT incorporate the expected emotions disappointment and relief into the evalu-
16Refer to Section 4.3.1, where it is discussed how RT captures risk attitudes.
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ation of a Prospective Outcome by comparing it to the expected value x¯ resulting
from the Lottery X. As within DT, the intrinsic value of a Prospective Outcome is
considered linearly, the only only element of SP in the sense of DT, is the disappoint-
ment/elation function v. The specific pattern of mixed risk attitudes in the sense of
DT is correlated with a general disappointment-aversion, expressed by the shape of
v. The only way to avoid disappointment is to keep expectations realistic which goes
along with a general aversion to any large scale risk. As this is a purely cognitive
deliberation, a subject’s Affective State is cold and a subject treats every Prospective
Outcome as if it was hard-to-evaluate. DT doesn’t account for the weighting of prob-
abilities. Thus, this leads to the fact that Lottery X’s Overall Value V(X) only includes
the Deliberate Value, with a reference point r = x¯ = px1 + (1− p)x2. That is, with
w(p, a) = p, ̺(a) = 0 and δ(x,r) = µ(x|x¯) = x + v(x− x¯) this leads to
(5.7) V(X) = U(X) = pµ(x1|x¯) + (1− p)µ(x2|x¯)
which can be interpreted as the Overall Value in the sense of DT. Figure 5.7 depicts
the computation of V(X) in the sense of DT graphically.
RDP’s utility function is similar to DT’s utility function with respect to its repre-
sentation as a function µ with an intrinsic utility u and a reference-dependent utility
v. The differences to DT and also PT is, that RDP approaches context specific Risk
Attitudes and it approaches a stochastic reference point Y. The transformation of the
OL into the SPL, which is allowed within RDP, is the intrinsic utility u and the ref-
erence dependent utility v. The specific pattern of mixed risk attitudes in the sense
of RDP is correlated with the source of risk and its scale. It is assumed that risk at-
titudes are context specific in situations with modest scale risks, such that they are
determined by v, and not context specific in situations with large scale risk such that
they are determined by u. Considering context specific risk attitudes (u(x) = x), RDP
differs between situations in which risk is surprising or expected, implying more
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FIGURE 5.7: Disappointment Theories as a Special Case in the ADMF
risk aversion for expected risks. The choice between the following lotteries is ap-
proached to highlight the differences in context specific risk attitudes: X : (−55,1)
and Y : (−100,0.5;0,0.5). RDP argues, that in surprise situations, expectations are
fixed before the lottery is evaluated such that paying 55 Euros is evaluated as a loss.
When the subject however knows that he will have to choose between these lotter-
ies, his reference point is the expectation that he will have to pay, such that 55 Euros
are not evaluated as a loss anymore. A subject will be even more risk averse if it is
possible to commit for his decision long ahead before the outcomes are realized. In
situations of large scale risk, u cannot be considered linearly such that the influence of
v is close to be neglected. In the sense of RDP, this means that the SPL differs from the
OL by the influence of the Risk Attitude and by the decision context. However, RDP
also doesn’t allow for any affectivity to be considered such that a subject’s Affective
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State is cold and he treats every Prospective Outcome as if it was hard-to-evaluate.
RDP doesn’t account for the weighting of probabilities. Thus, this leads to the fact
that Lottery X’s overall value V(X) includes the Deliberate Value, with a reference
Lottery Y. That is, with
w(p, a) = p, ̺(a) = 0 and δ(x,r) = µ(x|r) = u(x) + v(u(x)− u(r)) this leads to
(5.8) V(X) = U(X|Y) =
∫ ∫
µ(x|r)dG(r)dH(z)
which can be interpreted as the Overall Value in the sense of RDP.
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FIGURE 5.8: Reference Dependent Preferences as a Special Case in the ADMF
Figure 5.8 depicts the computation of V(X)in the sense of RDP graphically.
RDP approaches the differences of decision context that DT explicitly ignores in or-
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der to highlight the role of disappointment. However, if a subject is generally disap-
pointment averse this implies that he will avoid situations with wide spread risk. This
makes it a very intuitive approach of RDP to differentiate between large scale risk sit-
uations and modest scale risk situations as in large scale risk situations it is almost
not possible to avoid disappointment. Large scale situations are most commonly as-
sociated with affective Prospective Outcomes which are easy-to-evaluate (T1) such
that ̺largescale(a) > ̺modestscale(a). The strong influence of β on the Overall Value im-
plies that a subject evaluates a Prospective Outcome without the need for a reference.
Considering context specific Risk Attitudes reveals differences in risk aversion with
respect to surprise risk and expected risk. The surprise payment of an insurance fee is
evaluated as a real loss (T1). This immediately elicits hope to avoid this loss such that
the subject is in a hot positive Affective State (T2). This leads to risk affinity (ST2),
(ST3). If however, the subject is faced with such a decision and has time to contem-
plate, the situation is per definition less affective such that ̺surprise(a) > ̺expected(a).
The time to deliberate about paying an insurance fee reduces the intensity of hope
such that the uncertainty about the future becomes dominant and induces a nega-
tive Affective State which leads to risk aversion (ST2), (ST3). If the realization of the
lottery is far ahead of the time of choice such as for example in most insurance sit-
uations, uncertainty about the future is even more dominant such that the negative
Affective State leads to more risk aversion. That is, differences in behavior in surprise
risk situations and expected risk situations can be interpreted with the difference of
real losses to relative losses as well as the characteristics of the decision. The surprise
risk situation represents a hot decision, where System 1 is supposed to be dominant
whereas the expected risk situation represents a cold decision, where System 2 is sup-
posed to be dominant.
Table 5.1 summarizes the Subjective Transformations as supposed by each eco-
nomic theory, describing the economic interpretation of these Subjective Transfor-
mations and the affective implications in the sense of the ADMF.
The ADMF expands the economic theories in two points. First, all the discussed
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TABLE 5.1: Affective Interpretation of the Subjective Transformation within Decision Making under Risk
(EUT = Expected Utility Theory, PT = Prospect Theory, RT = Regret Theory, DT = Disappointment Theory, RDP = Reference Dependent Theory)
Theory Subjective
Transfor-
mation
Economic Interpretation Affective Interpretation
EUT u shape of u reflects a sub-
ject’s static risk attitude
neither (T1), (T2), (T3) trigger the affective state: cold. Only sub-
jective transformation:(ST3)
PT v, π slope of v: losses loom
larger than gains; shape of
v: content specific risk at-
titude; shape of π: specific
pattern of prob. weighting
aversive emotions are more intense than positive: (T1); positive
affective state: risk affinity, negative affective state: risk aversion
(ST2), (ST3); hope and fear are triggered when probabilities are
evaluated with respect to the prospective outcomes which leads
to subjective probability weighting (T1), (T2), (ST1)
RT v v reflects a general regret
aversion such that subjects
minimize expected regret
swap the possibility of experiencing regret (pain) against hope
(pleasure): minimizing expected regret goes along with main-
taining the hope for winning-> Lotto: (T1): Jackpot very desir-
able (T2): Hope for winning Affective state hot positive (ST1):
probs are overweighted (ST2), (ST3): risk affinity
DT v) v reflects a general disap-
pointment aversion
The only way to avoid disappointment is to keep expectations
realistic which goes along with a general aversion to any large
scale risk.
RDP u, v u: context insensitive util-
ity v: context sensitive util-
ity large scale risk: risk at-
titude not context specific
modest scale risks: risk at-
titude context specific with
more risk aversion when
risk is expected than sur-
prise risk. When ex-
pected, more risk aversion
with commitment long af-
ter choice than commit-
ment soon after choice
large scale risk goes along with affective prospective outcomes
which are easy-to-evaluate (T1)(̺largescale(a) > ̺modestscale(a));
strong influence of β on the overall value implies that a sub-
ject evaluates a prospective outcome without the need for a ref-
erence. surprise payment of an insurance fee is evaluated as a
real loss (T1). Hope to avoid this loss is the dominant emotion
in this situation (positive affective state) and leads to risk affinity
(ST2), (ST3). Time to deliberate about paying an insurance fee re-
duces affectivity of hope such that uncertainty about the future
induces a negative affective state which leads to risk aversion
(ST2). If realization is far ahead of the time of choice uncertainty
is more dominant such that the negative affective state leads to
more risk aversion. Main difference: surprise risk is a hot deci-
sion, expected risk is a colder decision where paying the fee isn’t
evaluated as a real loss ̺surprise(a) > ̺expected(a).
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theories are based on different assumptions about the underlying SPL, yet neither
theory specifies to any extent how the objective input of a decision is transformed into
something subjectively perceived. EUT neither allows for content nor context but the
expected utility. However, the shape of a subject’s utility function is determined by
the subject’s risk attitude. EUT implies a static risk attitude for every subject, given
by nature. The other theories, which all base their decisions on a reference dependent
evaluation open up for some context sensitivity. PT transforms probabilities into sub-
jective probability weights, yet without any further specification. Further, PT also
implies a subjective utility function, determined by a specific pattern of risk attitude.
RT and DT consider expected emotions to be relevant in the evaluation of a lottery, so
that one could believe that these theories approach some affective component. How-
ever, in order to concentrate on effects due to disappointment or regret, utilities are
modeled linearly such that mixed risk attitudes are only determined by an aversion
towards disappointment/regret, which is implied by the subjective shape of v. That
is, RT and DT also imply a subjective utility function, depending on the decision
context, without further specifying it. RDP goes even one step further and considers
some context sensitivity with respect to a subject’s risk attitude. Yet, RDP also doesn’t
make any implications on the reasons why risk attitude changes in some situations,
besides the induced shift of the reference point. The ADMF approaches these points
by implementing another dimension: affectivity. Thus, the ADMF offers an explana-
tion for some assumptions of economic literature which are not further specified. The
Subjective Transformation explains how the specific shape of u and v is derived and
how a subjective probability weight is added to the probability distribution.
Second, RT, DT and RDP imply similar modified utility functions, which are all
based on the assumption that a subject has an absolute value of a Prospective Out-
come which is somehow modified by its comparison to a reference point: µ = u + v.
For the sake of simplicity, RT and DT usually assume u(x) = x. That is, they do not
analyze the different impact of u and v on µ. They rather highlight the impact of v as
the regret/rejoice function or the disappointment/elation function respectively. RDP
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however approaches the different impact of u and v. Köszegi and Rabin (2007) state:
"[...]we investigate attitudes toward large-scale risk, where consump-
tion utility cannot be assumed to be linear. We show that under reasonable
conditions, the reference point has only a minor impact on how a person
evaluates very large gambles. A person is therefore prone to exhibit risk
aversion reflecting diminishing marginal utility of wealth independently
of the environment."(Köszegi and Rabin (2007), p. 1049)
They approach a subject’s context sensitivity only within different situations of risk:
modest-scale risk and large-scale risk. They show that, as discussed in section 4.3.1,
subjects are only context sensitive when the situations are modest in risk. Whenever
the risk is very large, they find that risk attitudes mostly coincide with classically pre-
dicted risk attitudes. Thus, as discussed above, Risk Attitude is the only subjective
factor to be considered in order to explain different behavior to different context. The
ADMF however approaches this from the perspective of the affectivity of a Prospec-
tive Outcome. As large scale risk situations mostly go along with high Prospective
Outcomes, the ADMF offers an explanation why a subject is more context sensitive
in modest-scale risk situations than in large scale risk situations as modeled within
RDP. The more affective a decision situation, the more impact has β due to its weight-
ing by ̺(a). Further, the differences in risk attitudes considering surprise risk and
expected risk go along with the parallel processing of System 1 and System 2 as mod-
eled within the ADMF. A surprise risk situation as supposed by RDP is characterized
by a hot decision where System 1 is dominant. An expected risk situation is charac-
terized by a cold decision where System 2 is dominant (always keeping in mind that
these systems process parallel).
Thus, the ADMF comprises situations in which a decision is purely cold in its char-
acteristics such that only System 2 is active, as discussed in the sense of EUT. How-
ever, as pointed out above where the economic theories are interpreted in the sense
of the ADMF, most decisions are parallel in their characteristics. Then one system is
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dominant. The dominance strongly depends on the subject’s individual properties
such as experience, cognitive abilities and welfare. There are also examples of situ-
ations in which a decision is based on a purely affective evaluation. Contrary to the
purely cognitive evaluation as depicted in the sense of the economic theories, these
examples comprise a situation in which the subject is highly emotional and aroused
and decides unconsciously according to an affective impulse. Such a situation can
be described as a Fight-or-Flight decision as for example the encounter with a wild
animal. It is not rational to deliberate about how the Prospective Outcomes are dis-
tributed. It is a life-saving human property to intuitively know when to run in the
face of danger. Yet, there might be economic situations in which it is useful for a
subject to take the advantage of this ability. Consider for example a stock exchange
trader or a manager. They sometimes have to decide very fast without the possibility
to think deliberately. It is very useful to rely on the intuition for what is advantageous
or not as processed by System 1.
In this chapter I combined a utility-maximization approach with the intuitive ap-
peal that subjects make some Subjective Transformations of the objectively given facts
with respect to a decision situation. I developed an Affective Framework of Decision
Making under Risk which generates a wide range of explanations for the necessary,
but not further specified, assumptions within each of the economic theories. The
ADMF gives rise to the following questions:
• How can the specific properties of a utility function be derived from the affec-
tivity of a decision situation?
• How can a subject’s context sensitivity, that is the impact of the reference depen-
dent component of utility be derived from the affectivity of a decision situation?
179
Chapter 5 A Framework for Affective Decision Making under Risk (ADMF)
180
Part III
Conclusion

Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Research
The objective of this thesis is to understand how the cognitive-affective interplay in
the sense of the Dual-Processing-Theory influences decision making under risk. Since
the middle of the last century, economists have observed that subjects do not de-
cide as predicted by EUT. Therefore, economic research has focused on some psycho-
logical components as key to understanding decision behavior under risk in greater
depth. However, the idea that there is an affective processing prior to a cognitive
evaluation of a decision, in the sense of the Dual-Processing-Theory, has not been ap-
proached by economics yet. This thesis therefore establishes a solid foundation on
which further economical research on the cognitive-affective interplay can be based.
The central result, the Affective Decision Making Framework, enables economists to
analyze the role of affect in economic decision making under risk and experimental-
ists to discuss affective decision making under risk using a standardized concept. The
application of this standardized concept sheds light on the influence of affect on the
Subjective Transformation of utility functions and probabilities as well as on the Con-
text Sensitivity of a decision situation. It illustrates the importance to include affect
into the question of how utility is derived form a prospective outcome, the proba-
bility distribution and the risk attitude. The affectivity of a prospective outcome re-
flects the impact of the absolute component and the relative component of the utility
function such that the affectivity of a prospective outcome determines the reference
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dependency of a decision. The analysis of the affectivity furthermore determines the
subjective probability weighting and gives rise to the determinants of a subject’s risk
attitude.
Chapter 2 addresses the interdisciplinary approach of this thesis and motivates the
promising role of affect in economic decision making from the perspective of psy-
chology and neuroscience. The main result of Chapter 2 is that Psychology as well as
Neuroscience reveal that decisions are based on two systems, an affective as well as
a cognitive system and that a subject’s affective state serves as a mediator to control
for the activation of affective or cognitive processing. Yet, it concludes that there is
little consensus how the cognitive-affective interplay can be analyzed with respect to
economic decision making under risk. The literature review in Chapter 3 discusses
the most common economic theories of decision making under risk with respect to
the observation that subjects do not decide as predicted by EUT. These theories in-
clude psychological components, such as anticipated regret and expectations into
the subjective utility function. The discussion from Chapter 2 however reveals that
such emotional components as regret, disappointment or other expectations cannot
be equated to the cognitive-affective interplay in the sense of the Dual-Processing
Theory. Instead, Chapter 2 reveals that affective reactions in the sense of the Dual-
Processing Theory elicit immediate emotions. The psychological and neuroscientific
literature review of Chapter 3 discusses how the cognitive-affective interplay with re-
spect to decision making under risk is approached by these disciplines and identifies
the appropriate concepts which are useful for the further analysis of affect in eco-
nomic decision making under risk. The main result of the discussion within Chapter
2 and Chapter 3 is the understanding that affect, being the counterpart of cognition, is
mediated by a subject’s affective state. However, there is no consensus of how its in-
fluence within the economic decision making process can be analyzed in a structured
way. This result motivates the further structure of analysis.
Chapter 4 analyzes the relevant components of decision making under risk from
the perspective of economics, psychology and neuroscience. The objective is to un-
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derstand how prospective outcomes, the probability distribution and the risk attitude
can be evaluated on the basis of the cognitive-affective interplay. The main results
of the discussion within Chapter 4 are first, that there are several characteristics of
prospective outcomes which allow to classify them as easy-to-evaluate or hard-to-
evaluate. This classification implies different context sensitivity within the evalua-
tion. An easy-to-evaluate prospective outcome does not need any context to be eval-
uated whereas a hard-to-evaluate prospective outcome needs a reference. Second,
the subjective probability weighting is strongly influenced by the affectivity of the
decision situation which implies that an affective situation leads to a stronger pro-
nounced inverted s-shaped probability weighting function whereas a non-affective
situation leads to more linear probability weighting. The stronger pronounced over-
weighting and underweighting of probabilities is related to the immediate emotions
hope and fear. The correlation between the affectivity of the decision situation, mostly
elicited by the characteristics of the prospective outcomes, and the subjective proba-
bility weighting refers to the intensity with which hope and fear are perceived. The
desire for a prospective outcome intensifies the hope to receive it, if probabilities are
low (overweighting) or the fear not to win it, if probabilities are high (underweight-
ing). The dislike for a prospective outcome intensifies the fear of losing if probabili-
ties are small (underweighting) and the hope to avoid the loss if probabilities are high
(overweighting). Third, the analysis of risk attitude reveals the content and context
specificity of risk attitude. Subjects either react risk neutral, risk averse or risk seek-
ing to the presence of risk. This manifests in mixed risk attitudes within different
situations. Within EUT, it is assumed that risk attitude is a static individual property,
expressed by the shape of its utility function. A Subject’s behavior, however, shows
that risk attitude is a context and content specific variable. PT, RT and DT allow for
mixed risk attitudes which depend on the decision content. RDP even reveals how
risk attitude is context specific. Psychology and Neuroscience specify the role of affect
influencing a subject’s risk attitude. Psychological research reveals different factors
influencing a subject’s risk attitude. These factors can be classified in three categories:
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relation to the decision task, no relation to the decision task and individual properties,
whereof factors with relation to the decision task can be further categorized as context
specific and content specific. All these factors, to some extent, change a subject’s af-
fective state and thus influence his risk attitude. Neuroscientific research underlines
these psychological results and suggests that there are two different systems in the
brain processing positive and negative affective states. NAcc is responsive to posi-
tive emotions such as pleasure and happiness. There is evidence that subjects decide
more risk seeking if they are happy. aINS is responsive to negative emotions such as
fear and anger. Subjects decide more risk averse if they are scared. Thus, a positive
affective state leads to more risk affinity whereas a negative affective state leads to
more risk aversion.
These results are approached in Chapter 5. The objective of Chapter 5 is to under-
stand how affective decision making under risk can be analyzed in a standardized for-
mal decision making framework which is the central result of this thesis. The ADMF
reflects the human decision making process adequately such that it enables the inter-
pretation and analysis of affective elements of a decision under risk. This framework
should give researchers a deeper understanding of the interactions involved in the
evaluation of a lottery and helps to describe behavior within a decision under risk
in a structured way. The evaluation sequence in the ADMF is characterized by three
steps.
First, the Triggers of the Affective State are identified. Here, immediate integral
emotions are elicited with the representation of the Prospective Outcomes as well as
the Probability Distribution. Further, immediate incidental emotions can change a
subject’s Mood, which also influences the Affective State.
Second, based on the Affective State, the Subjective Transformation of the Objective
Lottery (OL) into the Subjectively Perceived Lottery (SPL) is specified. The Subjective
Transformation of an OL into a SPL can formally be expressed as a function F which
maps an OL and particular Subjective Perception (SP) onto a SPL. SP is a set of af-
fective information which includes the Affectivity a, the properties of the Impulsive
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Value Function β, the properties of the Deliberate Value Function δ, the properties of
the Weighting Function w and the Reference Point r. This affective information can
then be used to compute the Overall Value in the next step.
Third, the Affective State triggers the Processing System which finally computes
the Overall Value of the SPL. The Overall Value is composed of two components: the
Impulsive Value β(x) and the Deliberate Value δ(x,r). The impact of each component
on the Overall Value is determined by ̺(a). The more affective a Prospective Out-
come is, the more impact has the Impulsive Value on the Overall Value. This implies
a subject’s context insensitivity for affective Prospective Outcomes. The less affective
a Prospective Outcome is, the more impact has the Deliberate Value on the Overall
Value. This implies context sensitivity for non-affective Prospective Outcomes. The
sum of the Impulsive Value and the Deliberate Value is weighted with the Weighting
Function w(p, a) which is more pronounced in its inverted s-shape when the Prospec-
tive Outcome is affective and it is close to be linear if the Prospective Outcome is non-
affective. Based on the foundations developed in Chapter 5, the economic theories
of decision making under risk are discussed with respect to the ADMF. The objective
of this discussion is to understand first, how can the specific properties of a utility
function be derived from the affectivity of a decision situation and second, how can a
subject’s context sensitivity, that is the impact of the reference dependent component
of utility, be derived from the affectivity of a decision situation?
This research provides a structured method to identify affective components of de-
cision making and a methodology for conducting lab experiments focusing on affect
and its implications in a systematic way. It contributes to the existing literature in the
following points.
From the economic perspective, the ADMF is mostly related to the model of Ref-
erence Dependent Preferences by Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). Yet, it expands
this model by two major points. First, the ADMF gives rise to the question of why
subjects show different risk attitudes within large scale risk and modest scale risk
situation and second, the ADMF gives rise to the question why subjects show differ-
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ent context sensitivity, expressed by absolute or reference dependent evaluation of a
Prospective Outcome.
While designing an experiment, the ADMF enables researchers to consider all steps
of decision making and their affective incidences. Identifying all triggers of a decision
and the possibility to analyze their implications on behavior makes affective process-
ing within decision making under risk clearer and future discussion more produc-
tive. Thus, this structured approach to identify and discuss the cognitive-affective
interplay within decision making under risk will benefit affective decision making
research in general. The discussion of the economic theories shows how applying the
ADMF can lead to new insights into the cognitive-affective interplay and decision
behavior.
However, it is evident that the ADMF has some limitations which imply interesting
questions for future research.
First, the hypotheses derived from the ADMF within the different steps of decision
making need to be empirically tested, with the methods of experimental economics
as well with psychophysiological methods. So far, the whole discussion is rather
hypothetical, although with solid foundations from psychology and neuroscience.
Second, the ADMF might be presented and discussed as a fully formalized model.
Especially, the Impulsive Value Function and the Deliberate Value Function lack fur-
ther specification with respect to their differentiability, shape and slope. This thesis
presents a first idea of how affect could be modeled within a utility maximizing the-
ory, yet further formalization would go far behind the scope of this thesis.
Third, the discussion within this thesis is restricted to one-shot decisions, as most
of the considered models only consider one-shot decisions. However, this framework
may be extended such that sequential choice, intertemporal choice, social choice and
strategic choice can also be analyzed by means of the ADMF.
In summary, this thesis contributes an important method for identifying and inter-
preting the cognitive-affective interplay in the decision making process and its role in
decision behavior. It provides a substantial basis for future research of the cognitive-
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affective interplay within decision making.
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